Monday, September 28, 2026
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Name:Rahel Nigussie

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2 Education : ( የት/ት ደረጃ)

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3 Company Name ( የካምፓኒ ስም)

Rich Coffee

4 Title; : ( የስራ ድርሻህ)

Owner

5 Founded in; ( መቼ ተመሰረተ )

2013

6 What it do; (ምንድነው የምትሰሩት)
Coffee and Tea services

7 Head quarter ( መስሪያቤት )
Addis Ababa

8 Start up capital ( በምን ያህል ገንዘብ ስራዉን ጀመርሽ/ክ)
5,000 birr
9 Current capital ( የአሁን ካፒታል )

Above 800,000 birr

10 Number of the Employees ( የሰራተኞች ቁጥር )

6

11 Reason for Starting the business ( ለስራው መጀመር ምክንያት )

My passion for the work

12 Biggest perk of ownership ( የባለቤትነት ጥቅም)

Working toward my goal and making it a reality

13 Biggest strength ( ጥንካሬህ/ሽ)

By not giving up and being able to focus only on the future

14 Biggest challenge ( ተግዳሮቶች ምን ነበሩ)

The veranda/street-side work I used to do was very difficult

15 Plan : ( እቅድ)

Establishing my own coffee house

16 First Career ( የመጀመሪያ ስራ) :

Housemaid in Beirut

17 Most interested in meeting (መገናኘት የምትፈልገው ) :

Ethio Telecom CEO Frehiwot Tamru

18 Most admired person ( የምታደንቀው ሰዉ)

Abraham Afewerki

19 Stress reducer ( ጭንቀትን የሚያቀልልሽ/ለህ) :

Talking with my husband

20 Favorite book:( የመፅሐፍ ምርጫ)

The Bible

21 Favorite past time ( ማድረግ የሚያስደስትህ) :
Helping and supporting my family

22 Favorite destination ( ከኢትዮጵያ ወጪ መሄድ የምትፈልገው/ጊዉ ስፍራ):

Jerusalem

23 Favorite automobile ( የመኪና ምርጫ) :

Range Rover

Invest in Ethiopian cities startup ecosystems for a transformational and sustainable private sector led economy

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Government versus Private Sector Led Economies

State led command and mixed economies are characterized by government owning major means of production. The state allocates resources via directs investments. The government directly controls prices be it for inputs, goods, services, Foreign Exchange (FX) or interest rates. They feature dominance of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and substantial corporate shareholding ownership in strategic markets. Government has direct management of macroeconomic outputs. They have highly centralized long run national plans, active strategic industrial policies and state interventions through subsidies.

The World Bank’s 2023 Business of the State (BOS) report showed Ethiopia had at least one traditional SOE in slightly over 40% of all economic sectors and at least one BOS firm in 50% of all sectors. The World Bank contends that traditional State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) firms focus on central government and majority ownership while Business of State (BOS) BOS is any firm with at least a 10% public sector ownership stake. The World Bank highlights that that complex, indirect, subnational, and minority state ownerships are very prevalent globally more so after Covid19 pandemic with these types of enterprises generating half of all BOS related revenues.

Private sector led market economies on the other hand has the market forces of demand and supply allocating resources, managing production, and determining prices. Individual households and businesses own the means of production, make investment decisions, and operate based on profit maximization motives. Government roles in these economies is limited to providing public goods and services (for instance national defense, protecting lives and property, maintaining law and order,  infrastructure (roads, railways, bridges , airports, seaports, energy, ICT, water, sanitation), regulating markets, market infrastructures and institutions  , preventing monopolies and market dominance.  

