This brief rejoinder targets an article published on the title “Ethiopia’s Language
Crisis Is Not About Identity. It Is About a Bad Theory of Language”, on December 28, 2025 by Tesfatsion Domenico on Capital. This review focuses mainly on the sociolinguistic aspects of the paper based on my own academic background.
A brief summary of the author’s article
The author rightly begins by stating that the problem of language crisis in Ethiopia does not emerge from linguistic identity and multilingualism. He argues that a flawed theory of language management that considers languages as fixed territorial entities rather than a flexible social structure is the cause of the linguistic crises. The state’s policy enforces territorialized region-bound language policies that halted linguistic mobility and created linguistic elitism and deepened socioeconomic inequalities is central to his arguments. He also relates the problem within the global linguistic context where unequal access to languages like English further entrenches exclusion. The author openly argued linguistic purism doesn’t represent Ethiopia’s sociolinguistic reality. His work generally calls for a shift from language-as-identity approach to language-as-infrastructure, a repertoire-based approach, and the use of Amharic as a shared public utility, normalizing code-switching in institutions, and aligning policy with how people actually live and communicate.
Even though I share some important points with this author, I strongly believe that the author has dislocated the very important locus of the argument from the centre to the margin. The sociolinguistic margin cannot provide any solution for the language policy crisis at the sociolinguistics centre. In this regard, the author seems to be looking for a right solution in a wrong spot. My reflection on his article is based on my own arrangement of specific points from the viewpoint of socio linguistics.
Which language policy?
The author commences discussion with a fascinating story of a trader from Walaita Sodo, a job seeker in Adama and a driver in Mojo. The story highlights how the sociolinguistic dynamics of context-bound switching between different languages is a real currency to make a living in multilingual Ethiopia. Ethiopia’s language policy, he claims, overlooks this reality.
It is not clear which language policy he is referring to in this context. Ethiopia had a number of language policy regimes, the pre-1991 assimilationist vs. the post 1991 pluralist (relative); the pre-occupation de facto or the post-occupation de jury, or the post-EPRDF multilingual federal working language. All these language policies have their own peculiar sociolinguistic features and ideological orientations.
Indeed, there are some scholars who argue that Ethiopia never had a language policy. That is not true seen in light of the literature of language policy in sociolinguistics. Some even state that the new post-EPRDF Ethiopian language policy is the first language policy in the country. Language policy can be overt or covert, written or unwritten, de facto or de jury, etc. Those countries believed to have no overt language policies do really have language policies. The USA, for instance, did not state its language policy in any legal document, including its constitution, yet its language policy is known as “the no language policy policy”.
The post-EPRDF language policy, the newly designed language policy, not yet put to practice though, designates five federal working languages: Afaan Oromoo, Amharic, Tigrinya, Somali and Afar. This language policy clearly and openly recognises the linguistic diversity in Ethiopia, and it overtly aims to secure national integration through multiple national link languages within the federal domains.
In fact, the imperial language policies of Ethiopia are the ones that undermine and disregard the multilingual scenery of Ethiopia. If the author is referring to imperial language policy regimes, his claims are appropriate.
The obsession with linguistic purism, Africa
The question on why African states are obsessed with linguistic purity is fair enough to ask. African leaders must believe in and accept the true heteroglossic reality of the continent and the people. This also holds true for Ethiopia. The history of language policy of Ethiopia clearly shows that we have come a long way, and in 1991, thanks to the struggle made by the people, the country effectively transitioned from linguistic nationalism and linguistic pluralism. A huge number of Ethiopian languages began to enjoy linguistic autonomy, and multilingualism was liberated, and the country has embarked on a process of nation-building on the basis of linguistic pluralism.
Indeed, there were challenges, yet the collective picture shows a huge sociolinguistic progress compared to the past. The only domain that remained monolingual despite the heteroglossic truth on the ground is the federal administrative domain that is still run by a single federal working language. The federal domain is the real example of linguistic purism at work in Ethiopia.
Poor language management, not multilingualism, as cause of linguistic crisis
The author is perfectly right, multilingualism is not a problem, but our mistaken belief of it is. For instance, the country’s pre-1991 obsession with linguistic nationalism has been the major source of political crises. Linguistic nationalism has been nowhere closer to the sociolinguistic situation in Ethiopia. The attempt of putting it to practice during pre-1991 Ethiopia was a total disaster.
