Africa has been increasingly drawn into conflicts and faces difficulty in preventing or managing them. At the Fourth India-Africa Forum Summit to be held on May 28-31, India can announce assistance to the continent in capacity-building in training, logistics, and technology. India-Africa defence industrial cooperation, particularly in affordable equipment and maintenance capabilities tailored to African conditions, will align with its evolving needs.

The assassination of the Defence Minister of Mali by jihadists in a suicide bombing on April 25 was the latest security shock in Africa. The rise of radicalised groups like Al Shabab and Boko Haram and dozens of others loosely connected with Al Qaeda and Islamic State has created security complications for the continent, from Somalia to Nigeria. They have led to military coups overthrowing governments in Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, which, in turn, have dissociated themselves from France, their traditional security provider, and withdrawn from the regional Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). These shifts are unravelling the African Union Peace and Security Architecture^[1](APSA), set up in 2002 to prevent, manage and resolve crises and conflicts within Africa.

APSA has had few successes. Africa faces over 50 ongoing armed conflicts, with over 35 million people displaced. Major hotspots include the Sudanese civil war, violence in the eastern Congo, and insurgencies across the Sahel – Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Other significant conflicts exist in Somalia, Nigeria, and the Central African Republic.^[2]

Since 1946, Africa has accounted for nearly a third of international armed conflicts, underscoring its persistent security challenges. In recent decades, conflicts are increasingly internationalised, with external interventions rising sharply from 12 cases (1991–2010) to 27 (2011–2021). The period after 2014 saw a notable surge, peaking in 2015–16.

Total military spending across Africa grew by 8.5% in 2025 from 2024 to an estimated $58.2 billion. Algeria is the largest spender ($25.4 billion), and Nigeria is increasing expenditure by 55% from the previous year to $2.1 billion.^[3]

Why does peace consistently evade Africa, despite having, in the African Union Peace and Security Architecture, the most ambitious regional security governance frameworks in the contemporary international system? APSA, established alongside the transformation of the African Union from the Organization of African Unity, was a decisive normative and institutional shift from the principle of non-interference to that of “non-indifference.”^[4] This evolution reflected Africa’s recognition that sovereignty could no longer serve as a shield for atrocities, unconstitutional changes of government, or state collapse. APSA sought to be a comprehensive framework of institutions, norms, and operational mechanisms for “African solutions to African problems.”^[5]

The core of APSA is the Peace and Security Council (PSC), a standing decision-making body designed to function as Africa’s equivalent of a collective security council. Comprising 15 member states with varying tenure, the PSC is mandated to undertake conflict prevention, authorize peace support operations, impose sanctions, and coordinate post-conflict reconstruction. Its authority is supported by four principal pillars: the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF), and the Peace Fund. Together, these form a layered architecture that integrates diplomacy, intelligence, military readiness, and financial support.

The Panel of the Wise^[6] is APSA’s preventive diplomacy arm – a proactive action to prevent disputes from arising, and stop existing ones from escalating into violent conflict. It consists of eminent African personalities tasked with mediation, quiet diplomacy, and advisory functions – but without enforcement authority. That hobbles its active efforts in electoral mediation and conflict de-escalation efforts in countries such as Kenya and Burkina Faso. The Panel of the Wise consists of five respected African personalities tasked with advising the PSC and the AU Chairperson. It runs parallel to the African Forum for Former African Heads of State and Government^[7]which leverages the expertise of former leaders to support current governance, conflict resolution, and development initiatives across the continent.. Individual leaders like Thabo Mbeki, through his eponymous foundation and Olusegun Obasanjo, through his non-profit African Leadership Forum for young leaders, have been individually active. These have certainly contributed to embedding a culture of preventive engagement within African conflict management practices.

Other entities of APSA, like the Continental Early Warning System to anticipate and mitigate conflicts before escalation, and the Africa Standby Force (ASF) with five regional standby-brigades have uneven efficacy, limiting their transformative potential.

The ASF struggles with issues of readiness, interoperability, logistics, and political authorization. Although ad hoc coalitions such as the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram and the G5 Sahel Joint Force have demonstrated Africa’s willingness to act, they have often operated outside the formal ASF framework, highlighting both flexibility and institutional weakness. When in 2017 Mozambique faced insurgency in Cabo Delgado, the SADC ASF took a long time to be ready. Instead, Rwandan troops came and quelled the insurgency at the French behest.

