Tuesday, May 12, 2026
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INVITATIONS TO BID

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(International Competitive Bidding)

  1. Public Servants’ Social Security Administration hereunder referred as (PSSSA) is desirous of hiring an Engineering Firm for Design-Build Construction Work for Wastna Smart Village Development Project (Phase 1 – Hotel-Mall) to be developed near Addis Ababa at Koye Fetche Sub City inside Sheger City.
  2. Public Servants’ Social Security Administration (PSSSA) now invites eligible bidders of Category One Engineering firms with relevant experience and valid licenses or its equivalent as first class firm in their origin of country valid for the year 2018 Ethiopian Calendar, to submit sealed tenders for Design-Build Construction Work for Wastna Smart Village Development Project (Phase 1 – Hotel-Mall).
  3. The building shall have an estimate minimum total floor area of 300,000 m2 fulfilling the minimum FAR requirement of the local development plan and an estimated net floor area of not less than 80% and in no way it maximum total floor area shall be more than 320,000 m2.
  4. Interested bidders can purchase a full set of tender documents by paying Birr 1,000.00 in cash to the Public Servants’ Social Security Administration’s (PSSSA) Finance Directorate.
  5. All bids must be accompanied by a bid security of ETB 2,000,000.00 /Two Million Birr or equivalent amount in USD as per the selling price of USD to ETB at Ethiopian National Bank 28 days before the date of Bid Closing, in the form of CPO or unconditional Bank Guarantee valid for 45 calendar days from bid opening in the form provided in the Bid Document payable to the Employer at the first demand without any contestation whatsoever, and must be submitted at the address of:-

Public Servants’ Social Security Administration -Procurement Directorate

Arat Kilo, Queen Elizabeth Street

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

  • The bid will be closed at 2:00 P.M on the 41st day from the date of the bid announcement and will be opened on the same day at 2:30 P.M in the presence of bidders or their legal representatives at the Office of the Procurement Directorate of the Public Servants’ Social Security Administration. If the 41st day is a weekend or holiday, the bid will be opened at the above time on the next working day.
  • Bids shall be valid for a period of forty five (45) calendar days after bid closing.
  • The Public Servants’ Social Security Administration reserves the right to accept or reject any or all bids.                                  

Public Servants’ Social Security Administration (PSSSA)

Arat Kilo, Queen Elizabeth Street

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

0111232699

ICS

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Each year, the International Community School of Addis Ababa (ICS) grants scholarships to current 8th grade Ethiopian students living in Addis Ababa. The scholarships cover four years of high school (grades 9-12) at ICS. The Scholarship Program is open to students from all schools registered under Ministry of Education, except the foreign community schools.

Scholarship students will be expected to pay the amount of tuition fees they would pay at their current school under the ICS scholarship terms. Families must also be prepared to make some financial commitments annually for student travel or activities that are

essential for gaining the well-rounded experience that top universities are looking for ICS Scholarship students attract the attention of college recruiters with their excellent academics and their involvement in sports, school activities, community service and

leadership. In recent years, our ICS scholar graduates have won competitive scholarships at universities such as Harvard, MIT, Stanford, Yale, Princeton, Columbia, Amherst, Cornell and other top schools in the USA.

Each middle school in Addis Ababa receives an invitation letter from ICS by delivery or from their sub city educational bureau by the end of February. Schools also receive three (3) application forms and further information regarding the nature of the examinations,

eligibility requirements to sit for examinations necessary documentation required to support an application, and various deadlines connected with the scholarship competition.

Schools are asked to publicize their selection process to constituency to assure transparency and fairness. Schools are invited to select and recommend to ICS three (3) candidates for the scholarship competition.

Parents are not permitted to approach ICS individually with alternate candidates. Please ask your Head of School for more information. The completed application signed by the Head of School must be returned to the Counselor’s Office at ICS on or before 4:00 PM,

February 27th, 2026. Late or incomplete applications will not be accepted.

(251) 11-371-1544 

ፖ.ሳ.ቁ 70282

www.icsaddis.org

Earl Chamberlin Head of School

Geo-economics and Geopolitics in the Horn of Africa

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The Horn of Africa has long been framed as a theater of humanitarian crises and chronic conflict. Yet this narrow lens obscures a deeper and more consequential reality: the region is rapidly becoming a proving ground for 21st-century geo-economics, where trade routes, ports, investment flows, and infrastructure financing increasingly shape political power. From the Bab el-Mandeb strait to inland Ethiopia, the Horn sits at the intersection of global commerce and great-power competition. Understanding its future requires seeing how economics and geopolitics now reinforce rather than replace each other.