True, we need to fix our ill-perceived views of linguistic diversity. There are a number of scholars in Ethiopia that believe linguistic diversity is a curse, a source of poverty and a cause of disunity. Socionlinguists clearly argue that no empirical evidence has so far proven this claim. On the contrary, research showed that linguistic diversity has a number of incredible benefits.
The views of linguistic diversity in Ethiopia over the last three decades
The author argued that languages have been viewed as fixed entities over the last three decades.The truth is that the last three decades is a time where Ethiopia’s true nature of linguistic diversity is recognized. Speakers of different Ethiopian languages enjoyed the use of their own language in politics, administration, media, and education.
Children have gotten an incredible chance of exploring the world with their own mother-tongue within the primary educational domains. This is a scientifically justified move, and it is not just politics. The pre-1991 fixed and monolithic view of Ethiopia’s linguistic diversity was made to come to terms with its own true reality. This is a period where ascribed identity is replaced by a claimed identity.
The mythology of one language and one nation
The author seems to argue that the EPRDF constitution put in place one language-one-region policy.
The Ethiopian constitution clearly states that regions choose their own working languages, and Amharic is used as a federal working language. It only gave regions to choose, and it did not impose. Yet, the problem with the constitution is that it clearly imposed a single language as a sole federal working language in a multilingual country. That cannot be inclusive, pluralistic and democratic when it comes to the federal domain. Yes, Ethiopia is multilingual, and that is why it needs to have a multilingual federal language policy model.
The territoriality of linguistic rights
The author argues that the Territorially based language right in post-1991 Ethiopia has turned regions to linguistic islands. It is true that the current Ethiopian language policy recognises collective language rights. It also acknowledges individual language rights though the translation on the ground is very poor.
There is no problem with territorial language policy, yet what is important is to devise a mechanism of horizontal link among the different language policy regions. The most dangerous linguistic island within the Ethiopian state is the federal domain, particularly the capital city, that keeps alienating non-Amharic speakers from public affairs.
When setting, not choice, shapes multilingualism
The author suggests that a graduate from Gambella needs Amharic to succeed in the federal domain. This might be true for the stated speaker, as their regional working language is already the same, but it may not work universally for all linguistic groups in Ethiopia. Here, the author generally intends to defend the most exclusive monolingual island, the federal domain, and continuously draws his examples from linguistic margin.
Speakers do not need anyone’s permission to use their own languages locally, yet the problem is language use in the public sphere which is under the monopoly of a single working language, in federal domains for instance.
Let us take a young Oromo, graduate of Wallaggaa University, who does not speak
Amharic, how can he/she compete for jobs in a monolingual linguistic island of Addis Ababa city, the federal domain, that has already shut down its doors to the multilingual reality of Ethiopia.
Societal communicative flexibility
The state has to fix its language policy to create a communicative platform for citizens. It is not appropriate for speakers of very important major languages like Afaan Oromoo to learn Amharic when it is easy to designate Afaan Oromoo as the federal working language of Ethiopia. This guarantees national integration, and expands the communicative circle for Afaan Oromoo speakers and broadens employment opportunities for a number of young people in Ethiopia.
Monolingualism and the elite circle
The author believes that the current Ethiopian language policy empowers the elite circle. That may be true, yet still the way out of this elite closure is to increase the number of federal working languages. The question is in fact who the elites are.
Why should there be only one federal working language? Why is the author obsessed with that? Why should children transition to a federal working language? Who should transition? And who shouldn’t? The author never makes these points clear.
The author contradicts himself here. Does this really work for mega languages? It is this ‘transition’ view that is really creating hierarchy. I think the author better argues for functional complementarity instead.
De-sentimentalization and linguistic hierarchy
It is true that linguistic hierarchy is a global phenomenon, and languages like English and French, foreign languages to us, and they are also operating systems of global trade, diplomacy, science and digital life. That is true,yet the author’s attempt of locating these languages outside their speech communities is a misplacement.
There are linguistic communities that own these languages, take pride in them, and cherish them as their symbols of national identity and pride. It is true that mastering these languages is a socioeconomic, political and technological empowerment, regardless of what ethno-linguistic background the speaker possesses.
The misrepresentation here, however, is the de-sentimentalization and exclusive instrumentalization of languages as if they are neutral vehicles of communication. Seen from the viewpoint of critical sociolinguistics, such a strategy of de-sentimentalization of a language could be an expression of implied sociolinguistic ideology.
Multilingualism is not a threat
Countries like Switzerland, Canada and South Africa do really understand the role of linguistic diversity in the process of nation building. If we take South Africa, for instance, the implementation of multilingual language policy,11 official languages covering about 98% of the entire population, marks the country’s aspiration of creating inclusive, pragmatic, pluralist and democratic sociolinguistic communicative infrastructure empowering citizens to navigate socioeconomic and political space.
