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Ethiopia’s Corporate Governance Code Reform: An Idea Whose Time Has Come

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Ethiopia stands at a crossroads. The Ethiopian Capital Market Authority is building infrastructure for securities trading. Foreign investors are evaluating opportunities in one of Africa’s largest economies. Yet Ethiopia lacks what has become standard across the continent: a comprehensive corporate governance code.

Nigeria adopted its National Code of Corporate Governance in 2018. Ghana launched its code in 2022. Kenya has operated under governance standards since 2002, comprehensively revised in 2015. Egypt updated its code in 2016. South Africa has refined its King Reports through four iterations since 1994. Mauritius developed its first code in 2003. Even Tanzania and Uganda have established frameworks.

Ethiopia is now a latecomer to institutional development that has reshaped African corporate landscapes. A comprehensive governance code would fundamentally transform how Ethiopian companies operate, access capital, and contribute to development. The question is not whether Ethiopia needs such a code but how to develop one that learns from regional experiences.

What a Code Would Achieve and the Costs of Its Absence

South Africa’s experience demonstrates how governance frameworks reshape corporate ecosystems. Research on companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange shows that better-governed firms, measured by compliance with King Code principles, consistently outperform poorly-governed peers in financial returns. The mechanism is straightforward: good governance reduces information asymmetry between companies and investors. When boards demonstrate independence, financial reporting is transparent, and minority shareholders enjoy meaningful protections, capital flows more readily at lower cost.

Kenya’s experience illustrates governance codes’ role in capital market development. Though the Nairobi Securities Exchange lists only sixty-six companies, Kenya’s requirement since 2016 that all securities issuers comply with comprehensive governance standards has attracted foreign portfolio investment disproportionate to market size. The Capital Markets Authority requires annual governance audits by professionals accredited through the Institute of Certified Public Secretaries of Kenya, providing external verification that governance claims are credible rather than self-reported.

For Ethiopia, a governance code would provide the institutional foundation for capital market growth. Without standardized practices, Ethiopian securities will trade at discounts reflecting governance uncertainty. A 2026 risk assessment identified corporate governance as an emerging concern for Ethiopia, with investors conducting deeper due diligence on “opaque structures, related-party risks, and inconsistent documentation.” Without clear national standards, each investor must independently assess whether Ethiopian companies meet minimum thresholds, increasing costs and reducing capital flows.

Nigeria’s experience before 2018 illuminates costs of fragmentation. Prior to the unified National Code, Nigeria operated with sectoral codes for banks, insurance companies, pension operators, and telecommunications while many companies fell under no specific framework. Companies operating across sectors faced conflicting requirements. Large private companies not subject to sectoral regulation operated in governance vacuums. Investors lacked unified reference points for what constituted good governance.

Ethiopia faces analogous fragmentation. The National Bank regulates banks through directives including governance provisions. The Capital Market Authority is developing standards for securities issuers. State-owned enterprises operate under the 2020 Code of Corporate Governance for Public Enterprises. But large private companies in manufacturing, construction, trade, and services operate without clear governance frameworks beyond the Commercial Code, which research consistently identifies as inadequate for modern corporate complexities.

Egypt’s approach shows how codes influence enterprises beyond formal requirements. Egypt’s Corporate Governance Code, issued by the Egyptian Institute of Directors under the Financial Supervisory Authority, applies formally to listed companies but provides frameworks for state-owned enterprises and large private companies. Though voluntary for non-listed entities, the code has shaped expectations across Egypt’s corporate sector because international partnerships and development institution financing increasingly require governance certifications.

Learning from Regional Experiences: What Works and What Doesn’t

South Africa’s King Reports represent African governance codes’ most sophisticated evolution. King IV reduced principles from seventy-five in King III to sixteen, recognizing exhaustive rules create compliance burdens without proportionate benefits. It shifted from “apply or explain” to “apply and explain,” assuming organizations practicing good governance will have applied all principles but may implement them differently based on context.

Yet even South Africa faces governance challenges. State-owned enterprises, including Eskom, have experienced governance failures resulting in massive losses despite formal compliance. These failures reveal codes alone do not guarantee good governance. Effective governance requires genuine board independence, credible enforcement with real consequences, and professional expertise among directors and regulators.

