Monday, May 11, 2026
Home Blog Page 3273

An Agenda to Reform Party Affiliated Companies in Ethiopia Seid Hassan and Minga Negash

0

Introduction
On October 5, 2018, on the Ethiopian privatization, together with our coauthors, we attempted to draw the attention of policymakers to some of the grey areas of selling public assets. The grey areas mentioned were state ownership of land and “the 100 or so companies operating as “endowments” and other privately-held public interest economic entities.” The endowment companies are affiliated with ethnic political parties, by each of the constituents of the now-defunct EPRDF. We argued that it makes no sense to privatize State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) like the Ethiopian Telecom, sugar factories and industrial parks and leave party business untouched. We argued that ethnic-party-affiliated businesses are not only instrument of unaccountability and corruption but also major sources of conflict and atrocity and economic crimes and spoilers of clean elections. In this commentary, we argue that the conflict in Tigray, despite the enormous cost to human lives and resources, has created an opportune moment for a “big bang” approach to reform the ethnic party-affiliated business sector, if there is the political will.
On November 17, 2020, the Ethiopian Attorney General’s Office announced the freezing of the bank accounts of TPLF-affiliated conglomerate-the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray (EFORT) and its 34 subsidiaries, accusing them of being in cahoots with the now-defunct TPLF led regional government of Tigray and participating in financing ethnic-based conflict, acts of terrorism, tax evasion, corruption, illicit financial flows, thereby seeking to derail and overthrow the country’s “constitutional order.” The same source informed us that these enterprises benefitted from preferential policies, tax waivers, and loans from state-owned financial institutions with little or no collateral. If the allegations are correct, an interesting policy question arises as to whether the other ethnic party-affiliated endowment companies are doing the same, arguably on a smaller scale. The accusation came as no surprise to the authors of this commentary. In our previous works and commentaries which illuminated how conflict assets were recycled into a legitimate business and how the entities are obstacles to political liberalization, fair economic development and exacerbate corruption, nepotism, and government unaccountability.
Corruption Networks and the Privatization Debacle
Cross-country studies have documented the link between corruption and privatization, and in transition economies, some have been asking whether privatization can be done without corruption. The evidence from developing countries is that the IMF conditionalities largely do not involve strong corruption abatement strategies, and hence “large-scale privatization should be avoided especially under conditions of weak accountability”. The Ethiopian case has not been an exception. The ruling regime, with the tacit support of international financial institutions, used the privatization process to transfer the SOEs’ assets to powerful individuals, ethnic political party-owned/affiliated enterprises and the Mohammed International Development Research and Organization Companies (MIDROC) conglomerate at throwaway prices. To date, there are no publicly known corruption mapping strategies to identify the theft and retrieval of public assets, and much of the publicized actions appear dramatic and episodic primarily targeted at those who are on the losing side of the power games.
The tactics employed in transferring publicly owned enterprises to political party affiliated companies and other vested interests included exploiting institutional voids and bureaucratic corruption such as, selling the SOEs without competitive bidding or using the worst form of valuation, depleting the value of SOE assets- designed to depress their sale prices, bid-rigging that included revealing bids to (ethnic) cronies, canceling bids without cause, cutting procurement procedures, subcontracting main contracts to the losing bidders, official self-dealing and expropriations. The consequences of the faulty privatization have been serious. First, and at the basic level, it is not clear what percentage of the proceeds from the sale of public assets have been remitted to the government’s coffers. It is also not clear how the buyers financed the acquisitions and whether the debts from state banks were paid off. Second, it has led to the commanding heights of the economy being in the hands of a few ruling party-owned conglomerates known as EFFORT, MIDROC, and foreign private equity funds who are known for hunting privatizations in developing countries. The beneficiaries have been the clientelist kleptocratic-politicized ethnic elite cartel which are competing to capture the economics as well as the politics.
Corporate and public sector reform before privatization
The Government of Prime Minister Abiy is under immense pressure. With the United States and European Union freezing aid disbursements, the indications are that the IMF and World Bank-supported economic recovery program is already in jeopardy. Geopolitical dynamics, lack of cohesion within the ruling party, COVID 19, desert locust, armed conflict, and large internally displaced people (close to 3 million) have exacerbated the uncertainty and the economic misery indices (inflation, the collapse of the currency, debt, deficit, bank illiquidity, unemployment, and refugees)-the cumulative effects of which may oblige the cash trapped government to dispose state assets at throwaway prices. The evidence however shows that governments do not fall simply because of sanctions and economic misery (witness: Eritrea, Iran, Venezuela, North Korea, Syria, Zimbabwe, etc.). Dictators and illiberal regimes thrive under these settings. Furthermore, the evidence presented so far is that economic liberalization requires much more careful study, prudence, and pragmatism than being driven by external pressures and ideological predilections (e.g. neo Marxian-neo liberal- prosperity gospels) especially in old nations like Ethiopia whose history is replete with resistance to colonialism.
