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Why ending child marriage is key for seizing Africa’s demographic dividend

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Africa’s future prosperity needs its girls…

Africa is home to approximately 160 million adolescent girls aged 10 to 19. They embody the energy, creativity, and potential of the continent. It is undeniable that The Africa We Want, as envisioned in the African Union’s Agenda 2063, will not be realized without the full participation of this group which represents a key component of the continent’s current and future workforce. Yet one of the most persistent obstacles to realizing this vision is the prevalence of child marriage and its negative impact on Africa’s productive capacities. Child marriage is among the most underestimated structural constraints on Africa’s capacity to harness its demographic dividend.

…yet millions are being left behind

The statistics paint a concerning picture. According to the World Bank, four out of ten girls aged 15 to 19 in Africa (excluding North Africa) are not in school and not working, or are married or have children, compared to just slightly above one out of ten boys. On average, nearly one-third (32 percent) of young women (ages 15–24) are not in education, employment, or training (NEET), compared with 23 percent of boys in that age range.

In Africa, 130 million women and girls were married before their 18th birthday, the highest incidence of globally (UNICEF, 2025). The prevalence of child marriage varies across the continent. Central and West Africa bear a disproportionate share of the global burden. But even North Africa, with the lowest yet significant rate of child marriages, shows that this harmful practice persists across the continent. Moreover, nine out of ten countries with the highest incidence of child marriage are in Africa.

The data reflect the most recent available information for the period 2016-2023.

…and economic costs are staggering

Child marriage is most frequently portrayed as a human rights violation or a social and health issue. And indeed, complications from pregnancy and childbirth remain a leading cause of death for adolescent girls. These tragic and most visible aspects, however, are only part of the story. Less visibly, but most frequently, child marriages are associated with early pregnancies and effectively exclude girls from education and formal economic participation at the very stage when investments in skills and learning yield the highest returns. Besides limiting individual futures, this practice thus has major economic implications for African countries and regions.

For African countries, as for some other developing countries, child marriage is a major unaddressed economic distortion. It distorts human capital accumulation and labor allocation, with economy-wide consequences for productivity and growth. More specifically:

  • Child marriage truncates education, limits skills acquisition, and impedes women’s participation in the formal labor markets
  • Girls who marry early are far more likely to enter unpaid care work or low-productivity informal activities, with limited prospects for upward social mobility.
  • Child marriage limits girls’ full integration into society by depriving them of their rights, identities, and agency. It creates dependency and stalls leadership potential.

The implications for Africa’s labor markets are particularly severe. Productive structural transformation requires a workforce that can move from low-productivity activities into higher value-added sectors, including manufacturing, modern services, and the digital economy. When girls’ education and skills acquisition are cut short, the supply of skilled workers for these sectors is reduced. In turn, incentives of entrepreneurs to create and grow productive firms are curtailed. At the macro level, productivity growth, job creation in the formal sector, and diversification into high value-adding activities are diminished.

Economic costs of child marriages persist across generations. The practice is closely associated with early and high fertility, increased maternal morbidity and mortality, and poorer health and educational outcomes for children. If unaddressed, these social outcomes lead to lower human capital (educational attainments and health) of the next generation, thus reducing labor productivity and innovation. Over time, they result in a persistent barrier to achieving fiscal sustainability, regional integration and inclusive growth.

These dynamics hamper Africa’s chances to seize demographic dividend. While the continent’s growing working-age population is viewed as a potential source of accelerated growth if accompanied by adequate investments in health, education, and job creation, child marriages are accompanied by reduced female employment in the formal sector (Figure 6). Subsequently, productivity gains fall below potential and demographic opportunity risks becoming a demographic burden.

Despite the negative macroeconomic implications, child marriage is not included in the mainstream economic frameworks and discussions that inform macroeconomic planning and policies in Africa. It is typically addressed through social or legal interventions, while macroeconomic strategies, industrial policies, and fiscal frameworks proceed as if these aspects of human capital constraints were exogenous. Such disconnect results in systematic underinvestment in one of the most binding constraints on Africa’s productive capacities.