Nigeria’s 2018 code illuminates implementation challenges Ethiopia should anticipate. Research examining the code’s first years identifies critical problems. First, the code did not replace existing sectoral codes but layered atop them. When national provisions conflict with sectoral requirements, for example, different independence standards for board composition, the legislation provides no hierarchy or resolution mechanism. Companies in regulated sectors navigate overlapping requirements without clear guidance on which standard prevails. A bank must comply with Central Bank directives and simultaneously report compliance with the national code, creating confusion and costs without corresponding benefits.

Second, Nigeria’s voluntary “apply and explain” approach limits enforceability. The Financial Reporting Council can monitor and report but has limited sanctioning authority beyond reputational pressure. Sectoral regulators have stronger enforcement powers, reinforcing sectoral over national standards. Third, announcing a code does not automatically create capacity to implement it. Many Nigerian companies lack directors with governance training. Board members appointed through family, political, or business relationships may be successful but unfamiliar with fiduciary duties or audit committee oversight concepts.

Ghana’s November 2022 National Corporate Governance Code offers a different model. Rather than attempting to replace sectoral frameworks, Ghana’s code explicitly positions itself as harmonizing them while preserving sectoral specificity. It establishes thirteen core principles applicable across sectors while explicitly endorsing existing sectoral codes from the Bank of Ghana, Securities and Exchange Commission, and National Insurance Commission. This pragmatism reflects political reality: sectoral regulators have established turf and expertise. Attempting to eliminate sectoral codes would provoke bureaucratic resistance that could derail reform entirely.

Kenya’s phased implementation provides valuable lessons. When Kenya gazetted its comprehensive Code of Corporate Governance Practices for Issuers of Securities in March 2016, it didn’t become fully applicable until March 2017, allowing companies twelve months to align governance structures. Moreover, Kenya invested heavily in capacity building. The Capital Markets Authority partnered with the World Bank to conduct training. Master classes for CEOs, CFOs, and company secretaries preceded full implementation. The Institute of Certified Public Secretaries developed accreditation programs for governance auditors.

Egypt demonstrates the importance of iterative improvement. Egypt’s first code appeared in 2005, was revised in 2011 to incorporate corporate social responsibility and enhanced disclosure, then updated again in 2016. The 2016 code expanded to encompass state-owned enterprises explicitly, recognizing their importance in Egypt’s economy. This evolution demonstrates that first-generation codes inevitably require revision as implementation reveals gaps.

Mauritius provides cautionary lessons about selective compliance. Research tracking Mauritius’s 2004 code implementation through 2007 found reasonable compliance with highly visible requirements—companies appointed non-executive directors and established audit committees—but deeper investigation revealed selective compliance. Many boards claimed independence for directors with obvious conflicts. Audit committees existed on paper but exercised minimal oversight. Directors’ remuneration remained opaque despite transparency requirements. Companies implemented visible, low-cost elements while resisting costly accountability requirements.

Why Simply Copying Won’t Work: Ethiopia’s Specific Context

Ethiopia’s governance challenges differ importantly from those that shaped codes elsewhere. Research on Ethiopian corporate governance identifies concentrated ownership and political connections as defining features. Ethiopia’s large businesses divide into state-owned enterprises, party-owned companies, and family-controlled private companies. When control structures are examined, ruling party influence extends across both SOEs and party enterprises, with some family businesses maintaining complex associations with political actors.

This ownership concentration creates different governance problems than dispersed shareholding environments where UK or Australian codes originated. Anglo-American codes emphasize protecting minority shareholders from management abuse, assuming the central problem is agency conflict between shareholders collectively and managers. Ethiopia’s problems center on conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority stakeholders, between public and private interests in state-influenced enterprises, and between formal structures and informal relationship networks.

Research documents enforcement deficits across multiple dimensions. The judicial system faces capacity constraints and perceptions of political influence. Shareholder protection laws exist but are inadequately enforced, with courts handling cases slowly and inconsistently. Studies identify discriminatory enforcement between state and private banks, with regulators applying different standards based on ownership. Research examining Ethiopian boards documents widespread deficits in director knowledge and skills, with directors often appointed through political connections rather than professional qualifications.