In our ongoing research, version of which was presented at Vision Ethiopia’s 2018 7th Conference that was held in Addis Ababa, we documented, among other things, the opaque business-political relationships that Ethiopia was, and still is, engulfed with the highest form of corruption known as state capture. Gradual reform under conditions of state capture has proved to be impossible. We argued that the Ethiopian state capture is more serious and dangerous than what the World Bank investigators and other authors discovered in transition countries. In Ethiopia, the evidence is that ethnicity has become not just a governance problem but also a threat to peace and national security. Political leaders wear multiple hats: as business owners, board members of SOEs, corporate and ethnic parties associated companies, policymakers, as the military’s top brass, national security officers, diplomats, etc., by which the state-business boundary is completely fused; the. bureaucracy and media are opportunistic; good. norms, ethic and cognitive-cultural values of public service are hard to find. The 2018 presentation and the economics panel that attracted several news outlets that included the attention of the State-owned Ethiopian News Agency, called for a clear separation of powers and decoupling of the state, the party, and the economy. We take that statement further and argue that Proclamation No. 46/1993; Article 27 (2), which states that a political party “may not directly or indirectly engage in commercial and industrial activity” is unenforceable given the de facto problems of accountability in government, the ruling and opposition parties, and the in the ownership structure in the economy.
The TPLF is not the only ethnic party that has affiliated business enterprises in the country, as there are also Tiret in Amhara; Tumsa in Oromia; and Wendo in the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Regional State (SNNPRS). We do not fully know the link between the parties that rule the other regions and their business structures/affiliations. They appear to operate along similar organizational lines as EFFORT and are intertwined, in one way or another. For example, “like EFFORT (and Tumsa and Wendo) Tiret has shares in Wegagen Bank, and Walta Information Centre, and its regional credit and savings organization” (Vaughn & Gebremichael, 2011). It is, therefore, important to recognize that the rapacious ethnic-politico-business empire would still be alive and well as long as the authorities target only EFFORT and its subsidiaries. That is, since these party-affiliated/owned companies have been doing more or less the same, the authorities who claim to be change agents should not fail to see how deep their roots go right under their noses. The political costs of not including the Amhara, Oromo, SNNPRS and other ethnic party-controlled enterprises in the reform process would be inviting ill will, a sense of being expropriated by one ethnic group from the other, exacerbate/sustain the conflicts, and vendetta – seeking vengeance against TPLF’s wrongs. Not including the other party owned entities in the reform would be like, in the parlance of the corruption/anticorruption lexicon: “Under the TPLF, its tribesmen ate. Now it’s our turn to eat.”
Turning a crisis into an opportunity
Looking for a silver lining of a crisis and seeking for opportunities to seize on as WWII winds down, it is said that it was Winston Churchill who reportedly said, “never let a good crisis go to waste.” His approach is known to have contributed to the creation of the United Nations which was done in collaboration with Stalin and Roosevelt and other nations. It was Rahm Emanuel, President Obama’s chief of staff who popularized the expression and Churchill’s insight during the great recession of 2008. Along similar lines, many companies are now leveraging the Covid-19 pandemic, turning the crisis to their advantage, as for example, looking into the many advantages of working from home. The ability to transform a crisis into an opportunity and embarking the country on a different path is the hallmark of all successful leaders. Big crises and great opportunities rarely come together, and we believe that the current situation in Ethiopia should be considered as such.
Above, we showed the problems at hand and alluded to what is to be done. In our ongoing work which deals with the accountability of party-owned businesses, we explore alternative issues ranging from “do nothing”, i.e., keep status quo ante and let the endowment companies continue ravaging the Ethiopian economy, to “do something”, i.e., choose a reform- under which several alternatives reveal themselves that we refrain from enumerating here to save space. We also explore whether to go piecemeal or reform with a “bang”, each of which has its variants.
Given the continuity of TPLF’s grip on the Ethiopian polity and the economy, we thought, earlier, that a phased or piecemeal approach to tackling corruption was the “second-best” action for tackling the Ethiopian corruption conundrum, especially because the new Prime Minister’s approach was one of a slow motion-gradual reform. We did so although corruption in Ethiopia is highly systemic and the establishment of an anti-corruption agency did not deliver what it was supposed to do (Hassan 2019). Furthermore “big bang” fight against corruption networks run the risk of turning into conflict as the stakes are high. Despite the recognition that it requires collective actions to tackle it, and that gradual reform had the potential to fail, but thought doing something was better than the alternative especially when ethnicity is the corner stone of governance and politics. Now that TPLF’s political calculus has gone wrong, the “big-bang” method of reform has availed itself. Therefore, if Ethiopia is going to have a decent post-conflict economic recovery, this mixing of business with politics, the ethnically centered enterprise empire-building, and few family-controlled conglomerates need to be reformed. The opportunity should not be missed.