The post-1991 sociolinguistic transformation in Ethiopia has obviously created a wider sociolinguistic space for non-Amharic speakers. Compared to the pre-1991, imperial and socialist language policies, that overtly employed linguistic nationalism, the post-1991 Ethiopian language policy, in general, employed linguistic pluralism, except the sociolinguistics situation of the federal domain that maintained the old fashioned linguistic singularism.
It would have been far more convincing had the author discussed how the federal linguistic singularism has left a significant number of Ethiopians outside socioeconomic and political realms of their own country.
English and structural exclusion in Ethiopia
The situation of English within the Ethiopian sociolinguistic landscape needs a very careful consideration as opposed to the situation of anglophone African nations where English, the ex-colonial language, has a stronghold because of the colonial past. English, a language that assumes the highest position in Ethiopia as a medium of instruction in secondary schools and all the way to university levels, is really endangered within the Ethiopian educational system.
Students of higher education institutions in Ethiopia, the professors themselves, even a large number of professors directly trained in teaching English, could hardly communicate in English language. A number of studies have confirmed that the quality of English is already poor in Ethiopia, and the de facto medium of instruction in many Ethiopian Higher Education Institutions is already Amharic.
Amharic-English codeswitching is very rampant in Ethiopian universities. The tragedy is that the Amharic-English code-switching in Ethiopian university classrooms, where a large number of students come from different linguistic backgrounds, has brought about academic disadvantage to a great many students who could not speak Amharic.
This is an real manifestation of linguistic human rights violation and academic discrimination within the Ethiopian higher education system. Any scholar who cares about linguistic diversity and the dynamism of linguistic and cultural identity should feel the pain these young people go through due to such a discriminating linguistic and academic environment. I think, that is what structural exclusion means for millions of non-Amharic speakers in Ethiopia
Amharic-English global parallelism, trade and technology
The author explains the parallel emergence of Chinese Mandarin and English in building communicative infrastructure for trade and technological networks, and he appreciates this phenomenon as a pragmatic approach suggesting that the situation in Ethiopia is not pragmatic and endorses linguistic purity. He argues that Ethiopia risks reproducing internal linguistic rigidity.
This argument, revealing his implied position on the role of Amharic, is built upon fallacious assumptions of the sociolinguistic situation of Ethiopia. Ethiopia is a multilingual country with very important and competing mega languages like Afaan Oromo, in addition to Amharic. The building of communicative infrastructure for trade and technology networks without regard to such sociolinguistic reality is counterproductive.
Linguistic purism, the pure speaker
Identity can be either ascribed or claimed. In sociolinguistics, it is believed among scholars that the claimed identity is by far more authentic than ascribed identity. If people say who they are, and tell what language they speak, then who are we to say they’re not what they say they are.
We describe identities, we don’t prescribe them. The role of a sociolinguist is not about worrying whether a certain ethnolinguistic groups and their language can be counted neatly or not, but it’s about finding a communicative infrastructure that build inter-linguistic communication beyond ethnolinguistic fault-lines among different language speakers.
There is no such thing as “a pure” speaker of any language. A pure speaker of a language must be a speaker of a poor language. Yes, a Wolaita native speaker might speak Wolayttatto at home, Amharic in the neighborhood, and English online. That is really interesting.
Yet, let me give my side of the story. I was born and grew up in Nekemte town during the socialist regime. I was educated in grade 1 and grade 2 in Amharic as a medium of instruction, and in grade three, I began to learn in Afaan Oromoo as a medium of instruction, following the sociolinguistic change of 1991. This, coupled with my many years of experience of teaching at Bahir Dar University, gave me a wonderful opportunity to develop a native like control of Amharic, my second language.
A huge number of young people of the post-1991 generation in the town I grew up in, Nekemte, do not speak Amharic as fluently as I do. I hope the author wouldn’t dare to say “They must have spoken Amharic.” These young people communicate in Afaan Oromoo at home and in the neighborhood, and they use English online. How could they communicate in the federal domain if they cannot speak Amharic?
You know, Amharic speakers are relatively monolingual compared to speakers of other Ethiopian languages. How could they communicate with non-Amharic speakers?
Should non-Amharic speakers be compelled to master the glorious language of the
Empire? The point is that the author’s implication that everyone in Ethiopia speaks Amharic is far from the truth.