Related-party transactions present particularly acute challenges. Research documents extensive related-party relationships between companies, political actors, and controlling shareholders that would violate codes in most jurisdictions but operate openly in Ethiopia. Family businesses engage in transactions with other family companies without independent oversight. SOEs transact with party-owned companies through arrangements blurring commercial and political considerations.

Political instability represents another Ethiopian-specific challenge. Research on Ethiopian banks from 2014-2023 found political instability significantly impacts financial performance, particularly for institutions serving conflict-affected regions. Some banks “suffered tremendously” affecting returns on equity and operational capacity. Directors must navigate governance responsibilities while operating where violence, displacement, and regulatory disruption can occur unpredictably.

What Ethiopia Must Do

Ethiopia must develop a code reflecting Ethiopian political economy, institutional capacity, and business structures while drawing on international experience. The first imperative is genuine multi-stakeholder engagement. Ghana’s code emerged from extensive consultation involving the Institute of Directors, professional bodies, academia, government, regulatory agencies, and business associations. This inclusive process created stakeholders who felt ownership because they shaped content. Nigeria’s more technocratic approach, where the Financial Reporting Council drafted with limited broad engagement, contributed to implementation difficulties.

Ethiopia should convene a National Corporate Governance Council representing the National Bank, Capital Market Authority, Ministry of Finance, professional bodies, business associations, and civil society. This Council should drive development through working groups, public consultations, exposure drafts, and iterative revision. The process will take longer than expert-driven drafting but produces better code with stronger implementation prospects.

The code’s architecture must balance comprehensive principles with sectoral flexibility. Ethiopia should establish core principles applicable to all entities above certain thresholds: ethical leadership, board composition including independent directors, audit committees, risk management, stakeholder engagement, transparency, and accountability. Simultaneously, permit sectoral regulators to impose additional requirements. Critically, the code must establish clear hierarchy: where sectoral standards are higher, they apply; where silent or lower, national principles apply; where conflicts arise, a designated body adjudicates.

Enforcement mechanisms must be designed into the code. For listed companies, the Capital Market Authority should have enforcement jurisdiction with power to audit, investigate, and impose penalties from warnings to delisting. For banks, the National Bank exercises similar authority. Sanctions should include financial penalties, mandatory remediation, public disclosure of non-compliance, and in severe cases, director disqualification. Without credible consequences, companies will engage in selective compliance.

Capacity building must parallel code development. All directors of public companies, listed entities, and SOEs should complete certified governance training within twelve months of appointment. Professional certification programs should be developed through partnerships with regional institutes of directors. Ethiopian universities should incorporate governance modules into business programs. Company secretaries need similar professionalization, with clear qualifications including governance training and certification.

Phased implementation allows learning and adjustment. Ethiopia could begin with companies seeking capital market access, requiring full compliance as a condition for securities issuance. Second phase could encompass banks, building on National Bank directives. Third phase might cover other public companies and large private entities above thresholds. This sequencing allows regulators to develop enforcement capabilities gradually and permits code revision based on implementation experience.

State-owned enterprise governance deserves particular attention. Following Egypt’s model, Ethiopia could integrate SOE governance into the comprehensive code while recognizing their distinct characteristics. SOE boards should include independent directors from private sector backgrounds, not only political appointees. Appointment processes should be transparent and merit-based. SOE governance reporting should serve dual accountability: to the state as owner and to the public through transparent financial reporting.

Finally, Ethiopia must commit to iterative improvement. The code should include provisions requiring formal review every three to five years, with revisions based on implementation experience, stakeholder input, and evolving international standards.

The Path Forward

Ethiopia cannot afford continued governance gaps that create uncertainty, increase capital costs, and signal institutional immaturity. A comprehensive code would provide foundations for capital market development, establish standards facilitating business activity, create transparency attracting investment, and position Ethiopia competitively in global markets.

But Ethiopia must proceed thoughtfully. South Africa demonstrates iterative evolution elevating governance standards. Kenya shows systematic capacity building enables implementation. Ghana illustrates pragmatic harmonization of national principles with sectoral specificity. Nigeria warns against layering requirements without resolving conflicts. Mauritius cautions that selective compliance undermines effectiveness without robust enforcement. Egypt demonstrates addressing state-owned enterprise governance explicitly.