Ethiopia is widely acknowledged to be in the midst of transitioning from a government led economy hinged on mega state infrastructure into a private sector led economy anchored on the ingenuity and resilience of her entrepreneurs. The late Meles Zenawi Asres (9 May 1955 – 20 August 2012) who served as Ethiopia’s President between 28 May 1991 and 22 August 1995 and Prime Minister between 23 August 1995 and 20 August 2012 architected the 1991 to 2018 Ethiopian government “developmental state” model. This was heavily influenced by the successes of China, East Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan) and Tiger Cub (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam) model. The results were outstanding from heavy direct investments to modernize the economy via railways, roads, dams, industrial parks, monopolies (telecommunications, banking, aviation, logistics, and power) and a double digit GDP growth of around 10% in the period 2005 – 2019.

            Heavy public borrowing led to macroeconomic imbalances. Output gap between the economy’s actual GDP and its long run potential full employment GDP. Divergence between national savings and national investments. Aggregate demand outpaced aggregate supply causing high inflation which further created economic uncertainty, severely eroded purchasing power, disproportionately impacted lower-income households, and distorted interest rates. Labour market supply of workers outpaced demand by job creators (government enterprises and MSMEs) leading to high unemployment. .

Fiscal deficits from government expenditure outpacing tax revenues (PAYE, corporate income tax, VAT, excise tax, customs and duties), SOEs dividends and appropriations in aid (A-in-A) fees led to public debt borrowings ‘’crowding out’’ the private sector from credit markets. The external sector current account deficit imbalances emanated from goods and services imports exceeding exports. The current account deficits signified high dependency on foreign capital to finance domestic consumption and investments, heavy burden of repaying principal and interest on the foreign currency debt and made the local currency vulnerable to excessive depreciation.

Ethiopia from 2018 onwards started embarking on reforms which will culminate into a dynamic private sector led economy. The Home-Grown Economic Reform (HGER) agenda was launched in 2019 to address major economic and structural imbalances (GDP output gap, savings investment gap, inflation from aggregate supply versus aggregate demand imbalances, fiscal deficit from government revenues lagging expenditure and public debt ‘’crowding out’’ the private sector from credit and current account deficit from imports exceeding exports occasioning foreign debt pressures and Ethiopian Birr depreciation. Phase II of the HGER is hinged on pillars across macroeconomic and financial sector stability, promoting private sector–led growth, expanding trade and investment , unlocking productive potential, and strengthening institutions.

Invest Heavily in Ethiopia’s Startup Ecosystems in Ethiopian Cities for Rapid Private Sector Development (PSD).

The Global Startup Ecosystem Index (GSEI) by StartupBlink has been updated annually since 2017 and currently ranks the startup ecosystems of 1,473 cities and 118 countries. It levers three sub-scores. The quantity sub score measures the activity level of the ecosystem. This includes the number of startups, ­ the number of investors, the number of co-working spaces, the number of business incubators and accelerators, and the number of startup-related meetups.

The quality sub score assesses the impact and success of the activity in the startups ecosystem. These include private sector startup investment, the number of startup employees, and the ­ number and size of Unicorns and exits above USD$1Billion. It also covers the traction of startups (traffic, domain authority, and customer base), ­ bigtech research & development (R&D) centers, branches of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) and value of exits with a valuation below US$1B. Other parameters includes the ­ number and size of global startup events and conferences held in the country or city,  ­ the presence and impact of Pantheon members and global startup influencers, the number of startups accepted by top global accelerators per ecosystem, as well as the number and market capitalization of listed companies in technology sectors.

The business environment sub score evaluates how supportive the overall conditions are for startup growth. This includes the diversity index, internet speed, cost of internet, internet freedom, R&D investment, and availability of various technological services (payment portals, ride-sharing apps, cryptocurrency). It further comprises of the level of English proficiency, the country’s passport strength, availability of startup or Nomad Visas, corporate tax rate, startup-friendliness of labor laws, and Corruption Perception Index-CPI. The other indicators includes the number of peer-reviewed scientific papers published, the sovereign debt credit score, top universities per location ­and corporate startup activity per location.