The authors are respectively, Professor of Economics at Murray State University and Professor of Accounting at Metropolitan State University of Denver and the University of the Witwatersrand. The views expressed here are personal and do not reflect the views of the institutions the authors are associated with.

How can Africa’s fashion entrepreneurs access finance to grow their businesses?

Enhancing access to finance for Africa’s fashion entrepreneurs is critical if the industry is to develop its full potential and tap global markets in a post-COVID-19 world. That was the topline message at a Fashionomics Africa webinar hosted on 10 December by the African Development Bank and the HEVA Fund.
Roughly 150 fashion entrepreneurs and creative minds attended the fourth edition of the Fashionomics series, focused on finance. The discussion covered the challenges faced by fashion entrepreneurs, especially women and youth, in Africa’s creative industries.
Participants were also presented with opportunities to access finance from investment funds including the Alithea IDF Fund, for which the African Development Bank is an anchor investor; the Women’s Investment Club (WIC) Capital; the African Export-Import Bank; the State Bank of Mauritius; Thundafund and Senegalese clothing brand, SARAYAA.
Vanessa Moungar, Bank Director for Gender, Women and Civil Society said the ongoing pandemic has prompted adaptations and innovations to keep Africa’s $31 billion fashion industry thriving.
“The crisis provides an opportunity to set up targeted support mechanisms and develop new and innovative financial tools for the textile, apparel and accessories industry that will not only help the entrepreneurs make it through, but set the basis for them to grow their businesses going forward,” she said.
Evelyne Dioh Simpa, managing director at WIC Capital, which invests in businesses run by women in Francophone West Africa, stressed the importance of developing financial products and capacity building tailored to fashion entrepreneurs.
Safiétou Seck, founder and creative director of SARAYAA recently attracted $230,000 in investment from WIC Capital to expand operations and grow the brand.
“For me, banking was the best option to scale up my business. My advice would be: be patient, you are going to be rejected many times, but fashion is going to make you stick with it,” Seck said of trying to raise capital.
New solutions, including alternative financing channels, will be key for fashion entrepreneurs, said Matt Roberts-Davies, chief operating officer of Thundafund, South Africa’s leading online crowdfunding marketplace for creatives and innovators.
He encouraged entrepreneurs to be brave. “Put yourself out there and find the crowd of people that loves what you do,” he said.
Fashionomics Africa promotes investments in the textile and fashion sectors by leveraging data, information and communication technologies to drive development. The initiative also aims to increase entrepreneurs’ access to finance via traditional and non-traditional channels, while providing business skills to start-up founder and staff as well as to micro, small and medium-sized enterprises.
The Fashionomics Africa webinar series is available for fashion entrepreneurs, digital enthusiasts and creative minds on the Fashionomics.