Policymakers and the population at large need to rethink child marriage

From an economic perspective, the case for investing in girls is compelling. Analysis consistently shows that investments in girls’ education and health yield high returns, raising lifetime earnings, boosting productivity. Closing gender gaps in education, employment, and decision-making could add up to a trillion USD to Africa’s GDP in 2043. Estimates also suggest that every dollar invested in adolescent girls’ health, education and empowerment can generate multiple dollar economic returns over time.

Translating evidence into effective policies will require a shift in approach — a one where ending child marriage is seen as a core component of Africa’s economic strategy. Indicators on adolescent girls’ education, employment, and unpaid care burdens should thus become an integral part of macroeconomic frameworks, labor market projections, and assessments of productive capacity. Against this background, addressing the child marriage issue in Africa is a matter of economic necessity, given that successful Africa’s transformation requires unlocking the full productive potential of its population. This, in turn, demands sustained investment in girls as economic actors and not merely as beneficiaries of social programs.

Africa must finance Africa’s girls, and measures such as strengthened domestic resource mobilization, gender-responsive budgeting, and gender bonds could go a long way in this regard. Moreover, policymakers should view public spending aimed at reducing child marriages and supporting girls’ continued education as capital expenditure instead of pure social spending.  This would help align fiscal frameworks with longer term growth targets.

Ending child marriage practice will not, on its own, ensure that Africa will reach its development goals. However, unless addressed, this structural barrier will continue to hamper productivity, competitiveness, and the delivery of the Agenda 2063. Recognizing that ending child marriage is an economic as much as social imperative would be an important step forward. It would also place the girls’ empowerment where it belongs: at the center of Africa’s development strategy and its pursuit of inclusive and sustainable growth.

Zuzana Schwidrowski is the Director of Gender, Poverty and Social Policy Division, Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and Omolola Mary Lipede is an ECA Fellow.

The Prosperity Gospel And The Mirage Of Real Development

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Across much of the Global South, and increasingly beyond it, the Prosperity Gospel has become one of the most influential religious movements of the past four decades. Its message is simple and seductive: faith, positive confession, and generous giving to religious leaders will yield material wealth, good health, and social advancement. In contexts marked by poverty, inequality, and weak institutions, this theology often appears less as a spiritual doctrine and more as an informal development model. That is precisely where the problem lies.

At its core, real development is about expanding people’s capabilities: access to quality education, productive employment, healthcare, infrastructure, accountable governance, and social trust. The Prosperity Gospel, by contrast, reframes development as an individualized spiritual transaction. Structural problems are spiritualized, and material deprivation is treated not as a collective policy failure but as a personal deficit of faith.

This shift has profound consequences. By locating economic outcomes in divine favor rather than political economy, the Prosperity Gospel discourages systemic analysis. Corruption, predatory governance, monopolistic markets, and poor public services fade into the background. If prosperity is evidence of righteousness, then wealth accumulation, no matter how obtained, acquires moral legitimacy. Conversely, poverty becomes morally suspect. This narrative undermines solidarity and weakens the social pressure required for institutional reform.

Proponents argue that the Prosperity Gospel fosters hope, discipline, and entrepreneurship. There is some truth here. Many adherents adopt goal-setting, abstain from destructive behaviours, and pursue income-generating activities. Yet these individual gains should not be confused with development. Self-help strategies, even when spiritually motivated, cannot substitute for functioning schools, reliable electricity, or impartial courts. At best, they allow a minority to navigate around dysfunction. At worst, they normalize it.

The economic model implicit in Prosperity theology also deserves scrutiny. Congregants are encouraged to “sow seeds”, often through tithes, offerings, and special donations, with the expectation of supernatural returns. This creates a regressive financial flow from low-income households to religious elites who frequently display conspicuous wealth. The result is not capital formation for productive investment, but consumption-driven redistribution upward, shielded from critique by theological claims. In development terms, this is value extraction, not value creation.