At the heart of the Horn’s strategic relevance is geography. The Red Sea corridor connects Europe to Asia, carrying a significant share of global maritime trade and energy flows. Any disruption reverberates across global markets, as seen in recent attacks on shipping and rising insurance costs. Djibouti, perched at the mouth of this corridor, has become a microcosm of modern geopolitics: it hosts military bases from the United States, China, France, and others, while simultaneously serving as a logistics hub for landlocked Ethiopia. This convergence of hard security and commercial infrastructure illustrates how geo-economics has become the currency of influence.

Ethiopia, the region’s demographic and economic heavyweight, exemplifies the stakes. With more than 120 million people and ambitious industrialization plans, Ethiopia’s growth depends on access to the sea. Its near-total reliance on Djibouti’s ports has turned port access into a strategic vulnerability and a geopolitical bargaining chip. Ethiopia’s search for diversified maritime outlets has heightened tensions with Eritrea and Somalia, underscoring how economic imperatives can inflame political disputes. In the Horn, access to trade routes is not merely a development issue; it is a matter of sovereignty and national identity.

External powers have been quick to grasp this reality. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has poured billions into ports, railways, and industrial parks, notably the Addis Ababa–Djibouti railway. For China, infrastructure financing is not charity; it is a means of securing supply chains, exporting industrial overcapacity, and cultivating political alignment. Critics warn of debt dependence and strategic leverage, but for Horn governments facing urgent development needs, Chinese capital often arrives faster and with fewer political conditions than Western alternatives. The result is a complex bargain in which economic opportunity and strategic exposure grow in tandem.

Gulf states, too, have emerged as pivotal geo-economic actors. The United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar have invested heavily in ports, agriculture, and telecommunications across Somalia, Sudan, and Eritrea. Their motivations blend commercial logic with security concerns, including food security and Red Sea stability. The Horn has become an extension of Gulf rivalries, where port concessions and aid packages double as instruments of influence. When Gulf tensions spill over into local politics, fragile states can find themselves caught between competing patrons.

The United States and Europe, long dominant in the region’s security architecture, now face a more crowded field. Their traditional focus on counterterrorism and humanitarian assistance, while still vital, has struggled to keep pace with the geo-economic strategies of rivals. Trade, investment, and development finance are no longer peripheral tools; they are central to geopolitical relevance. The challenge for Western actors is to engage economically without replicating extractive or purely strategic models that have fueled resentment in the past.

Yet the Horn’s geo-economic promise is constrained by internal fragilities. Conflict in Sudan, persistent instability in Somalia, and unresolved tensions in Ethiopia and Eritrea deter investment and disrupt trade corridors. Climate change compounds these pressures, intensifying droughts and competition over land and water. In such an environment, infrastructure alone cannot deliver stability. Without inclusive governance and regional cooperation, economic projects risk becoming new fault lines rather than foundations for peace.

This is where regionalism becomes crucial. The Horn’s states are economically interdependent, whether they acknowledge it or not. Trade corridors, energy grids, and digital networks transcend borders. Institutions like the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have the potential, still largely unrealized, to mediate disputes and coordinate development strategies. A shared vision of economic integration could transform zero-sum geopolitical rivalries into positive-sum outcomes.

The Horn of Africa stands at a crossroads. It can remain a battleground where global powers project influence through ports and bases, or it can evolve into a connective hub that leverages its geography for shared prosperity. Geo-economics will continue to shape geopolitics here; the question is whether it will do so in ways that entrench dependency and conflict, or foster resilience and cooperation. For policymakers, investors, and citizens alike, the lesson is clear: in the Horn of Africa, economics is no longer just about growth – it is about power, peace, and the region’s place in the world.

China’s countermeasures against U.S. arms firms underscore Taiwan as the focal point of an intensifying global realignment

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By our staff reporter

China’s decision to impose counter-sanctions on 20 U.S. military companies and 10 senior executives involved in arms sales to Taiwan represents a firm and necessary response to repeated provocations that undermine China’s sovereignty and regional stability. Released alongside a new position paper clarifying the authoritative interpretation of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758, these actions demonstrate that Beijing is not merely responding tactically, but acting strategically to defend the postwar international order and the one-China principle at its core. Together, they make clear that the Taiwan question has become the most sensitive and consequential issue in China–U.S. relations—and one on which China will no longer exercise unilateral restraint.

From “red line” to accountable action

In announcing the countermeasures, China stated plainly that they were a response to “large-scale” U.S. arms sales to China’s Taiwan region, reiterating that the Taiwan question is a core interest and a red line that must not be crossed. While such warnings have been issued before, the expansion of sanctions to include a broader range of companies and named executives reflects a more resolute approach: those who profit from undermining China’s sovereignty will be held accountable.

From an economic perspective, these measures are not designed to inflict immediate commercial damage. Most U.S. defense contractors have limited business exposure in China, and the individuals targeted are unlikely to suffer direct financial losses. The significance instead lies in principle and precedent. By invoking the Law on Countering Foreign Sanctions, China is making clear that interference in its internal affairs carries legal and political consequences, and that China will respond using institutionalized, rule-based tools rather than rhetorical protest alone.