A striking number of Ethiopians are still mixing languages, and code-switching is a very common phenomenon, exactly the same way multilingualism is already a norm in the country. I think no one is imposing any category on the people, yet their claimed identities are far more recognized in the post-1991 as opposed to pre-1991, the period of ascribed identity.
Linguistic diversity is not a political construct of the last three decades. It had always been there in Ethiopia. The author does not seem to be interested in looking into the true multilingual scenery of Ethiopia with competing mega languages like Afaan Oromo which could contribute quite significantly to the process of pragmatic, pluralistic, inclusive and democratic nation building in multilingual Ethiopia.
Towards a conceptual shift, away from symbolic debate
The author lacks consistency in argument; at times, he de-sentimentalize languages and argues from the instrumentalist view point. At other times, he brings in the view that language is not just a matter of mere communication. He swims between the two points of views as it suits him.
Yes, language is a social action. It’s a power. It’s about mobility. That is true. He associates the existence of language with institutions.Yes, languages could be institutional.Yet he never delves into the role that institutions could play in constraining speakers within multilingual settings.
Institutional ideologies could really strangle people speaking different languages not to participate in socioeconomic and political affairs of their country. In Ethiopia, a great number of institutions, particularly in federal domains, systematically constrain some languages while empowering others. That can be considered as one of the most serious challenges that affects horizontal communicative infrastructure among the diverse ethnolinguistic groups in the country.
The author seems to be uninterested in raising the current and visible language use problem observed in the federal domain due to exclusive and rigid monolingualism in federal settings in Ethiopia.
It is true that languages could be learned formally and informally. It is important to understand that not only attitude towards languages but also the existing socioeconomic and political structure affects who learns what language and why. The author overlooks such very important issues of institutional power asymmetry and how they affect language use on the ground, particularly in the federal domains, including the capital city.
Language policy as a transport policy
Language policy should put access to linguistic resources, mobility and participation of citizens into consideration. No argument on this. The question, however, is whether it is possible to divorce language and identity. Identity is multiple, dynamic and relational. There is also this thing called salience in identity. The salient identity of a certain ethnolinguistic group is what the members believe is the core representation of who they are.
In the African context, for some groups, religion might be a salient identity, for other groups, language could be a salient identity, and so forth. Here I’m talking about a claimed identity, not the ascribed one. If a given ethnolinguistic group claims a certain salient identity, for example language, who am I to tell them that they’re wrong. As scholars, we could describe, interpret and explain, we don’t prescribe.
Linguistic practice, not administration
I think what is far more important is being able to facilitate inter-linguistic horizontal communicative infrastructure among different language speakers in Ethiopia. Achieving such a noble goal is very difficult in a country where the federal domain is solely controlled by a single working language.
A genuine quest for inclusive national integration and expanded sociolinguistic circle of public engagement for citizens begins with challenging the federal linguistic melting pot that does not give space for the dynamic multiple linguistic identity.
Building bridges, not defending boundaries
The author repeatedly raises the challenge of linguistic mobility across multilingual Ethiopia. It is true that language policy is mainly territorial based in Ethiopia, but linguistic boundaries are not rigid as he claims them to be. Language contact zones in
Ethiopia have always been multilingual at individual level, not just at societal level. It is naturally impossible to defend linguistic boundaries in multilingual countries like Ethiopia since they are mostly harmonious and speakers easily navigate them.
Take the Oromia National Regional State, for example. The region is operating in three languages: Afaan Oromo, Amharic and English, even violating the regional constitution that designates Afaan Oromoo as the sole regional working language. It is apparently clear that linguistic mobility is never hindered in this region.
Contrarily, monolingual Afaan Oromoo speakers of the region, including those living in and around the capital, Addis Ababa, are experiencing linguistic exclusion, and suffering communicative barrier, within the city’s public domains, for not being able to speak the sole federal working language of the city, Amharic. There is a clear vertical and horizontal communication challenge for non-Amharic speakers in the capital. This is the real meaning of the linguistic mobility problem in the Ethiopian sociolinguistic context.
Languages as economic infrastructure
Teaching of Afaan Oromo in Addis Ababa city as a subject might enrich Amharic speakers’ linguistic capital to navigate the larger economic geography of the country. It’s equally important to create a wider economic geography for non-Amharic speakers in Addis Ababa city. The benefit has to be mutual and bidirectional. The best recipe for this to come true is the promotion of Afaan Oromo to the status of the federal working language of Ethiopia though the author utters no word about this very important language policy issue.
