Tuesday, September 29, 2026
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Ethiopia opens freight forwarding sector to foreign investors

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The government’s latest move to liberalize the freight forwarding sector has drawn mixed reactions from industry experts. While some players fear that a handful of investors may take over the business,others believe the decision creates opportunities for the sector and brings several economic advantages, including a smoother market system and help in tackling inflation.

The Ethiopian government has moved to fully liberalize the country’s freight forwarding sector, allowing foreign investors to operate without local partnership requirements for the first time. The decision, approved by the Ethiopian Investment Board chaired by Ambassador Girma Biru, economic advisor to the Prime Minister, takes immediate effect.

The move overturns Investment Regulation No. 474/2020, issued six years ago, which restricted foreign participation to joint ventures with domestic investors and capped foreign shareholding at 49 percent. According to a statement from the Ethiopian Investment Commission (EIC), the previous framework failed to attract the desired level of new investment, and the Board’s new decision is expected to address those shortcomings.However, logistics experts remain sharply divided over the timing and potential impact of the liberalization.

Some industry insiders argue that Ethiopia’s logistics market is too small and underdeveloped to attract significant interest from major international players.
One veteran expert, speaking on condition of anonymity, suggested the government may have acted partly to regularize existing practices.

“Some local freight forwarders have already sold all or a majority stake of their companies to international operators informally, against the 2020 regulation,” he said. “I think the government pushed this decision to ease that situation.”

He also echoed concerns that foreign interest will be limited given the modest scale of Ethiopia’s logistics market.“Very few big players can be accommodated. I suspect companies will enter mainly by acquiring major shares in existing local firms,” he added.

For small freight forwarders, the decision could spell trouble, while those that have already structured back-to-back deals, such as 90–10 percent arrangements with foreign partners, stand to benefit.
Dawit Woubeshet, CEO of Cosmos and president of the Ethiopian Freight Forwarders and Shipping Agents Association, also believes international interest will be constrained.

“The market can only accommodate a limited number of large operators,” he said.
One expert drew parallels with Ethiopia’s recent telecom and financial sector liberalizations, noting that Safaricom Ethiopia’s entry did not unfold entirely as expected, while foreign financial firms have shown only muted interest in taking stakes in local banks.

“The logistics sector will likely follow a similar pattern,” the expert predicted.
But Worku Lemma, Director of the National Logistics Transformation Office (LTO) and a key architect of the reform, rejects that comparison.

“The telecom case involved a new operator competing with a dominant incumbent and needing to use existing infrastructure — a far more complex situation. The financial sector has just opened, and foreign firms are already exploring entry, but that takes time because of the detailed reworking required,” he told Capital.Worku, who prepared the Board document, is optimistic that foreign logistics firms will enter and intensify competition.“The sector needs knowledge, cross-border expertise, technology and resources. We believe this decision will help reduce logistics costs, cut delays and improve predictability and market trust,” he said.

He noted that weaknesses in the logistics system have contributed to inefficiency, domestic inflation and a lack of price competitiveness for Ethiopian exports.
“Higher costs are a sign of limited competition,” he added.
Maritime lawyer and logistics expert Yared Shiferaw called the decision timely.

Our Voice, Our Future: Why the integrity of our election rest with us

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Over the past few years, the people of Ethiopia have walked through challenging times, carrying a shared longing for peace, stability, and dignity. Today, as we stand on the threshold of the national election, the power to shape the next chapter of our history returns entirely to where it belongs: into the hands of the ordinary citizen.

With more than 50 million citizens registered to vote, this election is not just a routine political exercise. It is a profound declaration of our collective resilience. It is an opportunity to prove that the future of this great nation will be written by the ink on our thumbs, not by the alignment of external interests or the clamor of divisive rhetoric.

To ensure that our collective voice truly matters, we must protect the integrity of this election from two major disruptions:

First, we must reject the noise of internal division. In the heat of campaigns, it is easy for radical narratives to use fear or ethnic grievances to pull us apart. But true strength lies in our ability to engage in peaceful dialogue. A fair election requires us to look beyond immediate friction and focus on the common ground we all share—the desire for a prosperous, safe, and unified Ethiopia. When you step into the polling station, remember that you are voting for a future where your children can thrive in peace.