Ethiopia’s code must reflect Ethiopian realities: concentrated ownership, political connections, capacity constraints, enforcement challenges, and political instability. Importing Anglo-American models designed for different contexts will fail. Ethiopia should develop principles addressing Ethiopian challenges while drawing on proven international practices appropriately adapted.

This requires sustained commitment from political leadership, regulatory agencies, professional bodies, business communities, and civil society. Code development through genuine engagement will take time but produces better results. Capacity building must parallel development. Phased implementation allows learning. Integration with capital market development creates incentives for quality.

Ethiopia has delayed long enough. The Ethiopian stock exchange has just been established, with only two or three companies listed and many more in the pipeline. As these capital markets develop and investment flows increase, governance gaps will impose growing costs. Without a comprehensive code establishing clear standards, well-governed Ethiopian companies will pay higher capital costs because investors cannot easily distinguish them from poorly-governed peers. Even now, in private capital markets—bank lending, private equity, development finance—Ethiopian enterprises face governance uncertainty premiums that increase borrowing costs and reduce valuations. A comprehensive code will not solve all problems, but it establishes frameworks within which solutions develop and allows well-governed companies to signal quality credibly.

The time for Ethiopia’s corporate governance code has come. Regional peers are not waiting. International investors are evaluating alternatives. Ethiopia should move forward deliberately but decisively: convene the National Council, begin consultations, study regional experiences, develop principles reflecting Ethiopian contexts, build capacity, plan implementation, establish enforcement, and commit to improvement.

The opportunity is clear. The path is knowable. Ethiopia must seize this moment to join African nations with comprehensive frameworks, learning from their experiences to build something adapted for Ethiopian needs. The work begins now.

Tesfaye T. Lemma (PhD)  is a tenured Full Professor of Accounting at Towson University and a multi-award-winning scholar whose research focuses on corporate governance, banking sector reforms, sustainability, climate-related governance, and sustainable finance in emerging and developing economies. He serves as an Associate Editor of Business Strategy and the Environment, one of the world’s leading journals in sustainability research, and his work informs policy and practice on climate finance design, institutional capacity, and the implementation of sustainability strategies.

Name: Beza Mengistu

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2. Education: Master’s candidates

3. Company name: ZERAF DESIGN

4. Title: Founder & Creative Director

5. Founded in: 2023

6. What it does: High-end creative design and contemporary fashion

7. HQ: Addis Ababa / Online

8. Number of Employees: 4 permanent and 11 contractual workers

9. Startup capital: 190,000 birr

10. Current Capital: Growing

11. Reason for starting the Business: To bridge the gap between traditional craftsmanship and modern, global creativity

12. Biggest perk of ownership: Having the creative freedom to set my own trends

13. Biggest strength: Consistency, vision, and the ability to turn challenges into creative 

opportunities

14. Biggest challenge: Managing rapid growth while maintaining the high quality of every 

single piece

15. Plan: To establish ZERAF as a leading creative fashion brand in Africa that exports the 

“African Aesthetic” to the world

16. First career: Designer

17. Most interested in meeting: Virgil Abloh and Any visionary global fashion icon

18.Most admired person: Donatella Versace

19. Stress reducer: Sketching new ideas or a quiet cup of Ethiopian coffee

20. Favourite pastime: Exploring local markets for inspiration and fabrics

21. Favourite book: Creativity, Inc. by Ed Catmull and Amy Wallace

22. Favourite destination: Milan and Paris (for the fashion) or the Ethiopian highlands 

(for the soul)

23. Favorite automobile: Hyundai, SUV’s

The socioeconomic pain from macro reforms needs remedial intervention at source

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Back in May 2024 several high-caliber economists and practitioners gathered in Berlin to discuss principles that should guide policymakers and finally came out with the Berlin Declaration. And there was a striking degree of consensus that policy reforms along the lines of market-liberal, “Washington Consensus” orthodoxy have disappointed in many countries. Specifically, pro-market policies have not focused enough on people’s real problems such as shared prosperity and decent jobs and, instead, resulted in an ever-rising income and wealth inequality. Not to mention depriving developing states and their citizens of control over key strategic interests. In fact, in one document cited by the influential economist Dani Rodrik, none other than the World Bank had already warned people “to be skeptical of top-down, comprehensive, universal set of solutions,” recommending instead selective, modest and local context-driven policy reforms.