The StartupBlink local ecosystem partner is Entrepreneurship Development Institute [Ethiopia]. Ethiopia’s startup ecosystem innovators business environment global ranking in 2026 stood at number 120 of 125 nations. The country posted an annual startup ecosystem growth rate of +4.4% as the ecosystem value grossed USD$1.1 Billion which ranked 84/125. Ethiopia Software and Data industry ranked 99/125.

Addis Ababa startup ecosystem was ranked 422nd in the global top 1,000 cities with its 5.5% annual ecosystem growth rate proving to be inadequate to keep pace with faster growing global peers culminating in its 32 spots annual drop. The city total score stood at 1.044 which constituted a national share   of 100% .The Minister for Labor and Skills, H.E Ms. Muferiat Kamil, noted that, “Ethiopia’s reform-driven administration has created a supportive legal and policy environment that empowers private businesses to innovate and expand, thereby strengthening entrepreneurship nationwide and beyond. We are witnessing the emergence of a bold generation of innovative entrepreneurs willing to take risks and establish diverse businesses.”

The most notable startups ecosystem builders includes the Ministry of Innovation and Technology (MInT) which oversees national innovation policy, startup ecosystem strategy, and digital transformation programs including the Next Ethiopian Startup initiative and ICT Park development. The Entrepreneurship Development Institute (EDI) Institute under the Ministry of Labor and Skills delivers entrepreneurship training, business development services (BDS) and access-to-finance programs and it’s also the national host of the UNCTAD EMPRETEC program. International Finance Corporation (IFC) through private sector investment, telecom liberalization advisory, digital skills programming, and Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) capacity building for the capital market. IceAddis is Ethiopia’s first innovation hub and tech startup incubator, providing co-working space, incubation, acceleration programs, and ecosystem advocacy through continental networks such as AfriLabs.

The key startup ecosystem milestones in Ethiopia includes the 2011 launch of IceAddis as the first innovation hub and tech startup incubator. The government set up the Ministry of Innovation and Technology in 2018 to lead national digital transformation and ecosystem growth. Safaricom launched commercial mobile services, ending decades of state telecom monopoly in 2022. Climate tech startup Kubik closed a record US$ 5.2 million seed round in 2024 to expand sustainable building material production. Parliament in 2025 passed the Startup Business Proclamation which established a formal legal framework and a national startup fund.

The valuations of leading startups on DealRoom Ethiopia with aspirations to reach the USD$1bn Unicorn status includes Komari Beverage, an FMCG founded in 2017 valued at $104—156m which offers lightly sweet fruit-flavored cocktails with zero sugar and carbohydrates that include 5% ABV in apple, lime and pineapple flavors, providing consumers with a high-quality beverage option that fits all occasions. Roha Medical Campus which offers affordable and advanced healthcare services through various hospitals and facilities is valued at $168—252m. Standard Bank Group was the exclusive financial adviser to M-BIRR which raised €8m ($9.8m) worth of equity in 2018 from European Investment Bank (EIB). EthioChicken founded in 2010 raised almost USD$ 3 million in 2017 and is today valued at $20—30m.

Ride (Hybrid Designs is the dominant ride-hailing mobility and logistics platform in Addis Ababa.Yegara host is a meaningful portal for social participation and self-discovery. Gebeya valued at $8—12m is a pan-African tech talent and marketplace platform providing software-as-a-service (SaaS) and workforce solutions launched in 2016.Chapa is an Ethiopian financial service and a global data engineering technology-based service provider of payment gateway, payment instrument, and bill aggregator solutions. Dodai is a Japanese e-mobility company focusing on the manufacturing and assembly of electric motorcycles and batteries launched in 2021 valued at $32—48m.Belcash / HelloCash provides fintech and digital payments. ArifPay provides digital point-of-sale (POS) and mobile payments has an enterprise value of $14—21m.

Call to Action for Transformation of Ethiopia’s Startup Ecosystem.

