Sunday, October 5, 2025
Home Blog Page 4130

Inconvenient truths about migration

0

Standard economic theory says that net inward migration, like free trade, benefits the native population after a lag. But recent research has poked large holes in that argument, while the social and political consequences of open national borders similarly suggest the appropriateness of immigration limits.
Sociology, anthropology, and history have been making large inroads into the debate on immigration. It seems that Homo economicus, who lives for bread alone, has given way to someone for whom a sense of belonging is at least as important as eating.
This makes one doubt that hostility to mass immigration is simply a protest against job losses, depressed wages, and growing inequality. Economics has certainly played a part in the upsurge of identity politics, but the crisis of identity will not be expunged by economic reforms alone. Economic welfare is not the same as social wellbeing.
Let’s start, though, with the economics, using the United Kingdom – now heading out of the EU – as a case in point. Between 1991 and 2013 there was a net inflow of 4.9 million foreign-born migrants into Britain.
Standard economic theory tells us that net inward migration, like free trade, benefits the native population only after a lag. The argument here is that if you increase the quantity of labor, its price (wages) falls. This will increase profits. The increase in profits leads to more investment, which will increase demand for labor, thereby reversing the initial fall in wages. Immigration thus enables a larger population to enjoy the same standard of living as the smaller population did before – a clear improvement in total welfare.
A recent study by Cambridge University economist Robert Rowthorn, however, has shown that this argument is full of holes. The so-called temporary effects in terms of displaced native workers and lower wages may last five or ten years, while the beneficial effects assume an absence of recession. And, even with no recession, if there is a continuing inflow of migrants, rather than a one-off increase in the size of the labor force, demand for labor may constantly lag behind growth in supply. The “claim that immigrants take jobs from local workers and push down their wages,” Rowthorn argues, “may be exaggerated, but it is not always false.”
A second economic argument is that immigration will rejuvenate the labor force and stabilize public finances, because young, imported workers will generate the taxes required to support a rising number of pensioners. The UK population is projected to surpass 70 million before the end of the next decade, an increase of 3.6 million, or 5.5%, owing to net immigration and a surplus of births over deaths among the newcomers.
Rowthorn dismisses this argument. “Rejuvenation through immigration is an endless treadmill,” he says. “To maintain a once-and-for-all reduction in the dependency ratio requires a never-ending stream of immigrants. Once the inflow stops, the age structure will revert to its original trajectory.” A lower inflow and a higher retirement age would be a much better solution to population aging.
Thus, even with optimal outcomes, like the avoidance of recession, the economic arguments for large-scale immigration are hardly conclusive. So the crux of the matter is really its social impact. Here, the familiar benefit of diversity confronts the downside risk of a loss of social cohesion.
David Goodhart, former editor of the journal Prospect, has argued the case for restriction from a social democratic perspective. Goodhart takes no position on whether cultural diversity is intrinsically or morally good or bad. He simply takes it for granted that most people prefer to live with their own kind, and that policymakers must attend to this preference. A laissez-faire attitude to the composition of a country’s population is as untenable as indifference to its size.
For Goodhart, the taproot of liberals’ hostility to migration controls is their individualist view of society. Failing to comprehend people’s attachment to settled communities, they label hostility to immigration irrational or racist.
Liberal over-optimism about the ease of integrating migrants stems from the same source: if society is no more than a collection of individuals, integration is a non-issue. Of course, says Goodhart, immigrants do not have to abandon their traditions completely, but “there is such a thing as society,” and if they make no effort to join it, native citizens will find it hard to consider them part of the “imagined community.”
A too-rapid inflow of immigrants weakens bonds of solidarity, and, in the long run, erodes the affective ties required to sustain the welfare state. “People will always favor their own families and communities,” Goodhart argues, and “it is the task of a realistic liberalism to strive for a definition of community that is wide enough to include people from many different backgrounds, without being so wide as to become meaningless.”
Economic and political liberals are bedfellows in championing unrestricted immigration. Economic liberals view national frontiers as irrational obstacles to the global integration of markets. Many political liberals regard nation-states and the loyalties they inspire as obstacles to the wider political integration of humanity. Both appeal to moral obligations that stretch far beyond nations’ cultural and physical boundaries.
At issue is the oldest debate in the social sciences. Can communities be created by politics and markets, or do they presuppose a prior sense of belonging?
It seems to me that anyone who thinks about such matters is bound to agree with Goodhart that citizenship, for most people, is something they are born into. Values are grown from a specific history and geography. If the make-up of a community is changed too fast, it cuts people adrift from their own history, rendering them rootless. Liberals’ anxiety not to appear racist hides these truths from them. An explosion of what is now called populism is the inevitable result.
The policy conclusion to be drawn is banal, but worth restating. A people’s tolerance for change and adaptation should not be strained beyond its limits, different though these will be in different countries. Specifically, immigration should not be pressed too far, because it will be sure to ignite hostility. Politicians who fail to “control the borders” do not deserve their people’s trust.