So it is an interesting coincidence that Ethiopia adopted “comprehensive macroeconomic reforms” à la the Washington-Consensus, best-practice tradition only shortly after the latter’s postmortem was held in Berlin. To be fair, Ethiopia is only one among dozens of developing countries that have recently resorted to such policy reforms under intense fiscal and debt pressures. Ethiopia’s policy reforms have come in the form of conditionality attached to the IMF’s four-year Extended Credit Facility arrangement. The economic program has a distinctive focus on short- and medium-term macro stabilization, putting fiscal discipline, reorientation of public expenditures, tax reform, unified and competitive exchange rate, and financial liberalization at the top of the wish list. However, while the extra capital inflow secured from international financial institutions has definitely alleviated our national financial crunch, the macro stabilization program has deepened the socioeconomic pressure on typical Ethiopians.  

Notwithstanding officially slowing inflation, Ethiopians are currently going through a dreadful cost-of-living distress and more anxious about affordability than ever before. True, we had difficulty in making ends meet even in pre-reform years. But the IMF-supported program could not come at a worse time, with prices of basic necessities subsequently jumping two- or three-fold. Most people’s purchasing power has gone through the floor. Middle- and lower-income households, who have no surplus to spare, are shouldering the heaviest burden – even more so in urban centers like Addis Ababa, where an increasing number of people are downgrading consumption to goods of cheaper variety, from sheger bread to “Sunday market” vegetables and to other items from street vendors. The overall consumer confidence could only have plunged.

How do we know that the macro stabilization program has hurt the typical consumer? Anyone who demands protest demonstrations as proof is foolish. Let’s instead look at the program’s main manifestations to date – namely, steep currency devaluation, tax escalation and subsidy cuts/removals. First, there has been a move toward a floating exchange rate regime in order to eliminate exchange rate overvaluation, which the IMF believes is “the source of deep, longstanding macroeconomic distortions.” So the birr has duly obliged and relinquished all its value in Forex in a year. However, not only that the regime change does not guarantee either confidence or a real exchange rate competitive enough to accelerate non-primary exports, but it has clearly inflated the values of many goods via import prices and price-setting behavior that incorporates inflationary expectations.

What about tax reform? It is supposed to broaden the tax base over time while lowering marginal rates, thereby enhancing the federal government’s fiscal position. It is not meant to take a spray-gun approach to taxation, including within the tax base whatever was untaxed or now looks taxable, or to push rates as high as possible, especially quickly. But the government has now levied or increased taxes on such basic goods and services as water, electricity, transport, modest owner-occupied homes, house rental incomes with too low a threshold, and retail mobile and digital transactions. One might argue that the prices of some of these are lower than regional averages, but our income per capita, adjusted for price level differences, is also significantly lower than the Sub-Saharan African average. Moreover, a tax reform is supposed to be distributionally at least neutral if not progressive. So the authorities’ increased use of a uniform value-added tax (VAT) to raise additional revenue, not even exempting basic food items and given limited coverage of social protection programs, represents a serious hit to the average consumer, especially in urban areas. This is because a VAT, being a tax on final consumption, is regressive in its incidence, falling most heavily on the poor and middle class, as the latter consume a higher fraction of their income than the rich. You may counter by pointing to the collected money’s welfare-improving effect on the poor, but that is far from being a sure thing.  

Even more frightening, the reform program appears to have envisaged imposition of VAT and excise on fuel starting in the fiscal year 2025/26. This will indeed be very bad news, if acted upon. Mind you, fuel prices have already been increased three times in just under a year, by withdrawing subsidies, prompting additional inflationary pressures. True, fuel prices for an importing country normally reflect the global price of crude oil. But this should not be enforced at a time when the vast majority of people are already facing a major price shock and workers have seen overall consumer prices rise a lot faster than their wages, while carrying effective tax overburden. Why not? Because subjecting fuel to taxation will increase transport prices and operating costs of businesses even more, which will inevitably be passed onto consumers, not to mention reignite the general price level. So full cost recovery and further taxation in the provision of fuel (and also utilities) may gratify the IMF, but almost surely hurts ordinary families. A fuel tax is not compelling as an excise either, when our public transportation is inefficient and there is as yet no viable replacement in the market for energy.