Ethiopia needs to become a startups nation serially churning out transformational USD$1billion valued Unicorns through interventions including taxpayer funded incubators and accelerators; pervasive university ideathons, hackathons, venture capital funds, spin-ins, spin-outs, spin-offs; and corporate venturing and venture capital funds. Other investments in the startup ecosystem external environment includes Ethiopia’s 12 Pillars of the World Economic Forum (WEF’s) Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), the 16 Criteria of the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), the Edelman Trust Barometer Performance , the 4 Clusters of the Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance – IIAG, the 11 World Bank Topics on Ease of Doing Business Conditions and 7 Pillars of the World Intellectual Property Organization Global Innovation Index.

Migwi Nduku can be reached via nikaminduku@gmail.com

Prosperity gospel, false prophets and the money scam

Religion has historically functioned as a source of moral guidance, spiritual meaning, and social cohesion. Across centuries, faith institutions have offered comfort to the poor, challenged injustice, and shaped ethical values within society. Yet religion has also repeatedly been exploited by individuals who weaponise belief for personal gain. In contemporary Christianity, the rise of the Prosperity Gospel and the emergence of self-styled “Prophets” have transformed sections of the Church into highly profitable enterprises where faith is increasingly commercialised. Behind promises of miracles, healing, and financial breakthrough lies an uncomfortable reality. For many false prophets, religion has become one of the most successful money-making scams of the modern era.

The Prosperity Gospel is built upon a simple but powerful theological claim in which God rewards faithful believers with material wealth, good health, and personal success. Poverty and suffering, by contrast, are often portrayed as signs of weak faith, spiritual failure, or demonic attack. Popularised through Pentecostal and charismatic movements, this doctrine has gained enormous influence in the United States, Africa, Latin America, and beyond. The current trend in Ethiopia is indeed alarming. Its appeal is particularly strong in economically fragile societies where unemployment, inequality, corruption, and social insecurity leave millions desperate for hope.

At first glance, the prosperity message appears empowering. It encourages optimism, discipline, ambition, and belief in the possibility of transformation. For many struggling individuals, hearing that their circumstances can change through faith provides psychological relief and emotional motivation. However, beneath the rhetoric of empowerment lies a deeply problematic theology that often turns religion into a transactional marketplace.

In many prosperity churches, faith operates according to economic logic. Congregants are instructed to “sow seeds” by giving money to the church or prophet with the expectation that God will multiply their offering in return. Donations are framed not merely as acts of generosity but as spiritual investments guaranteed to produce divine profit. The more one gives, believers are told, the greater the blessing. In this system, God becomes less a moral or spiritual figure and more a supernatural financier dispensing rewards to paying customers.

The consequences are alarming. Vulnerable individuals often donate beyond their financial capacity because they fear missing divine favour or delaying their miracle. Some believers surrender savings, salaries, pensions, or property in pursuit of promised breakthroughs that never materialise. Meanwhile, many prosperity preachers accumulate extraordinary wealth through tithes, offerings, television ministries, books, conferences, and branded religious merchandise. Luxury cars, private jets, designer clothing, and multimillion-dollar mansions are frequently displayed as visible proof of God’s blessing.

The contradiction is striking. Religious leaders who preach sacrifice, humility, and devotion often live lifestyles indistinguishable from corporate elites or entertainment celebrities. Yet followers are encouraged to interpret this wealth not as exploitation but as evidence of spiritual authority. The prophet’s success becomes the product being sold. “If you follow me,” the message implies, “you too can access divine prosperity.”

This is where the issue of “False Prophecy” becomes central. Historically, False Prophets have been defined not merely by inaccurate predictions but by their manipulation of people for power, influence, or wealth. In many contemporary prosperity movements, charismatic leaders cultivate unquestionable authority by presenting themselves as uniquely chosen by God. Through dramatic miracles, emotional performances, prophetic declarations, and carefully managed media personas, they create environments where scepticism is discouraged and obedience is rewarded.