There have been successes, for sure, over the past two decades. APSA has significantly strengthened Africa’s capacity for peace support operations, as seen in missions in Somalia (AMISOM/ATMIS), the Central African Republic, and Sudan. These interventions underscore the normative shift toward proactive engagement and collective responsibility. APSA has deepened coordination between the AU and RECs, creating a multi-layered security governance system that reflects Africa’s regional diversity.

However, a central challenge for APSA is financial dependency. Despite the establishment of the $610 million Peace Fund, the architecture has relied heavily on external donors, particularly the European Union, for operational and administrative costs. This undermines African ownership and constrains strategic autonomy. Efforts to enhance financial self-reliance, including the AU’s 0.2% import levy on all imports from outside Africa, have progressed slowly and unevenly.

The “Silencing the Guns” initiative, the flagship project of the AU’s Agenda 2063, encapsulates APSA’s long-term ambition to end violent conflict on the continent. Yet, the outcomes of this 2013 initiative have fallen short of expectations. While some conflicts have de-escalated, new and complex threats, such as violent extremism in the Sahel, insurgencies in Mozambique, and persistent instability in Libya and Sudan, have proliferated. The changing nature of conflict, characterised by non-state actors, transnational networks, and climate-related pressures, has tested APSA’s largely state-centric design.

A critical issue has been the gap between normative ambition and political will. The effectiveness of APSA mechanisms often depends on consensus among member states, which is not always forthcoming. Divergent national interests, concerns about sovereignty, and varying levels of commitment have frequently delayed or diluted responses. This has been particularly evident in situations requiring rapid intervention or sanctions against member states.

Despite these challenges, APSA does its best. Its greatest success lies perhaps not in resolving all conflicts, but in creating a framework within which African actors can collectively address security challenges. The architecture has normalized intervention in cases of grave circumstances and has elevated peace and security as central pillars of continental integration at least as aspirations.

Strengthening APSA will require addressing structural weaknesses. Enhancing the operational readiness of the ASF, bridging the early warning-early action gap, and ensuring sustainable financing are critical priorities. Equally important is adapting the architecture to emerging threats, including cyber insecurity, maritime piracy, and climate-induced conflict.

Can India play a positive role in this significant African effort? Certainly. As a long-standing partner of Africa and a major contributor to United Nations peacekeeping operations, India is well-positioned to support APSA. At the Fourth India-Africa Forum Summit to be held on May 28-31, India can announce assistance to APSA for capacity-building in training, logistics, and technology for early warning systems. India-Africa defence industrial cooperation, particularly in affordable equipment and maintenance capabilities tailored to African conditions and expanding cooperation in maritime security, counter-terrorism, and cyber resilience, will align with APSA’s evolving needs. Importantly, India’s Harambee development partnership model, emphasizing local ownership and demand-driven assistance, resonates with APSA’s foundational principle of African-led solutions.

In this way, India can be a catalyst in enhancing APSA’s transformation of Africa’s approach to peace and security. On its part, Africa through APSA must consolidate the gains, overcome persistent constraints, and better manage the rapidly changing security landscape.

Gurjit Singh is a former Indian Ambassador to Germany and author of The Durian Flavour: India, ASEAN and the Act East Policy. He is currently promoting the impact investment movement for implementing SDGs in Africa.

This was first published on Gateway Housem

Second, financing mechanisms must be reimagined. Critical minerals projects are capital-intensive and carry high risks. A blended finance model, combining public funding, private investment, and multilateral support from institutions such as the African Development Bank or trilateral partners, can unlock scale

As New Delhi prepares for the India-Africa Forum Summit IV, the agenda must move decisively beyond traditional development cooperation toward shaping the future economic architecture. Few areas demand such urgent and imaginative collaboration as critical minerals. The race for cobalt, lithium, rare earths, and other strategic resources is not simply about trade; it impinges on industrial sovereignty, energy transition, and geopolitical leverage. For India and Africa, this moment offers both a challenge and a shared opportunity to co-create a sustainable, resilient, and equitable supply chain.

Africa sits at the heart of this transformation. With nearly a third of global reserves of key transition minerals, the continent is indispensable to the clean energy revolution. Countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia and Tanzania are already central to global production networks. Yet, Africa’s historical experience with extractive industries has been marked by limited value addition, volatile revenues, and uneven development outcomes.

Today, through frameworks like the African Union’s Africa Mining Vision and the African Continental Free Trade Area, there is a clear determination to change that trajectory toward beneficiation, industrialisation, and regional value chains. India’s ambitions in electric mobility, renewable energy, semiconductors and defence manufacturing depend on secure access to these minerals. Yet India remains import-dependent, on China -led supply chains, which dominate processing and refining. This structural vulnerability has strategic implications.