More troubling is how the Prosperity Gospel reshapes political behavior. Where it dominates, public accountability often weakens. If leaders are framed as divinely appointed or spiritually anointed, criticism becomes sacrilege. Civic engagement gives way to ritualized optimism. Citizens are encouraged to pray for transformation rather than organize for it. Over time, this erodes democratic norms and entrenches patronage systems, precisely the opposite of what sustainable development requires.

There is also a psychological cost. When promised breakthroughs fail to materialize, the burden of explanation falls on the believer. Insufficient faith, hidden sin, or improper giving become the default diagnoses. This internalization of failure can deepen shame and anxiety, obscuring the real external constraints people face. Development theory has long recognized that dignity and agency are central to progress. A theology that blames the poor for their poverty corrodes both.

None of this is an argument against religion in public life. Faith communities have historically been engines of social development: building schools, hospitals, cooperative societies, and social movements. The problem is not belief, but a specific doctrine that collapses complex socio-economic realities into simplistic spiritual formulas. When religion aligns itself with evidence-based development, emphasizing ethics, stewardship, education, and collective responsibility, it can be a powerful force for good.

Real development is slow, institutional, and often unglamorous. It demands policy coherence, long-term investment, and uncomfortable conversations about power. The Prosperity Gospel offers a shortcut that feels empowering but ultimately diverts attention from these hard truths. In doing so, it risks becoming not a ladder out of poverty, but a mirror that reflects aspiration while leaving underlying structures unchanged.

If societies are serious about development, they must distinguish between hope that mobilizes collective action and hope that anesthetizes it. The difference matters, not just for theology, but for the future of economic and social progress.

Why Financial Crime Risk Demands Regulation and How Africa Is Leading the Way

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In the past decade, our financial systems have become more digitally interconnected than ever before. Convenience and speed now come with a price: financial crime. From sophisticated money-laundering networks to cyber-enabled fraud rings, criminal actors are exploiting gaps in regulation and oversight. As traditional finance evolves, so too have the methods and opportunities for abuse, and nowhere is this more evident than in the digital asset space.

Cryptocurrency and other digital assets promised a more inclusive and efficient financial system. But without the right guardrails, innovation can inadvertently create new avenues for exploitation. Over the last several years, financial crime has grown alongside the digital economy. According to a Chainalysis report by July 2025 over $2.17 billion were reported stolen from cryptocurrency services. But behind these numbers are real people. Small businesses locked out of working capital after falling victim to crypto scams. Families losing savings to impersonation schemes. Young founders forced to shut down promising ventures because a single fraud incident wiped out their liquidity. Financial crime in digital assets is not abstract. It is personal, and its impact is often irreversible.

From darknet markets moving illicit funds to ransomware groups demanding payment in digital assets, criminals increasingly leverage digital currencies because of weak oversight, inadequate identity verification, and jurisdictional gaps in enforcement. It’s why anti-money-laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CTF) controls are not bureaucratic niceties, they are essential infrastructure for a functioning financial system. Regulation is not a “nice-to-have”; it’s the safeguard that separates legitimate innovation from systemic risk.

The Risk Landscape Gets Sharper as Digital Assets Grow

In the absence of clear rules, digital assets have often been described as the Wild West of finance, a frontier of opportunity with little accountability. Stories highlighting lost wallets and exchange hacks grab headlines, but the larger issue is deeper: when markets operate without enforceable standards for transparency and oversight, bad actors thrive.

The digital asset ecosystem can be a force for economic inclusion, especially in emerging markets across Africa. But that promise will always be limited if fear of fraud, theft, or criminal misuse overshadows the potential benefits. Regulation that prioritises financial safety protects consumers and strengthens trust in the financial system, trust that is fundamental for adoption at scale.