De-ethnicizing Amharic
The author ignores how the historical power relationship between ethno-linguistic groups and their languages could display in the present sociolinguistic relations among different language speakers in a multilingual Ethiopia. I am a believer that the present is shaped by the past and the future will be the making of the present. The author misses this core truth in his analysis of Ethiopian language policy.
The idea that Amharic is a common operating system of the Ethiopian market is misleading, and it overlooks the real sociolinguistic context of the country. The status of Amharic as the national language of Ethiopia has already been reduced to the status of a federal working language in post-1991 Ethiopia. Therefore, the representation of the language as the sole national lingua franca of the country needs empirical justification.
Also, the degree of Afaan Oromoo-Amharic bilingualism among the post-1991 generation, in Oromia, is not as significant as it was for the pre-1991 generation. Amharic has already shrunk in its occupation of geopolitical space in the Oromia National Regional State following the change of its status in 1991. Therefore, the author’s view is far from the truth in this regard.
Amharic cannot be the sole national link language in the current sociolinguistic situation in Ethiopia, and it is hardly possible to impose it as such under the pretext of reversing economic self-execution. The author would have come up with a very interesting sociolinguistic solution where mega Ethiopian languages like Afaan Oromoo, Amharic and others could be used as a national link languages in building a platform for inclusive, pragmatic, pluralistic and democratic nation building, the way South Africans did.
The argument for the maintenance of the Amharic as a sole national link language in Ethiopia sounds like putting an old wine in a new jar, knowing that the jar could not sustain it.
Normalizing code-switching
The author has mixed up the idea of code-switching and polyglossia. Bilinguals could code-switch or code-mix between matrix and embedded languages, and that’s normal and natural. This is different from the situation where heteroglossic individuals use different languages depending on the linguistic contexts they are in. This is also normal in multilingual countries.
I believe the kinds of problems the author raises with regard to linguistic mobility can be resolved by designating multiple official languages at federal level in Ethiopia, instead of arguing for the imposition of a singular lingua franca across the board in the country. This can be designed using the three-plus-or-minus language policy model at a national level, putting regional, sub-regional, national/federal communicative infrastructure into consideration. This way it is possible to create a unified multiple national identity in Ethiopia in the long run.
Fluid people, rigid map
The map might be rigid, but ethnolinguistic boundaries have always been porous, and linguistic border areas have always been multilingual, both at individual and societal levels. The transition between linguistic boundaries have always been smooth and harmonious in Ethiopia. The post-1991 Ethiopian language policy has already crossed the boundary of the 19th century argument of linguistic nationalism.
We already have a multilingual language policy with some challenges within the federal domain-the federal domain being monolingual. Adopting multiple federal link languages in Ethiopia, in addition to the already existing one, Amharic, could create a dynamic and inclusive sociolinguistic platform where non-Amharic speaking citizens could also participate and contribute to socioeconomic and political development of their country.
That is the modern pluralistic view of language policy.
Languages as repertoire, not as flags
Languages are both flags and repertoire. They are the markers of their speakers’ linguistic identity, If the speakers say so. And they are also a very important capital of making a living in a multilingual setting. In sociolinguistics, languages are both the markers of identity, and the means of communication.
Every language policy decision and language planning action needs to put the sentimental and instrumental dimensions of languages into consideration. And this is far more important in multilingual countries like Ethiopia where the question of languages is a very serious issue, since sociolinguistic reductionism is not affordable in such a sociolinguistic setting.
Language as economy, mobility and power
The fact that language marks identity is as important as its role in economic mobility. In Ethiopia, especially, the question of linguistic identity has long been at the core of political mobilization for a number of ethnolinguistic groups. The various ethnolinguistic groups are very much aware of how language plays the role of empowering or excluding, and oppressing or liberating. They are very much aware of the real costs of not being able to effectively communicate in a multilingual public sphere. That is why every dialogue surrounding the issue of language policy in Ethiopia must be able to target a democratic, inclusive, pragmatic and pluralistic integration.
Policymakers need to understand languages as markers of identity and as tools of communication. Such understanding could lead to sound language policy decisions in multilingual countries like Ethiopia where the issue of language is very political. The federal domain in Ethiopia seems to be the last stronghold of the country’s failed project of linguistic nationalism. Ethiopia needs to transform the socio linguistic setting of the federal domain and create an inclusive sociolinguistic context where citizens, particularly speakers of mega Ethiopian languages, could participate in economic, social and political affairs of the country through communicative infrastructure that facilitates both vertical and horizontal integration. This can strengthen the creation of a unified multiple national identities in the future.
