Sunday, April 19, 2026

Mismatch in political grafting

By Gizachew Wolde

Ethiopia’s political history can be understood through the lens of political grafting, where successive regimes have sought to overlay new governing frameworks onto the country’s entrenched social, territorial, and cultural structures. Similar to the biological process of grafting, the success of political grafting relies on seamless integration between social roots, cultural elements, and the economic foundations that connect the existing system to the new political structure, ensuring mutual survival.

Ethiopia’s state-building has included three major “grafts”: the Imperial system’s Solomonic dynasty supported by the church; the Derg’s revolutionary Marxist rupture, which emerged from popular uprisings and military discipline; and the EPRDF’s ethnic federalism, which enshrined the right to self-determination, including secession, in the 1995 Constitution.

These three sequences of political grafting represent different governing logics imposed on Ethiopia’s deeply rooted social and territorial structures, each attempting to manage the country’s vast diversity and navigate state-building in its own way.

However, the success of effective political grafting hinges on maintaining the healthy functioning of the connections between these independent systems. This integration must facilitate the smooth flow of essential elements—akin to nutrients and water—between the different political structures.

Therefore, successful political grafting relies on establishing a seamless interconnection that restores continuity between the foundational roots providing stability and the new elements integrated into society. Just as calluses form a protective barrier against irritation, political systems must develop resilience against external pressures that may cause discomfort or unrest within society.

There are times, however, when the upper and root systems of political grafting do not align or exhibit significant differences, leading to a failure in bridging the two systems effectively. This misalignment prevents the flow of essential elements between them and is a common cause of political graft failure.

Applying the biological concept of vascular mismatch—where two living systems fail to form a functional union due to incompatible structures—serves as a practical metaphor for Ethiopia’s turbulent political transitions.

From the monarchical parliamentary system of the Imperial regime (pre-1974) with its centralized, hierarchical, and largely non-ethnic basis, to the revolutionary student movement that was later co-opted by the dictatorial Derg, and finally to the EPRDF’s ethnic federalism introduced in 1991—all represent attempts at different forms of political grafting in Ethiopia.

The Imperial system sought legitimacy through its connection to the church and territory. The dynasty claimed direct descent from Menelik I, the son of King Solomon of Israel and the Queen of Sheba (Makeda). This narrative, preserved in the Kebre Negest (Glory of the Kings), served as the foundational charter of the empire.

A belief emerged within society that the Ethiopian Orthodox Church openly supported the emperor, viewing him as a descendant of Solomon. His rule was regarded not only as political but also sacred, as he was seen as God’s anointed representative on Ethiopian soil. Ethiopia was viewed as the new Zion, housing the Ark of the Covenant, which was allegedly brought to Aksum. The emperor was seen as the guardian of this covenant, and thus, the dynasty’s legitimacy was assumed to be transcendent, not reliant on performance, elections, or ethnic support.

On the other hand, the Derg (1974–1987) served as the transitional phase—the “callus” that formed after the Imperial rootstock was cut and before the EPRDF scion was fully integrated. The sources of its legitimacy were fundamentally different from both its predecessor and successor.

The Derg, formally known as the Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, Police, and Territorial Army, lacked a dynastic, ethnic-federal, or electoral mandate. Instead, it derived its legitimacy from four main aspects. First, it claimed authority through Revolutionary Rupture and Popular Uprising, seizing power after months of mass protests, strikes, and rebellions against Emperor Haile Selassie, fuelled by widespread discontent over famine, corruption, and feudal stagnation.

Second, the Derg sought legitimacy by formally adopting Marxism-Leninism, co-opting the revolutionary intent of the civil intellectual community by nationalizing land, banks, private property, and industry. The third source of legitimacy stemmed from its chain of command, which was based not on popular vote or ethnic representation but on military hierarchy. Finally, the Derg’s legitimacy was reinforced by established military obedience to the council, framed as revolutionary discipline. The Derg was unwilling to relinquish its power to a civilian state and instead established the 1987 People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) constitution, creating a civilian façade while maintaining a one-party state under the Workers’ Party of Ethiopia, where real power remained with the Derg’s inner military circle, which adopted the title of “comrade” (guad).

In contrast, the EPRDF system derived its legitimacy from ethnic self-determination. When the EPRDF “grafted” its ethnic-based system onto the existing Ethiopian state, it encountered several critical misalignments due to its unorthodox approach. This new framework failed to account for the intermarried social integrity that had previously existed within society.

The core tension in the legitimacy of a system built on ethnic self-determination arose from its imposition on a state whose earlier historical legitimacies—the Solomon monarchy and the Derg’s top-down Marxism—were fundamentally territorial, unitary, and centralist, and had not been particularly successful. The new graft rejected the host’s immune system, leading to chronic structural dismissal.

The EPRDF’s constitution (1995) enshrined the unconditional right to secession for every “nation, nationality, and people,” framing ethnic self-determination as the endpoint of legitimacy. This approach has been criticized for creating a sovereignty paradox, generating tension between the right to self-determination and the integrity of the state. Many view Article 35 of the constitution as inconsistent and a point of contention.

This situation is considered a core constitutional and conceptual paradox within the Ethiopian federal order established by the 1995 Constitution adopted under the EPRDF. Many believe that ethnic self-determination invites unnecessary conflict among groups that previously coexisted peacefully. The imposition of this concept is seen as benefiting hardliners who seek to exploit divisions. This perception is widespread, with many viewing it as a threat to sovereignty and territorial integrity. The inclusion of Article 35 in the constitution is regarded as a serious flaw that risks damaging the nation’s integrity, triggering conflicts in various regions to this day.

The current government of Ethiopia, led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, has proposed new reforms since 2018 that can be viewed as a sought-after “fourth graft.” These reforms emphasize Medemer (synergy), economic liberalization, and pan-Ethiopian unity aimed at healing the wounds of the EPRDF era. However, Article 39 remains unchanged, contributing to the ongoing fallout from the Tigray War, unrest in Oromia, and grievances from Amhara rebels.

True integration requires significant constitutional changes: realigning ethnic rights with territorial integrity, promoting economic growth through renewable energy and diversification, and fostering genuine unity, or Medemer, that builds resilient social bonds. The Medemer concept aims to heal divisions and implement meaningful reforms, but it requires constitutional support to eliminate risk factors embedded in the existing document. Without this support, Ethiopia risks rejecting the graft amid global geopolitical pressures in the Horn of Africa.

I hope that the new Medemer framework and constructive dialogue can leverage inclusive nationalism and viable constitutional reform to support unity and synergy.

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