Regulatory Momentum: Kenya and Ghana Take a Stand

Recognising these risks, several African countries have moved beyond debate and taken decisive action. Two of the most important developments in the last year came from Kenya and Ghana, where comprehensive regulatory frameworks for digital assets were enacted. At a time when many developed markets are still struggling to reconcile innovation with enforcement, African regulators are proving that clarity is possible. These frameworks are not reactionary. They are deliberate, consultative, and built for long-term market health.

In Kenya, a new digital asset regulatory framework was formalised in November 2025, the Virtual Asset Service Providers Bill. This made the East African country one of the first in the region to clearly define licensing requirements, compliance expectations and supervisory oversight for Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs). This law was crafted, with major input and consultation from Yellow Card’s team, enabling innovation while ensuring that operators implement strong AML and CTF safeguards.

Similarly, Ghana’s Virtual Asset Service Providers Bill, 2025, which received president assent at the end of December 2025 marked a historic shift. For years, the digital asset market in Ghana had operated in a gray area – widely used by the public but lacking legal certainty. With the passage of the VASP Bill and receipt of presidential assent, cryptocurrency activities are now formally legalised and regulated. This framework assigns responsibility to multiple agencies – including the central bank, securities regulator, and financial intelligence unit – to monitor transactions, enforce identity verification, and prevent illicit flows. These laws are about more than legitimacy; they are about protecting individuals, businesses, and the broader financial system from abuse.

Why Regulation Matters: Financial Safety and Security Aren’t Optional

Financial crime isn’t just a compliance checkbox for multinational corporations – it’s a real threat that affects individuals, firms and economies. Losses from fraud and money laundering erode consumer confidence and divert capital away from productive use. Illegal activity distorts markets and can undermine the foundational trust people place in financial systems. In the digital asset context, unregulated exchanges and opaque operations amplify these risks.

Regulatory frameworks like those in Kenya and Ghana create what we call a “safe zone” – a space where innovation can thrive under clear standards that protect participants. Mandatory Know-Your-Customer (KYC) requirements ensure identities are verified. AML and CFT protocols detect and deter illicit flows. And coordinated oversight enables regulators and operators to combine on-chain analytics with traditional compliance tools to identify suspicious behaviour in real time.

A Global Operator’s Perspective: Yellow Card’s Commitment to Safety

At Yellow Card, our operations span across 34 markets, with a footprint in 20 African countries and strategic business relationships spanning Europe and the United States. This global reach means we interact with some of the most sophisticated regulatory regimes in the world. We don’t see financial safety and security as optional luxuries,  they are prerequisites for operating responsibly at scale.

We have built risk and financial crime programmes that adhere to the highest standards. That includes robust identity verification, transaction monitoring, and real-time risk scoring. These systems are not theoretical; they are deployed daily to protect users and reinforce trust in the digital economy.

The Future Depends on Safe, Secure, Accountable Markets

As digital assets continue to integrate with traditional finance and everyday commerce, the stakes for financial integrity will only rise. Countries that lead with thoughtful regulation – rooted in transparency, enforcement and international cooperation – will unlock broader economic potential. Those that delay risk stagnating in uncertainty. The real question for policymakers is no longer whether to regulate digital assets, but how quickly and how well. Clear rules today prevent crises tomorrow. In a global market where capital moves instantly, jurisdictions that move decisively will define the future of digital finance.

Regulation that confronts financial crime head-on doesn’t stifle innovation – it enables it by eliminating fear and establishing a foundation of trust. For Ghana, Kenya, and other forward-thinking nations, the message is clear: the future of finance must be safe to be sustainable.

And when safety is non-negotiable, everyone benefits: consumers, businesses, and the economy at large.