Critically, many so-called miracles are difficult to verify. Reports of staged healings, fake testimonies, paid actors, and manufactured prophecies have emerged across different countries and ministries. Someone with ample time and patience, can easily witness such practice in one of the very many so-called Prosperity Protestant Churches here in Addis Ababa. Some prophets sell “anointed” products such as miracle water, holy oil, stickers, wristbands, or private consultations (Gust House Prayer time in hotel rooms) for substantial fees. Others promise supernatural cures for illness, infertility, unemployment, overseas visas, or financial hardship. Such practices exploit desperation while masking commercial transactions in spiritual language.

The rise of Celebrity Prophets cannot be separated from broader economic and cultural conditions. Contemporary society increasingly celebrates wealth, visibility, and entrepreneurial success. Social media platforms reward spectacle and emotional engagement, while neoliberal economic systems encourage individuals to treat themselves as personal brands. Prosperity Prophets operate effectively within this environment because they merge religion with entertainment, marketing, and aspirational consumer culture.

In many ways, the Prosperity Gospel mirrors capitalism itself. Success is individualised, failure is personalised, and systemic inequality is ignored. Rather than challenging poverty as a structural issue linked to corruption, exploitation, or unequal economic systems, prosperity theology often places responsibility entirely on the individual believer’s faith. If blessings do not arrive, the problem is rarely the prophet or the system; it is supposedly the believer’s lack of faith.

This narrative is particularly dangerous because it shifts attention away from social justice. Instead of confronting political corruption, unemployment, or inequality, prosperity preaching frequently encourages passive spiritual dependence. Congregants are taught to wait for miracles rather than demand institutional accountability or economic reform. Religion becomes an escape from material hardship rather than a force for social transformation.

The irony is that many core Christian teachings directly challenge this obsession with wealth. The biblical tradition repeatedly warns against greed, exploitation, and the worship of money. Jesus Christ criticised religious hypocrisy and condemned those who turned sacred spaces into centres of commerce. His teachings consistently prioritised compassion, humility, and care for the poor over material accumulation. Early Christian communities emphasised communal sharing and solidarity, not conspicuous consumption.

This does not mean religious institutions should reject money altogether. Churches require financial resources to operate, support communities, and sustain charitable work. The ethical issue emerges when spiritual authority becomes a mechanism for financial manipulation or personal enrichment. Accountability, transparency, and ethical leadership are therefore essential within religious institutions. Without them, faith communities become vulnerable to exploitation disguised as divine revelation.

Supporters of prosperity theology often argue that critics focus excessively on abuses while ignoring positive outcomes. Many prosperity churches provide emotional support, social belonging, and practical assistance to members. Some genuinely encourage entrepreneurship, education, and personal discipline. For individuals living in contexts of hopelessness, the language of possibility can be transformative.

Yet positive intentions cannot excuse systemic exploitation. When religion promises guaranteed wealth in exchange for money, it risks becoming indistinguishable from a commercial scam. The danger lies not only in financial loss but in spiritual disillusionment. Many believers who invest emotionally and financially in false promises are left devastated when miracles fail to occur. Some lose faith entirely, while others remain trapped in cycles of guilt, shame, and dependency.

Ultimately, the prosperity gospel reveals a profound crisis within modern religious culture. It reflects societies where success is measured primarily by wealth and visibility, and where spirituality itself can be commodified for profit. False prophets thrive because they offer certainty in uncertain times, hope in desperate circumstances, and emotional spectacle in an increasingly anxious world.

However, religion loses moral credibility when it becomes a business model built upon the exploitation of vulnerable people. Faith should challenge greed, not sanctify it. It should comfort the oppressed, not enrich the powerful at their expense. The true danger of false prophets is not merely that they deceive individuals, but that they distort the ethical foundations of religion itself.

In an era where prophets increasingly resemble corporate executives and churches operate like commercial brands, believers must ask difficult questions about accountability, truth, and power. The challenge facing modern Christianity is not whether wealth and faith can coexist, but whether religion can resist becoming another marketplace where salvation is bought, miracles are sold, and desperation is transformed into profit.