Second, we must guard our sovereignty against external agendas. While the world watches Ethiopia, we must remain clear-headed. Outside commentary, foreign media narratives, and geopolitical pressures often view our complex realities through a narrow lens. They do not live our daily struggles, and they will not bear the consequences of our choices. The integrity of our vote means that our political path must be defined domestically, driven by the real needs of our local communities, and managed by our own institutions.

A truly fair and just election does not just depend on the rules written on paper or the technology at the polling stations; it relies on the conscience and responsibility of every voter.

Let us stand patient in the queues, respect our neighbors’ differing opinions, and reject any form of provocation or intimidation. By casting our ballots peacefully and demanding transparency at every step, we send a powerful message to the world: Ethiopia’s destiny belongs solely to Ethiopians.

Ethiopia’s Eurobond debt restructuring talks collapse due to disagreement; Bondholders reject revised proposal

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The Ministry of Finance (MoF) has released a major statement regarding its ongoing efforts to restructure the $1 billion bond (carrying a 6.625% interest rate) that matured in 2024. According to the official statement issued on May 27, 2026, the restricted dialogue session held from May 6 to May 27, 2026, with the primary bondholders’ group known as the “Ad Hoc Committee,” ended without any agreement, officially concluding the designated negotiation period.

A major focus of the discussions was to ensure that any potential agreement would meet the strict Comparability of Treatment (CoT) principle established by the co-chairs of the Official Creditor Committee (OCC).

MoF recalled that, according to the agreement in principle initially reached on January 12, 2024, the debt restructuring included the use of a Value Recovery Instrument (VRI). This VRI mechanism was designed to allow additional payments to creditors based on Ethiopia’s future macroeconomic performance.

However, the OCC indicated that the country’s broader macroeconomic conditions were not conducive to such a complex mechanism and pointed out that the structure failed to comply with the CoT principle.

Following this development, Ethiopia prepared an alternative “revised proposal” that completely eliminated the VRI mechanism. This new alternative was reviewed by the OCC co-chairs and was successfully verified to meet the CoT principle.

As detailed in the document, the commercial terms approved by the OCC co-chairs and offered for the issuance of the new bond involved issuing $880 million in new bonds, which represents a 12% haircut on the original $1 billion principal debt. The maturity date was set for July 15, 2029, with an annual interest rate of 4.25%, payable semi-annually every January 15 and July 15 until the debt is fully settled.

The debt amortization schedule was arranged for the principal to be paid in four consecutive installments: $180 million on July 15, 2026; $180 million on July 15, 2027; $260 million on July 15, 2028; and $260 million on July 15, 2029.

Additionally, along with offering a consent fee of 0.5% of the original 2024 bond value, the proposal included a provision to fully clear Past Due Interest (PDI) totaling $99.375 million at the time of settlement, which accumulated from three missed coupon payments between December 2023 and December 2024.

When this revised proposal was presented to the private bondholders’ “Ad Hoc Committee” within the designated negotiation timeframe, the committee rejected the terms. Consequently, the negotiation period concluded without reaching an agreement between the government and private creditors.

While the Ministry of Finance expressed its disappointment with the committee’s decision, it reaffirmed that Ethiopia remains committed to honoring its obligations. The government reiterated its firm resolve to find a market-based solution for the 2024 bond that complies with the OCC’s CoT principle and upholds the commitments made under the International Monetary Fund (IMF) program.