Japhet Gana is Group Head, Transaction Risk & Financial Crimes, Yellow Card

Seven Lessons for Ethiopia Innovation Economy from Switzerland

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Countries Are Evolving From Factor Driven, to Efficiency Driven and Ultimately to Innovation Driven Economy Stage

The World Economic Forum (WEF) Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) classified its twelve pillars into three sub-indices matching three stages of economic development for countries. The first Basic Requirements sub-index pillars (institutions, infrastructure, macro-economic environment, health and primary education) mapped to Primary Commodity Exports Factor Driven Economies. The second Efficiency Enhancers sub-index pillars (higher education and training, goods market efficiency, labor market efficiency, financial market development, technological readiness, market size) corresponded to Manufacturing Efficiency Driven Economies. The third Innovation and Sophistication Factors sub-index pillars (business sophistication, innovation) synchronized to Innovation Driven Economies. Ethiopia is still a primary commodity driven economy. The country is really struggling in growing its manufacturing, value added (% of GDP)  from 4 percent in 2024 to the planned target of 17.2 percent in 2030.

A comparative review of Switzerland which was ranked first globally (67.5 percent score) versus Ethiopia which was placed at number 130 (12.3 percent score) in the 17th edition of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Global Innovation Index (GII) 2024 on ‘Unlocking the Promise of Social Entrepreneurship’, would be able to highlight best practices Ethiopia needs to review to become a world class innovation driven economy. Ethiopia ’s innovation inputs-outputs global rankings stood at (133rd -112th) versus Switzerland’s (2nd-1st).Ethiopia ’s benchmark comparator Asian Tiger economies were led by Singapore at 4th globally (61.2 percent), South Korea 6th (60.9 percent), and Hong Kong 15th (50.1 percent). Comparator Asian Tiger Cub economies had Malaysia at 33rd (40.5 percent), Thailand 41st (36.9 percent), Viet Nam 44th (36.2 percent), Philippines 53rd (31.1 percent), and Indonesia 54th (30.6 percent). Latin America was led by Brazil at 50th (32.7 percent) and Chile at 51st (32.6 percent).  Ethiopia was ranked 6th in Sub-Saharan Africa with Mauritius leading at 55th (30.6), South Africa 69th (28.3 percent), Botswana 87th (23.1 percent), Cape Verde 90th (22.3 percent) and Senegal 92nd (22 percent).  North Africa was led by Morocco at 66th (28.8 percent), Tunisia at 81st (25.4 percent) and Egypt at 86th (23.7 percent).The comparison between Ethiopia  Vis a Vis Switzerland will be across all seven pillars of WIPO GII which include; institutions, human capital and research, infrastructure, market sophistication, business sophistication, knowledge and technology outputs, and creative outputs.

Creative Destruction Theory on Innovation Economics.

Joseph Schumpeter (1883-1950) entrepreneurship theories argued that entrepreneurs drive technical progress and innovation of a nation and that large companies use their capital to invest in research and development of new products and services, distribute them cheaply to consumers and thus raise the standard of living of economies. Schumpeter’s 1942 book on  ‘Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy’ posited that changes in institutions, entrepreneurs, and technological changes drive economic growth and that capitalism is an evolutionary process of continuous innovation and creative destruction / Schumpeter’s Gale (a process where new innovations replace and make obsolete older innovations). Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson in their 2012 book ‘Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty’ argues that countries reach stagnation and start decline because political elites block creative destruction thus thwarting innovation.

Pillar 1- Institutions- Ethiopia’s Score of   39.6 Percent Vs Switzerland 87.7 Percent.

Ethiopia  needs to improve its innovations institutional environment (operational stability for businesses- political, legal, operational or security risks, GOK effectiveness- quality of the civil service and policy implementation) as Switzerland at a score 92.4 percent is 3.51 times higher than Ethiopia ’s 26.3 percent. Innovations smart regulatory environment (regulation quality- sound private sector policies, rule of law- property rights and contract enforcement) requires mending to rise from 21.4 percent to Switzerland’s 89.2 percent.Easing of Doing Business Environment (policy stability for doing business, entrepreneurship policies and culture) is requisite with Ethiopia scoring 29 percent versus Switzerland at 81.5 percent.

Pillar 2- Human Capital & Research- Ethiopia’s Score of   7.2 Percent Vs Switzerland 61.8 Percent.

