According to the UNHCR’s July 2026 report, Ethiopia hosts 171,964 Eritrean refugees and asylum seekers, alongside a substantial number of other Eritreans living and working across the country under various statuses. Before their separation in 1991, Ethiopia and Eritrea functioned as a single nation; their populations share a striking physical and cultural resemblance, psychological and social traits, and a border stretching over a thousand kilometers. Cross-border trade and cultural exchanges remain common, even as both nations face below-average economic performance.
This raises a compelling question: Why have two countries with such profound historical, cultural, and geographic ties chosen conflict over cooperation, perpetuating hardship for their people? Since their 1991 separation, up to one-third of Eritrea’s population—approximately two million people—has fled into the global diaspora. Observers frequently ask why these neighbors, rather than modeling themselves on cooperative regions like Scandinavia, became bitter enemies.
Many political scientists and commentators argue that Eritrea would have neither won its war of liberation nor secured international recognition without the critical support of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). This support was deemed unusual because, upon capturing the Ethiopian capital, the TPLF allowed Isaias Afwerki’s Marxist–Leninist separatist organization—which had taken control of Asmara—to secede from Ethiopia without formal constitutional process, parliamentary approval, or a popular vote. Furthermore, at the United Nations, the TPLF leadership accepted a landlocked status for Ethiopia, ceding red sea access and declaring that the country did not require a seaport. Following the demise of the TPLF and the emergence of a new political order in Addis Ababa, the Eritrean question—particularly the status of the Port of Assab—has once again become a major flashpoint.
This article examines the Eritrean intervention in Ethiopia through the lens of political culture. It briefly reviews the historical grievances and political animosities between the two nations before exploring win-win scenarios for future cooperation and good neighborliness. Drawing on international best practices, it demonstrates that where there is a will, there are ample examples of successful regional cooperation.
What is the political culture of Eritrean leadership? Who is in charge?
The political culture of the current leadership in Asmara is deeply intertwined with the ongoing political and structural impasses facing Eritrea and the wider Horn of Africa region.
To understand how Asmara’s political culture contributes to these persistent deadlocks, several core features of its governance model must be examined:
The political heart of Asmara’s leadership traces back to its origins as a liberation front (the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front, or EPLF, which transitioned into the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice, or PFDJ). The “Front” Mentality: In this political culture, the ruling front views itself as the exclusive embodiment of the national will. Pluralism, competitive politics, and autonomous civil society are historically viewed not as healthy components of a democracy, but as existential threats to national unity. Institutional Vacuum: Because political authority is centralized around a tight-knit leadership of Isayas rather than institutional checks and balances, the country has operated without a fully implemented constitution, an independent judiciary, or a functioning legislature for decades. This lack of institutional architecture means political impasses cannot be resolved through legal, predictable frameworks.
Asmara’s political culture is heavily defined by a posture of permanent defense and existential threat. Militarization: Decades of conflict, unresolved border tensions, and regional volatility have fostered a culture where militarization is normalized. National service has become open-ended, and civilian governance structures are deeply intertwined with military command logic. Externalizing Crises: Political impasses—both domestic and regional—are frequently managed by leaning into isolationism, projecting blame onto external actors, or engaging in tactical, transactional alliances rather than long-term, rules-based diplomacy. This makes sustainable compromises difficult to reach because cooperative diplomacy is often treated with deep suspicion. Personalized Authority: Power is concentrated heavily at the top, leaving little room for bureaucratic feedback, internal reform, or policy adaptation. Lack of Transparency: The political culture prizes opacity. Decisions regarding foreign policy, regional interventions, and economic management are typically made without public debate. This opacity breeds profound uncertainty for citizens, neighboring states, and international partners alike, transforming routine policy disagreements into intractable diplomatic standstills.
What is the political culture surrounding the relationship between Eritrea and Ethiopia?
Political culture is the set of shared attitudes, values, beliefs, and norms that Eritrea and Ethiopia hold regarding their political systems. It shapes how citizens view government authority, judge legitimacy, engage in political life, and ultimately influence the relationship between the two nations.
Critical perspectives in Ethiopia often accuse the Eritrean government and its diaspora of exploiting Ethiopian hospitality. Critics point to alleged involvement in illicit financial activities, such as money laundering and black-market foreign exchange operations. A frequently cited example is 1991, when Eritrea was recorded as a major coffee exporter despite lacking domestic coffee production. Concerns were also raised regarding Eritrean involvement in small business sectors typically reserved for Ethiopian nationals. Critics argue that despite receiving economic opportunities, Eritrean actors continued to foster hostility and undermine Ethiopia’s stability. This dynamic is often attributed to an entrenched political culture characterized by a sense of superiority and strategic manipulation—a dynamic that many Ethiopians now argue must come to an end.