Robert Skidelsky, Professor Emeritus of Political Economy at Warwick University and a fellow of the British Academy in history and economics, is a member of the British House of Lords. The author of a three-volume biography of John Maynard Keynes, he began his political career in the Labour party, became the Conservative Party’s spokesman for Treasury affairs in the House of Lords, and was eventually forced out of the Conservative Party for his opposition to NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999.

By Robert Skidelsky

Exit strategy 5

0

Last week we referred to a publication “What We Know About Exit – Practical Guidance For Developing Exit Strategies in the Field” of the C-SAFE Regional Learning Spaces Initiative* by Alison Gardner, Kara Greenblott and Erika Joubert.
We saw that a program “exit” refers to the withdrawal of all externally provided program resources from an entire program area. A program exit may refer to the withdrawal of external support from an entire program area, or it may address the withdrawal of support from communities or districts within a program area. It could also refer to the end of a program funding cycle, with an extension through a follow-on extended recovery program or a longer-term development program. And lastly, it may include a combination of withdrawal, program extension or transition. A program Exit Strategy is a plan describing how the program intends to withdraw its resources while ensuring that achievement of the program goals (relief or development) is not jeopardized and that progress towards these goals will continue. The goal of an Exit Strategy is to ensure the sustainability of impacts after a program ends. It could also be defined in a broader sense as a program’s ‘sustainability strategy’, which could be accomplished through staggered graduation from specific project areas, simultaneous withdrawal from the entire program area, or transitioning to associated programming in selected areas.
Three basic approaches to Exit Strategies were outlined below. They are: 1) phasing down, 2) phasing out, and 3) phasing over.
PHASING DOWN. Phasing down is a gradual reduction of program activities, utilizing local organizations to sustain program benefits while the original sponsor (or implementing agency or donor) deploys fewer resources. Phasing down is often a preliminary stage to phasing over and/or phasing out.
PHASING OUT. This refers to a sponsor’s withdrawal of involvement in a program without turning it over to another institution for continued implementation. Ideally a program is phased out after permanent or self-sustaining changes are realized, thus eliminating the need for additional external inputs.
PHASING OVER. The third type of Exit Strategy approach is ‘phasing over’. In this case, a sponsor transfers program activities to local institutions or communities. During program design and implementation, emphasis is placed on institutional capacity building so that the services provided can continue through local organizations.
Now, Criteria used to determine when to exit programs vary. However, they can be grouped into three general categories.
Time Limit: Relief, recovery and development programs all have time limits dictated by funding cycles. Time limits may increase a program’s focus in establishing systems of sustainability or they may impose artificial timing constraints.
Achievement of program impacts: Although achieving the intended program impact is often difficult within a given timeframe (and may even create perverse incentives), indicators of program impact can sometimes be used as exit criteria. Impact indicators can be used to focus program “graduation” efforts on the more self-reliant communities or the effective program components. Lastly, impact indicators can help inform and guide the Exit Strategy time line.
Achievement of Benchmarks: Benchmarks are defined as the measurable indicators of identified steps in the graduation process of an Exit Strategy. They are part of the Monitoring and Evaluation planning matrix from the onset. Benchmarks should be linked to the graduation process and to the program components to be phased out or over.
Establishing an exit timeline that is linked to the program funding cycle, and clearly communicated
to the community is essential. Since program implementation will influence Exit Strategy activities, it
is important that the exit plan remains flexible with the expectation that some of the exit criteria and
benchmarks may need to be modified during the program cycle.
Further, implementing exit plans in a gradual, phased manner is recommended, as the staggered
graduation of project sites can contribute to sustained outcomes by applying lessons learned from
earlier sites to those that come later. Lastly, after phase over or program phase out is complete,
continued contact with communities will help to support sustainability of outcomes.
Ongoing and timely monitoring of benchmarks is critical to the successful implementation of Exit
Strategies. The monitoring of Exit Strategy benchmarks should, in fact, be integrated into the overall program’s monitoring and evaluation plan. This will prevent duplication of monitoring efforts and maximize use of existing data. While ‘process indicators’ are helpful to gauge the program or local partner’s progress along a developed continuum, ‘result indicators’ may help to graduate communities or to assess readiness to phase out programs. An example of a process indicator in a home-based care program may be the number of household visits conducted by the local partner, whereas a result indicator would be the improvement in nutritional awareness by the
home based care client and household. To determine the success of an Exit Strategy, an
evaluation should be conducted after a period of time has elapsed following the program exit.
*The C-SAFE Regional Learning Spaces is an Initiative by CARE, World Vision, CRS, ADRA and USAID.