For Washington, this should serve as a sober reminder that arms sales to Taiwan are not a neutral or stabilizing act, but a deliberate challenge to China’s sovereignty. While such sales may continue, they now come with clearer and more predictable consequences, further eroding the illusion that the Taiwan issue can be compartmentalized away from the broader bilateral relationship.

Clarifying Resolution 2758 as a cornerstone of international order

The counter-sanctions must also be understood in tandem with China’s release of a position paper on UNGA Resolution 2758. This document addresses growing attempts by the U.S. and a handful of allies to distort the resolution’s meaning and create space for “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan” in practice. China’s position is unequivocal: Resolution 2758 fully and finally resolved the issue of China’s representation at the United Nations, encompassing the whole of China, including Taiwan.

The paper emphasizes that Taiwan has no separate status under international law and that the UN, as an organization composed of sovereign states, has no basis for accepting Taiwan in any capacity. By citing UN legal opinions and long-standing practice, Beijing is reinforcing that Taiwan’s exclusion from the UN system is not a matter of political preference, but a consequence of established international norms.

What distinguishes this effort is China’s insistence that challenges to Resolution 2758 amount to challenges to the authority of the UN itself. By framing the issue this way, China places the debate squarely within the defense of multilateralism and post–World War II international arrangements, rather than allowing it to be recast as a matter of selective “participation” or so-called “meaningful engagement.”

Competing narratives, divergent worldviews

At its core, the dispute reflects a fundamental clash of narratives. From China’s perspective, Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory, and the question of reunification is the unfinished business of a civil war, not an international issue open to foreign manipulation. The position paper reiterates that the People’s Republic of China has been the sole legal representative of China since 1949, and that Resolution 2758 confirmed this reality against the backdrop of global opposition to hegemonism and power politics.

The United States, however, continues to advance a contradictory position. While formally recognizing the PRC as the sole legal government of China, Washington simultaneously arms Taiwan and promotes the notion that Taiwan’s status is “undetermined.” This dual-track approach, presented as a contribution to peace, is viewed in Beijing as the root cause of rising tensions, encouraging separatist forces on the island and hollowing out the one-China framework from within.

For many developing countries, the issue resonates deeply. Most supported Resolution 2758 and have long upheld the one-China principle. By highlighting the historical and legal foundations of this consensus, China is appealing to shared experiences of resisting external interference and defending sovereignty, contrasting this with what it describes as renewed U.S. efforts to impose its will through selective interpretations of international law.

Escalation risks born of persistent provocation

The real concern is not the sanctions themselves, but the behavior that necessitated them. China has repeatedly stated that “Taiwan has never been an independent country and never will be,” and that any attempt to separate Taiwan from China violates the will of the Chinese people and the basic norms governing international relations. When arms sales, official contacts and military signaling continue despite these warnings, firmer responses become unavoidable.

A dangerous cycle is taking shape: U.S. arms packages and political gestures toward Taiwan prompt stronger Chinese countermeasures, including military exercises and legal actions. Each step is then cited as justification for the next. The responsibility for breaking this cycle lies with those who first undermine the status quo by emboldening separatist tendencies under the guise of security cooperation.

At the same time, dismissing China’s actions as mere symbolism risks serious miscalculation. The Taiwan question is central not only to China’s territorial integrity, but to the legitimacy of the Chinese state and its role in the international system. When foundational principles like Resolution 2758 are openly challenged, restraint becomes increasingly difficult to sustain.

Implications beyond the Taiwan Strait

This episode should not be viewed in isolation. By combining targeted countermeasures with a comprehensive reaffirmation of UN principles, China is demonstrating how it intends to safeguard its interests in an era of intensified strategic competition. Legal clarity, diplomatic consistency and proportional counteraction are being deployed together as part of a broader effort to uphold a rules-based international order that respects sovereignty and non-interference.

For smaller and middle powers, the message is clear. Positions taken on Taiwan—whether in UN votes, joint statements or participation in international organizations—carry growing weight. Attempts to blur or hedge on the one-China principle may increasingly be seen as political choices rather than neutral compromises.

Ultimately, the notion that the Taiwan question can be indefinitely managed through ambiguity is becoming untenable. China’s actions signal a determination to prevent further erosion of the one-China framework and to counter incremental challenges before they harden into faits accomplis. Stability in the Taiwan Strait depends not on sanctions or arms sales, but on a genuine return to political dialogue grounded in mutual respect for sovereignty and international law.

Until external actors abandon efforts to instrumentalize Taiwan as a strategic pawn, the issue will remain the most sensitive barometer of the evolving global order—one where misinterpretation of a UN resolution or persistence in arms deals could have consequences far more serious than any sanctions list.