Africa can break the debt trap by trading more with itself

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Africa’s debt crisis will not be solved by borrowing alone, nor by waiting for rescue from outside the continent. The more durable answer is to grow the continent’s own markets, strengthen production, and expand intra-African trade so that African economies can generate more of the revenue they need at home.

For decades, many African countries have relied on external financing to cover budget gaps, fund infrastructure, and stabilize currencies. That model has left governments vulnerable to exchange-rate shocks, rising global interest rates, and sudden changes in investor sentiment. When debt service rises, social spending, development programs, and public investment are usually the first to suffer. The result is a cycle in which countries borrow to survive, then borrow again to repay the last round.

Breaking that cycle requires a shift in strategy. Africa must stop treating itself mainly as a collection of small national markets and start behaving like one large economic space. The African Continental Free Trade Area is the clearest path toward that goal. If it is implemented seriously, it can create scale, deepen industrialization, and keep more value within the continent. But trade agreements alone are not enough. Governments must remove the practical barriers that still make it easier to trade with Europe, Asia, or the Gulf than with a neighboring African country.

The first barrier is infrastructure. Goods cannot move cheaply across Africa if roads are poor, rail links are weak, ports are congested, and border posts remain slow and unpredictable. A trader in Kigali should not face more difficulty shipping to Nairobi than to Rotterdam. The same applies to a manufacturer in Accra trying to sell in Abidjan or a farmer in Ethiopia trying to access regional markets. Better logistics is not a luxury; it is the foundation of trade-led growth.

The second barrier is regulation. African businesses still face a patchwork of customs rules, product standards, permit systems, and payment procedures. These frictions raise costs and discourage cross-border commerce. Governments should harmonize standards, simplify customs procedures, and digitize clearance systems so that goods can move faster and more transparently. Regional trade should not depend on political speeches; it should depend on predictable systems that firms can trust.

The third barrier is finance. African trade needs African money. One reason intra-African trade remains underdeveloped is that many transactions are still settled in foreign currencies, exposing firms to exchange-rate risk and higher costs. Regional payment systems, local-currency settlement arrangements, and stronger correspondent banking links can reduce those burdens. If an importer in Uganda can pay a supplier in Tanzania more easily in regional currency, trade becomes simpler and cheaper. That is how markets deepen.

Africa also needs to build more regional value chains. Too many countries export raw materials and import finished goods at a premium. That pattern drains foreign exchange and leaves economies exposed to price swings. Instead, countries should specialize within the continent: one producing inputs, another processing them, another assembling finished goods, and others providing logistics and services. This is how trade becomes a ladder out of debt rather than another reason to borrow.

At the same time, governments must support small and medium-sized enterprises, which are the backbone of any meaningful regional trade system. Large firms can navigate high compliance costs and distant markets, but smaller businesses often cannot. If Africa wants trade to reduce debt pressure, SMEs need access to trade finance, market information, insurance, and export support. Without them, intra-African trade will remain a policy slogan rather than an economic engine.

There is also a political dimension. African leaders must resist the temptation to measure success by how much external financing they attract. The better measure is how much domestic wealth they mobilize and how much regional trade they enable. A continent that consumes what it produces, processes more of what it exports, and circulates capital within its own markets will be less dependent on lenders and more resilient in a volatile world.

Debt will not disappear overnight. Many countries will still need external financing for some time. But the terms of dependence can change. If Africa trades more with itself, it will earn more in local value, build more industrial capacity, and reduce the foreign exchange drain that makes debt so dangerous. Intra-African trade is not just a commercial agenda. It is a debt strategy, a development strategy, and a sovereignty strategy.

The continent’s future will not be secured by borrowing its way forward. It will be secured by building an economy that can stand on its own feet, with African goods, African markets, and African confidence at the center.