Conversely, Ethiopia—with its proud history of never being colonized—rejects this perspective entirely, creating a persistent political impasse. To resolve this, Eritrea must acknowledge regional realities, while Ethiopia extends a hand of neighborly cooperation. A practical coexistence can be achieved through mutually beneficial resource-sharing arrangements and concessions, models that have successfully fostered peace and stability in other parts of the world.
Many observers argue that the political culture of Eritrea’s leadership was deeply shaped by over half a century of Italian colonial rule, which fostered an ethos of regional distinctiveness and perceived modernity compared to Ethiopia. However, regional dynamics have shifted dramatically in recent decades. Ethiopia has cultivated a younger generation of leaders and built a dynamic, rapidly expanding economy, whereas Eritrea remains constrained by centralized, aging leadership and economic stagnation.
Certain political leaders in Asmara harbor ambitions to transform Eritrea into the dominant power of the Horn of Africa—drawing comparisons to the military strength of Israel, the stability of Denmark, and the prosperity of Singapore. While aspirational, this vision cannot materialize without regional harmony, particularly with Ethiopia. True stability requires addressing strategic regional interests, such as Ethiopian access to the Red Sea and the port of Assab. Ultimately, without democratic governance and self-determination for the Eritrean people, these state ambitions are destined to fail.
Global best practices in resource sharing
A powerful neighbor with a population of 140 million cannot be expected to go without a seaport indefinitely. One day, that necessity will erupt like a storm, threatening to sweep Eritrea away along with it. Unfortunately, the current Eritrean leadership seems to believe success can be achieved at the expense of its neighbors—or, more directly, through the misery and collapse of Ethiopia. How sustainable or rational is such an approach?
The most sustainable approach is a win-win strategy where both parties demonstrate the political will and open-mindedness needed for mutual growth. Together, the natural resources of both countries are more than sufficient to support their populations. Worldwide, numerous examples show that when shared resources are managed wisely, nations can prevent unnecessary bloodshed, man-made catastrophes, and conflict. By highlighting these global best practices in resource sharing, I hope Eritrean policymakers will choose cooperation over conspiratorial thinking and doom-driven planning.
Throughout history and across regions—from Asia and Europe to Africa and the Americas—neighboring states have repeatedly demonstrated that shared challenges can be resolved through diplomacy. By prioritizing mutually beneficial agreements over conflict, these nations laid the foundation for enduring peace. Their success proves that cooperation is possible; Ethiopia and Eritrea can follow a similar path.
Sweden and Denmark (Copenhagen Malmö Port)
In 2001, Denmark and Sweden merged their port operations to establish Copenhagen Malmö Port (CMP), a cross-border joint venture. Operating as a unified entity across the Øresund Strait, CMP leverages the distinct strengths of both locations: Copenhagen specializes in cruise shipping and consumer container imports, while Malmö serves as a hub for transit cargo, logistics, and automotive distribution. By eliminating local competition, both nations have significantly reduced operational costs and expanded their regional market reach.
China and Pakistan (Gwadar Port)
Operated under a long-term concession by the China Overseas Port Holding Company, Gwadar Port is a cornerstone of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The project provides Pakistan with modern deep-water port infrastructure and positions Balochistan as a potential commercial hub. In turn, China gains a direct land-sea route connecting its western Xinjiang region directly to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean.
Pakistan and China signed the initial bilateral agreement to fund and construct Phase I of Gwadar Port. China provided the majority of funding (around 75–80%) and engineering assistance. Phase I construction finished in December 2006, and the port was officially inaugurated in March 2007
Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania
Situated at the intersection of Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania, the Kagera River basin lies within a historically volatile sub-region plagued by civil conflict, displacement, and acute energy shortages. In this delicate landscape, unilateral resource exploitation carries a high risk of cross-border friction and political destabilization.
To mitigate these risks, the three nations—supported by international bodies like the World Bank and the Nile Basin Initiative—established a shared management framework to jointly develop the Rusumo Falls Hydroelectric Plant. The project operates on a benefit-sharing model: the generation facility is equally co-owned, and its 80-megawatt output is split evenly into three 26.6 MW shares to power each nation’s grid. By intertwining their national energy securities, the three countries replaced geopolitical tension with institutionalized, mutually beneficial interdependence.