Increasing budget allocation to education (expenditure on education % of GDP, government funding per secondary school pupil percent of GDP per capita, expected years from primary to tertiary, PISA scores for age 15 years on reading, mathematics and science; secondary teacher to pupil ratio) is needed to close the gap between Ethiopia’s score of 16.2 percent compared with Switzerland at 65.1 percent. Attention to tertiary education (tertiary gross enrolment percent of relevant age group, STEM graduates percent of all graduates, inbound mobility- percent of foreign students) percent) is vital in improving Ethiopia ’s score from a low of 4.2 percent to Switzerland’s 50 percent. A Marshal Plan on research and development (Full time employed researchers per a million people, Gross Expenditure on R&D percent of GDP, Top 3 global corporate R&D expenditure in million USD$, Average top 3 universities QS ranking) is paramount to move Ethiopia ’s score from a dismal 1.4 percent to Switzerland’s 70.4 percent.

Pillar 3- Infrastructure – Ethiopia’s Score of   21.5 Percent Vs Switzerland 60.8 Percent.

Ethiopia  ICT infrastructure scored 26.3 percent as compared to  Switzerland’s 82.1 percent (Access of mobile/internet/MNO network, Use- fixed broadband internet cost percent of GNI per capita and GB per subscription/mobile data and voice cost percent of GNI per capita/mobile broadband internet GB per subscription/ Active mobile-broadband subscriptions per 100 people ; Electronic government online services- services/technology/institution /content/electronic participation; Digital public participation). General Infrastructure (electricity output GWH per million population/logistics performance index/gross capital formation share of GDP) has a catch up gap to bridge with a 17 percent score versus Switzerland at 50.4 percent. Ecological Sustainability (PPP$ GDP per total energy supply/ percentage of low carbon energy use/ ISO 14001 EMS Certificates Issued Per Billion PPP$ GDP) saw Ethiopia score 21.2 percent as contrasted with Switzerland’s score of 49.9 percent.

 Pillar 4- Market Sophistication- Ethiopia’s Score of   5 Percent Vs Switzerland 66.5 Percent.

Ethiopia at 5.1 percent versus Switzerland’s 70.8 percent means the country needs to reform access to credit (finance for startups and scale ups, domestic credit to private sector percent of GDP, loans from MFIs percent of GDP). Increasing mobilization of capital for listed and private enterprises is needed to enhance Ethiopia’s really low score of 0.4 percent versus Switzerland’s 64.9 percent on investments (market capitalization share of GDP, number of venture capital investors deals per bn PPP$ GDP; number of venture capital recipients deals per bn PPP$ GDP; venture capital value received share of GDP).Reducing average tariffs , increasing manufacturing diversification by lowering Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) and increasing domestic market scale (country’s PPP$ GDP) is key for helping Ethiopia  grow its trade, diversification and marketing scale score from 9.5 percent to Switzerland’s 63.9 percent.

Pillar 5 – Business Sophistication- Ethiopia’s Score of   13.3 Percent Vs Switzerland 67.2 Percent.

Raising proportion of knowledge intensive employment of total (legislators, senior officials, managers, professionals & associates, technicians), share of firms offering formal training, GERD implemented by business as share of GDP, proportion of GERD financed by business of total and female employees with advanced degrees share of total should assist Ethiopia  mature its knowledge workers score from 7.2 percent to Switzerland’s 71.2 percent. Scaling Ethiopia ’s low score of innovation linkages at 12.2 percent as compared to Switzerland at 80.4 percent demands rise in public-private co-authored research publications share of total, university-industry R&D collaboration, width and depth of industry clusters, number of strategic alliances and joint ventures (JVs) deals per bn PPP$GDP, and number of patent families filed in at least two countries per bn of PPP$ GDP.  Knowledge absorption score for Ethiopia  can be grown from 20.6 percent to Switzerland’s 50.1 percent, by increasing Intellectual Property Rights- IPR payments share of total trade, high tech (aerospace; computers and office machines; electronics and telecom; pharmacy; scientific instruments; electrical machinery; chemistry; non-electrical machinery; and armament) imports share of total trade, ICT services imports share of total trade, FDI net inflows share of GDP and share of business enterprise research staff share of the country’s total research staffs.