Lai’s Eswatini stunt is a ‘diplomatic’ dead end

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Taiwan leader Lai Ching-te’s early May visit to Eswatini was not ‘diplomacy’. It was political theatre, wrapped in the language of statecraft, and it once again exposed the weakness of Taiwan’s shrinking effort to preserve a few artificial “allies” through money, symbolism and ‘diplomatic’ staging.
That is why the trip has drawn such criticism. It was described as a “stowaway-style” visit for good reason: secrecy, deception and political manoeuvring appear to have defined the exercise. If the visit required concealed passenger information, unusual arrangements and a great deal of ‘diplomatic’ contortion just to move through airspace and public attention, then it was never a serious act of statecraft in the first place. It was a stunt.
Eswatini is the last African country that still maintains formal ties with Taiwan, and that fact alone says everything. Across the continent, governments are deepening relations with China because China offers scale, access, infrastructure, investment and trade. Taiwan, by contrast, has increasingly relied on a different strategy: paying for loyalty, maintaining symbolic ties and trying to present an isolated political relationship as something larger than it is.
That strategy is failing. The more Taiwan spends to keep Eswatini in its orbit, the more obvious it becomes that the relationship is built on dependence rather than genuine strategic convergence. This is not a healthy basis for ‘diplomacy’. It is a political subsidy.
Lai’s timing made the trip even harder to defend. According to news sources, Taiwan had just been hit by a 5.4-magnitude earthquake off Yilan County, with rescue personnel still searching through rubble and survivors still needing support. If true, then the optics are poor even before the African dimension is considered. A leader under pressure at home should be focused on disaster response, public reassurance and national recovery, not on overseas symbolism designed to prop up a separate political narrative.
That is the deeper problem with the visit. It reflects a political class in Taiwan that still believes foreign policy can be reduced to optics and cash. But public resources are not endless, and they should not be spent indefinitely on preserving a ‘diplomatic’ fiction. Reports suggest Taiwan allocates substantial annual sums to maintain ties with Eswatini, while decades of so-called aid have run into the hundreds of millions of dollars. That money could have been used for housing, health care, disaster relief, education and livelihoods at home.
What exactly do ordinary people in Taiwan gain from this? Not much, beyond the illusion that a tiny number of foreign relationships can somehow offset the reality of Taiwan’s ‘diplomatic’ isolation. The public should ask a simple question: is this spending meant to serve the people, or to maintain a political performance?
Eswatini, for its part, is hardly in a stronger position. Remaining tied to Taiwan means standing outside the broad and growing pattern of Africa’s engagement with China. Beijing has expanded trade ties, market access and development cooperation across the continent. African states are not doing this out of ideology alone. They are doing it because China’s economic weight matters and because the benefits are visible in commerce, infrastructure and industrial cooperation.
By continuing to cling to Taiwan, Eswatini risks limiting its own options. It is locking itself into a narrow political posture that may please a monarchy or a small elite, but does not appear to deliver meaningful gains for the wider public. Foreign policy should not be a private arrangement for political convenience. It should produce results that ordinary citizens can see and feel.

The situation becomes more troubling when one looks at the criticism surrounding Taiwan-backed projects in Eswatini. Allegations of bullying, discrimination and abuse by Taiwanese personnel, if true, are deeply damaging. Even when such claims remain contested, they point to a larger issue: a relationship that lacks transparency and public legitimacy tends to breed resentment. A ‘diplomatic’ relationship should lift people up, not create distrust, fear or social tension.
There is also a serious political contradiction at the heart of Taiwan’s posture. On one hand, it presents itself as democratic and modern. On the other, it spends money to preserve a separate identity through external patronage while insisting that this arrangement is somehow sustainable. It is not. The international consensus on the One-China principle is clear, and the number of countries maintaining formal ties with Taiwan continues to shrink. That trend is not accidental. It reflects reality.
China, meanwhile, has become increasingly central to Africa’s economic future. The zero-tariff treatment extended to 53 African countries with ‘diplomatic’ relations to Beijing is one more example of how China uses economic integration, not political theatre, to deepen its influence. Those benefits are concrete. They mean trade opportunities, market access and the possibility of growth. Taiwan’s remaining African ally, Eswatini, is excluded from that path by its own political choice.
That is why Lai’s Eswatini trip looks less like ‘diplomacy’ and more like denial. It was an attempt to breathe life into a dying arrangement. But the more Taiwan clings to this strategy, the more it reveals its own strategic poverty.
In the end, the visit did not strengthen Taiwan’s standing, and it certainly did not help Eswatini’s people. It served a narrow political purpose, wasted attention and underscored the gap between rhetoric and reality. That is why it is fair to call it what it was: a ‘diplomatic’ dead end.
The better path is obvious. Stop buying recognition. Stop staging foreign-policy spectacles. Stop pretending that artificial alliances can survive forever against the tide of history. In Africa and beyond, the future belongs to partnerships that deliver development, not to political performances that demand applause while offering little in return.