Without reliable access to inputs, India’s manufacturing growth and energy transition could be constrained. The India-Africa partnership has a positive ambiance. PIO companies are already embedded across African mining ecosystems, particularly in copper, cobalt, tin, and tantalum. The paradox is that their output flows not to India but to China due to the absence of predictable systems such as long-term offtake agreements, competitive financing, and streamlined procurement. In global commodity markets, certainty drives decisions. Where China offers integrated, state-backed ecosystems, India’s engagement is fragmented.

This is where where IAFS-IV could introduce a new template that brings governments and the private sector into a coordinated partnership. First, India must move from a transactional to a systemic approach. This requires building a full-spectrum supply chain strategy: upstream access, midstream processing, and downstream industrial integration. At the upstream level, India needs to anchor long-term partnerships with African producers, not merely through MOUs, but through bankable projects backed by sovereign or quasi-sovereign guarantees. Indian companies operating in Africa should be integrated into a national critical mineral framework, incentivized to align their production with Indian demand. Second, financing mechanisms must be reimagined. Critical minerals projects are capital-intensive and carry high risks. A blended finance model, combining public funding, private investment, and multilateral support from institutions such as the African Development Bank or trilateral partners, can unlock scale. Intellecap and an Indian consulting company have successfully undertaken this for solar projects in Africa, and it may be replicated. Long-term offtake agreements, backed by Indian public sector undertakings or industry consortia, would provide the predictability that African producers seek. They also then attract private equity players. Third, the midstream segment of processing and refining must be a central pillar of cooperation.

Today, the bulk of value addition occurs outside Africa, mainly in China. This is neither globally sustainable nor aligned with African aspirations. India and Africa can jointly invest in processing facilities, utilising partnerships with other G-7 countries. Such a distributed model would allow Africa to capture greater value locally, while enabling India to build its own midstream capabilities. Already, companies like Lohum India are attracting global interest in this segment Here, collaboration with Japan adds a powerful dimension. Japan brings advanced technology, project structuring expertise, and access to capital. Its vision of an Indo-Pacific–Africa economic corridor aligns closely with India’s outreach and Africa’s development priorities. A trilateral India-Africa-Japan framework could create competitive alternatives to existing supply chains, particularly in high-purity processing and battery materials. This was discussed around TICAD9 in Yokohama in August 2025. The Pax Silica also offers such opportunities, which India needs to integrate into its partnership with Africa. Fourth, downstream integration must drive the entire strategy. The goal is not simply to secure raw materials, but to embed them within industrial ecosystems that generate jobs, innovation, and value. India’s “Make in India” initiative and production-linked incentives can serve as anchors for industries such as electric vehicles, battery manufacturing and electronics. African countries, in turn, can develop complementary industries, leveraging AfCFTA to build regional value chains. This creates a virtuous cycle in which secure supply enables industrial growth, which in turn sustains demand. Equally important is sustainability. The future of critical minerals cannot replicate the environmental and social costs of past extractive models. Ethical mining practices, community participation, and environmental safeguards must be integral to any India-Africa partnership. This aligns not only with African priorities but also with global expectations, particularly as supply chains come under increasing scrutiny from regulators and consumers alike. Connectivity and logistics form another critical layer. The Indian Ocean is the natural bridge linking African resources to Asian manufacturing hubs. Initiatives such as India’s SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) and broader Indo-Pacific frameworks can be leveraged to strengthen maritime infrastructure, port connectivity and supply chain resilience. Efficient logistics will be essential to ensure that new supply chains are not only secure but also cost competitive.
Finally, the role of the private sector must be elevated from that of a participant to that of a partner. Governments can set the framework, but execution will depend on the industry. This requires institutional platforms where businesses, financiers, and policymakers can align strategies, share risks, and co-create solutions. Indian-origin entrepreneurs in Africa can serve as vital bridges in this process. IAFS-IV presents a pivotal moment. It can either reaffirm existing patterns of engagement or catalyse a shift toward future-oriented cooperation. The latter demands bold thinking: converting goodwill into structured partnerships, aligning national strategies with continental visions, and bringing together diverse actors into a coherent ecosystem. The global contest for critical minerals will only intensify in the coming decade. For India and Africa, the choice is not whether to participate, but how. By building a sustainable, diversified, and inclusive supply chain, potentially strengthened by partnerships with Japan and the US under Pax Silica. They can not only secure their own economic futures but also reshape the global landscape. In doing so, they would move from the margins of supply chains to their very centre, as co-architects of a more balanced and resilient world order.

Gurjit Singh is a retired ambassador and author