But hasn’t the government set a goal to increase our tax-to-GDP ratio? Well, the first thing to remember is that tax is a policy instrument, not an objective. Second, the tax take varies with the business cycle regardless of tax policy (e.g., our tax-to-GDP ratio averaged 12% over the period 2009/10-2017/18, higher than current program target of 10%), so too much focus on the ratio is unwarranted. Last but not least, the government must beware of its triumphalism over the post-reform astronomical growth in tax revenue that is attained in no small part on the back of severe financial and mental strains for many households, workers and small businesses.   

There’s more. To increase non-tax revenue, the authorities have also made some mind-blowing upward changes in governmental service charges, fees and fines, which play their part in the cost-of-living story.  

Turning to public expenditure priorities, our government is correct to make an effort to save taxpayer money by reducing unnecessary bureaucracy, avoiding vanity projects, and cutting out waste and corruption in the management of worthwhile projects. There are also circumstances in which indiscriminate subsidies can be adjudged socially undesirable. Nevertheless, free-market ideologues’ “shoot-at-sight” approach to state subsidies in the name of raising efficiency is misguided (and, of course, hypocritical). Subsidies and transfers are key tools of income redistribution. And our subsidies for things like food, edible oil, water, electricity (home use), public transport, residential housing and fertilizers should not be dismissed as “waste and resource misallocation.” Rather, they should form part of the social safety net, as cutting or eliminating them would leave the poor majority worse-off and thus likely worsen poverty and social insecurity. As the saying goes, “a government is an insurance company with an army,” prioritizing spending based on public preference. So Ethiopians would also prefer to maintain the aforementioned subsidies – inasmuch as we value democratic consent in policymaking.

The point is, efficiency should not trump everything else, especially equity. If helping citizens to put food on the table results in a modest reduction in budgetary position, efficiency or growth, so be it – after all, growth will not trickle down to enrich everyone. It can also be viewed as a cost worth paying to avert the risk of sociopolitical crisis.

The IMF, for its part, says that part of their loans is to “strengthen targeted subsidies or social safety nets in order to help the poor and vulnerable groups.” Indeed, the government has given assistance along the same line, already accustomed to allocating life necessities like housing among citizens based on the “poorest of the poor” criterion. But think about it: Ethiopia is a low-income country where more than two-thirds of the population lives in multidimensional poverty. In this context, how can one make a distinction between targeted and untargeted subsidies in any meaningful sense? The “targeted social safety nets” advocated by the IMF are at best palliative and do little for the disadvantaged who make up the bulk of our population. Contra the IMF, what we need is proportionately universal social protection.    

All in all, the anticipated socioeconomic pain from the IMF-supported reform program has well and truly begun to bite. But the worst may be yet to come as the inflationary impact of policy changes takes time to fully manifest. Yes, the government insists that it is taking temporarily painful means to beneficent long-term economic ends. But the means should not be grossly disproportionate to the ends. And mustn’t a society first survive to reach the long run?

Meanwhile, the IMF is worried about maintaining the reform momentum and whether quantitative targets are met – which would probably mean that there is no end in sight to the affordability nightmare that currently haunts Ethiopians’ sleep.   

So what can be done? The authorities in effect reduced their “policy space” when they signed up for the IMF lending program and may not want to deviate from the latter now and risk losing the Bretton Woods institutions’ badly needed finances and approval. However, pragmatism dictates that they put the brakes especially on their fiscal efforts to meet overzealous budget targets by escalating taxation and suppressing subsidies, which typically end up pushing living costs upward for the majority vulnerable population, for which no targeted assistance will compensate.   

The stakes are high, not least in the political field. Economically painful reforms are a proven political loser, not a winner. If the public discontent over kitchen-table issues continues unabated, it can produce a political backlash in one way or another. Or will the government get away with it? We’ll have to wait and see.   