 

Addis Ababa will see a double-decker buses

0

Addis Ababa will see a double-decker buses for public transport in the coming few weeks. Yesterday December 2, Metals and Engineering Corporation (MeTEC) delivered the buses which were ordered by the Addis Ababa City Administration in a ceremony held at Meskel Square. The buses are assembled in Bishoftu by MeTEC. Pictured are Brigadier General Tena Kurundi Vice director of MeTEC and Addis Ababa City Mayor Driba Kuma during the handing over ceremony.

Free Zone proposed to increase exports

The Ethiopian Freight Forwarders and Shipping Agents Association (EFFSA) is considering the creation of a free zone facility.
The association developed a study, which was presented to logistics officials, including the Ethiopian Maritime Affairs Authority (EMAA) and international partners at the Sheraton Addis recently, to encourage use of the Mojo Dry Port by the private sector.
In its proposal (EFFSA), which includes private logistics facilitators, stated that the formation of Free Export Zone Facility (FEZF) is adequate.
If the free zone is accepted by policy makers it will be the first one in the country.
“The dry port (Mojo) should ideally include a duty free export market zone,” the study indicated.
The report was presented by Aman Wole, Senior Instructor of Commercial and Ground Services Training at Ethiopian Aviation Academy, under Ethiopian Airlines Group.
Aman elaborated that the FEZF would create great market opportunities for the products of our agricultural producers, agro industrial manufacturers and others.
“The free zone facility will be a place where we organize duty free sales of manufactured products mainly for buyers from Africa and the Middle East,” Aman, who is an IATA and FIATA accredited expert, said.
He said that this will provide great opportunities to local manufacturers to promote their products and attract buyers for their own brands.
Another proposal is for the FEZF to have bonded warehouses and product outlets.
“We recommend adding value to our export items locally and selling them as opposed to the current service that we provide outside the country,” he told Capital. “If the export zone and bonded warehouses are established at the same location it will create a place for buyers from other countries to come and shop and for local manufacturers to promote their products at the facility,” he elaborated.
Aman said that the FEZF will boost exports, promote local manufacturers and to add value to goods. Products can be sold competitively and hard currency earnings will increase.
“The current bonded warehouse has many restrictions. The state owned Ethiopian Shipping and Logistics Services Enterprise has not fully provided service for all users,” he added.
“We have seen this work in places like Singapore and other Asian countries,” he explained.
Plans are for the FEZF to be located at the Mojo Dry Port compound.
The study also looked at inland containerization services. It stated that currently the majority of sea bound export cargo travels to Djibouti without completing shipping processes in Ethiopia.
“Cargo is carried to the port loosely and its containerization, packing and preparation for shipping is done in Djibouti,” the study said.
With the setup of adequate facilities nationally, it will be possible for the private freight forwarding companies to provide complete services for organizing a full shipping process of exports.
“The whole task of positioning empty containers, inspection and cleaning, tallying and sorting, packing and stuffing and trucking and shipping scheduling, issuing shipping orders and getting a bill of loading releases locally can be handled effectively nationally creating additional opportunities for the logistics companies,” the study added.
Currently containerizing is mainly done at the sea port area and is paid for in foreign currency.
Logistics bottlenecks have hindered Ethiopia’s economic growth. Several strategies have been developed to improve the logistics sector and make it competitive with other countries. Ethiopia now spends up to 25 percent of its GDP on logistic services. In developed countries that figure is around 10 percent, according to the study.
The common use facility under the Mojo Dry Port that will include the private sector is one of the upcoming strategies that will be applied by the government. Mojo, the first dry port in the country is now under expansion by finance secured from the World Bank.
The expansion project that is expected to consume USD 150 million is expected to double the carrying capacity of the dry port facility from the current 14,500 containers.