Pillar 6 – Knowledge & Technology Outputs – Ethiopia’s Score of   14.7 Percent Vs Switzerland 65.1 Percent.

Increasing number of patents per bn PPP$ GDP, number of Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) applications per bn PPP$ GDP, number of Utility Model- UM patent rights applications per bn PPP$ GDP, number of published STEM articles per bn PPP$ GDP and number of published articles with a H citation is the holy grail of raising Ethiopia ’s knowledge creation score from 14.6 percent to Switzerland’s 78.7 percent. Ethiopia ’s knowledge impact score  of 23.9 percent can be raised to Switzerland’s 55.9 percent through interventions which grow the rate of GDP per employed person (labor productivity), increase the combined valuation of the country’s unicorns percent of GDP, grow software spending percent of GDP and accelerating the high technology and medium-high technology (MHT) output as a percentage of total manufacturing output. Knowledge diffusion score in Ethiopia at  a low of 5.7 percent  can be enhanced to Switzerland’s 60.7 percent by investing in increasing receipts from Intellectual Property Rights-IPRs percent of total trade, complexity (sophistication) of production and export (Economic Complexity Index), high tech exports percent of total trade, ICT exports percent of total trade and number of ISO 9001 Quality Management System certificates issued per bn PPP$ GDP.

Pillar 7 – Creative Outputs – Ethiopia’s Score of   5.2 Percent Vs Switzerland 67.1 Percent.

Growing Ethiopia ’s intangible assets score from 1.9 percent to Switzerland’s 61.7 percent needs raising of the country’s top 15 companies intangible assets value proportion of their total value, number of trademark applications per bn PPP$ GDP, top 5000 firms brand value percent of GDP, and number of industrial design applications per bn PPP$ GDP.

Ethiopia  has a Herculean task in raising its creative goods and services score from 0.1 percent to reach Switzerland’s global high of 59.7 percent by increasing its cultural and creative services exports as a percent of total trade, number of feature films produced per million of population aged 15-69, Global Telecom, Entertainment & Media Outlook per million of population aged 15-69, and value of creative goods exports over total trade.

Ethiopia’s online creativity score of 18.1 percent lags Switzerland’s 85.4 as it has to increase the number of Generic Top Level Domains (TLDs- .biz, .info, .org, .net,.com) per thousand population aged15-69, number of batched changes received and sent by publicly available projects on GitHub and global downloads of mobile apps per bn PPP$ GDP.

Ethiopia ’s innovation economy can further benefit from doubling efforts on several game changer innovation and technology targets in its 10 Years Development Plan by 2030. Ethiopia targets to increase access to mobile and internet from 37.2 percent and 18.6 percent respectively to 100 percent by 2030 more so given heightened competition to Ethio Telecom after licensing of Safaricom and another 3rd MNO (Mobile Network Operator).  In 2022, Ethiopia’s mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) stood at 57 percent versus Hong Kong at 319.5 percent.  Individuals using the internet (share of population) in Ethiopia stood at 16.7 percent in 2021 compared with Malaysia at 97.7 percent in 2023. WIPO Global Innovation Index (GII) 2024 ranked Ethiopia 130/133 with a score of 12.3 percent as opposed to Singapore which was ranked 4/133 and scored 61.2 percent. Universities and TVETs commercialization of research (spinoffs; spinouts) and hackathon culture. Building entrepreneur ecosystems and industry clusters. Angel investor networks to fund an Ethiopian ‘startups nation’’. Early stage venture capital and private equity including setting up of corporate venture funds by Ethiopia’s private sector.

You can reach the writer nikaminduku@gmail.com