I am an Economic and Business Analyst based in Addis Ababa. I can be reached at matias.assefa@gmail.com

The “Board of Peace”: Trump’s path to monarchy in a new gilded age

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In a lavish ceremony at Davos on 22 January 2026, President Donald Trump unveiled his “Board of Peace” — a self‑styled international body chaired by himself for life, ostensibly to mediate conflicts from Gaza to Ukraine. With early signatories like the UAE, Hungary and Azerbaijan, and invitations to 60 nations, Trump hailed it as “the most prestigious board ever formed,” hinting it could eclipse the UN. Elon Musk’s quip — “Peace or piece? Like a little piece of Greenland, a little piece of Venezuela?” — drew laughs, but beneath the jest lies a darker truth: this is no peace initiative. It’s the blueprint for a new world order where wealth reigns supreme, ordinary citizens are disenfranchised, and Trump crowns himself king.

Let’s be clear: the Board of Peace is Trump’s long‑cherished fantasy of unchecked power realised. Absent key allies like France, the UK, Germany and Canada, who cited conflicts with the UN Charter, the board reeks of selective legitimacy. Leaked drafts reveal Trump’s indefinite chairmanship, even post‑presidency, positioning him as a global arbiter above elected leaders. Critics, including Slovenia’s PM Robert Golob, call it a “dangerous interference” in the international order. Musk’s “piece” joke wasn’t just wordplay; it evoked Trump’s past obsessions with annexing Greenland and eyeing Venezuela’s oil — territorial grabs dressed as diplomacy.

This board accelerates a profound shift: from multilateralism to oligarchy. Trump’s second term, buoyed by billionaire backers like Musk (who donated over $250 million to his campaign), has already slashed regulations, gutted taxes on the ultra‑rich and weaponised tariffs. Global billionaire wealth exploded three times faster in 2025 post‑election, hitting records with Musk as the first half‑trillionaire. The board entrenches this, sidelining the UN and empowering a cabal where admission fees (rumoured at $1 billion, as Putin jested) favour the wealthy.

Wealth won’t just be “unfairly treated” — it will rule. Billionaires are already 4,000 times more likely to hold power than average citizens. Trump’s board amplifies this: imagine Musk, with his X platform amplifying propaganda, dictating ceasefires while BlackRock’s Larry Fink shapes investment flows. The poor? Repressed. Protests against austerity — from Kenya’s Finance Bill riots to Argentina’s union crackdowns — face tear gas, not tax hikes on yachts. Unequal nations are seven times more prone to democratic erosion, and Trump’s vision delivers exactly that: policy for plutocrats, crumbs for the masses.

Trump as king? He’s always craved it. His “America First” rhetoric masked monarchic impulses — lifelong board chairmanship is the clincher. With the board eyeing UN functions, he positions himself as global sovereign, mediating via Mar‑a‑Lago summits flanked by oligarchs. Allies snub it because they see the endgame: a world order where US veto power trumps sovereignty, and wealth buys vetoes too. France balked at the charter’s Gaza omissions; the EU fears irrelevance.

This isn’t hyperbole. History warns us: unchecked wealth breeds tyranny. Louis Brandeis nailed it a century ago: “We may have democracy, or we may have wealth concentrated in the hands of a few, but we can’t have both.” Trump’s board chooses the latter, a gilded cage for the world.

Africa, our home, feels this acutely. Our growth hovers at 5 percent amid debt traps and aid cuts, while billionaires extract minerals for AI chips. Trump’s tariffs hit our apparel exports; his board ignores our conflicts unless they serve elite interests. Wealth concentration here — tycoons in construction and telecoms — already stifles competition. A global board amplifying that? Recipe for neocolonialism 2.0.

Yet resistance endures. Kenya’s Gen Z forced a cabinet sacking; Uruguay’s Mujica rose from prison to presidency on people’s power. Trade unions narrow wage gaps; civil society demands NIRPs (National Inequality Reduction Plans).

Trump’s board is a coronation, not conciliation — crowning wealth as the new deity in a world order where the rich feast and the rest fast. But history bends toward justice when the many unite. Demand wealth taxes, end billionaire buyouts, reclaim multilateralism. Peace isn’t pieced out to the highest bidder; it’s won by the world’s collective will.