The Indus Waters Treaty (1960) — India and Pakistan
Despite enduring partition, multiple wars, and perpetual geopolitical friction, India and Pakistan have successfully maintained the Indus Waters Treaty. The Indus River system sustains hundreds of millions of people in both nations with essential irrigation and drinking water. Facilitated by the World Bank, the treaty completely divided the rivers rather than enforcing a complex co-management scheme: India received exclusive rights to the three eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej), while Pakistan gained rights to the three western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab).
Water allocation remains a primary existential concern for both nuclear-armed nations. By transforming a highly volatile issue into a strictly regulated technical and legal framework, the treaty has prevented water shortages from sparking a catastrophic conflict—surviving even during active military standoffs
The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 (U.S. – Canada)
At the turn of the 20th century, rapid industrialization, logging, and agricultural expansion along the 5,525-mile U.S.–Canada border sparked intense disputes over shared waterways, including the Niagara River, the Great Lakes, and the St. Mary and Milk Rivers. Without a clear mechanism to manage water diversion and pollution, these localized clashes threatened to escalate into broader geopolitical hostilities.
To resolve these tensions, the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 established the International Joint Commission (IJC). The treaty mandated that both nations possess equal rights to use boundary waters for navigation and commerce. Rather than allowing the stronger power to monopolize water flow, it created an independent, six-member binational body to review and approve projects affecting shared waters. Ultimately, this framework defused water-scarcity tensions, fostered collaborative engineering projects, and provided a peaceful blueprint for subsequent agreements, such as the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement.
The Itaipu Treaty (1973) — Brazil and Paraguay
In the 1960s, Brazil and Paraguay were locked in a tense border dispute over the Sete Quedas waterfalls on the Paraná River. Brazil desperately needed energy to fuel its economic boom, while Paraguay fiercely defended its territorial sovereignty. Tensions peaked in 1966 when a brief Brazilian military occupation threatened to spark an armed conflict.
Through the 1966 Act of Iguaçu and the subsequent 1973 Itaipu Treaty, both nations chose diplomacy over hostility, forming an equal partnership. They established a joint 50/50 binational enterprise to construct the Itaipu Dam—which would become one of the world’s largest hydroelectric power generators.
Under the agreement, Brazil financed the mega-project to secure the electrical supply required for its growing economy. In return, Paraguay secured a 50% ownership stake without upfront capital, enabling it to monetize its surplus energy by selling it back to Brazil and driving its own domestic modernization.
France and Germany
After World War II, the long-standing rivalry between France and Germany over the resource-rich Ruhr Valley and Rhineland posed a major threat to peace. Because coal and steel were crucial for both economic recovery and weapons production, managing them was vital.
To resolve this, six European nations signed the 1951 Treaty of Paris (initiated by the 1950 Schuman Declaration), placing their coal and steel production under an independent High Authority. The treaty guaranteed France access to German coal and permitted West Germany to rebuild its industry and reintegrate into Europe. By binding these critical war-making resources together, the treaty made war between the two rivals “not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.”
While I can deliver mutually beneficial solutions across neighboring countries worldwide, the examples above offer a clear glimpse into what is possible for Ethiopia and Eritrea.
Conclusion
Ultimately, the political culture in Asmara treats compromise and institutionalized power-sharing as vulnerabilities rather than strengths. As long as governance relies on centralized, securitized control rather than pluralistic engagement, political impasses across the region will remain structural and difficult to resolve.
Most well-educated Eritreans in the diaspora, who lead stable lives abroad, view the current regime as a disaster that must end. They believe that Eritrea’s future lies in regional cooperation and collaboration rather than confrontation and animosity with its neighbors. A win-win solution is entirely possible: both Eritrea and Ethiopia can thrive simultaneously through mutual cooperation. Ethiopia deserves access to a seaport, just as Eritrea deserves lasting peace and economic prosperity.
Influenced by the political cultures of their adopted homes, these “New Eritreans” have witnessed how nations share resources, live in harmony, and achieve development through peace and cooperation. They want to model these practices back home. This article strongly supports that vision—free from conspiracy theories, complexes, or a sense of either superiority or inferiority—envisioning instead a peaceful neighborhood modeled after the Scandinavian countries.
However, political transitions may open new avenues. Reports suggest potential succession plans involving Isaias Afwerki’s son, Abraham Isaias Afwerki. Regardless of how succession unfolds, a new generation of forward-thinking leadership has the potential to foster peace, democratic governance, and regional cooperation. By shifting toward win-win diplomacy, Eritrea can strengthen ties with Ethiopia and its neighbors to build a stable and prosperous Horn of Africa.