Egypt had never been a true friend of Sudan in history

0

By Habib Mohammed
Egypt’s occupation to Sudan had lasted for about 100 years. Beginning from the early 19th Century, Egypt had occupied Sudan following the Nile river route up to the southern tip of the country. It also occupied the capital Khartoum. The conquest was led by Mohammed Ali’s third son Ismail Kamil Pasha. Ismail’s force use explosives to blow open a navigable water way to pass though his ships and declared their control of Sudan from (1920-1924).
While many African countries have been cooperating to free themselves from colonial rule, Egypt restored its rule to Sudan as part of a condominium, or joint rule with Britain. Sudan, under the Anglo- Egyptian rule, (1899-1955) suffered a lot because of Egypt’s role of allying with colonial powers. During the Anglo-Egyptian occupation, Egypt had caused all sources of harm to its neighbor Sudan for over half a century. The Sudanese had lost every of their identity, treasures and material and spiritual wealth. They have been abandoned to their sense of nationalism and succumbed on their own land. Even after Sudan got its independence Egypt has never been showed up respect to Sudan with its continued provocative act in its northern border to destabilize the country. In addition, Egypt’s common strategy was setting up different coup attempts, in order to dismantle Sudan’s internal stability and its government by supporting different militant groups within the country.
Egypt was not a good neighbor of Sudan rather an enemy.
The two countries shared border lands starching up1200 Km, and 2.5 million people live in the area. Since the1956 until now, part of the Sudanese territory called “Haliyab”,which is highly rich in mineral resources had remained under Egypt’s control. The region is considered to have 700 tons of magnesium resource. It is also rich in gas and oil resources. Even though, Sudan has never been stopped trying to re-take Haliyab from Egypt using military and diplomacy efforts, the area is still under the control of Egyptian forces.
Ever since, Egypt’s historical influence and control of the region in defying Sudan’s sovereignty, the two countries were seen each other as enemies rather than good neighbors. By the decision of Egyptian government, the two countries boarder had been closed and no trade activities was taken place. Such situation particularly affected the “Nubian” tribes living along the border of the two countries, though they share the same language, religion and race. The Nubians in Egypt also faced marginalization because of their blacks kin color and are not treated equal citizens of Egypt.
Egypt always calculate its development plan at the expense of the Sudan
Egyptian leaders thinks, Sudan must lose something for Egypt to benefit. They need to put Sudan in conflict to pacify their country. Such type of relationship they want to establish with their neighbor Sudan is back routed to former leaders of Egypt. For example, When Egypt built the “Aswan” dam near the Sudan boarder, in1960, they were calculating that the reserve wire of lake “Nasir” to be laying on the Sudan’s territory. With such plan more than two hundred thousands of inhabitants were displaced and made to settle on desert leaving their fertile land.
Egypt’s contributions for the creation of South Sudan was immense
Egypt do not benefit from strong Sudan. Deferent leaders of Egypt has been working to split Sudan in to different countries over time. And such historical legacy of Egyptian governments has evolved up to the current Abdulfetah Al sis’s regime. The secret plan of Egypt in Sudan is changing the country in to different smaller countries. And they execute such plan in two ways. Firstly they use internal approach. They support different militant groups in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile states through supplying military equipment’s, providing military training as well as giving diplomatic protection to such groups. Secondly, it uses external approach. One show case for such approach is Egypt’s ongoing effort of pulling Sudan in to war with neighboring Ethiopia. It is adamant that Egypt considered Ethiopia as its enemy because of its GERD project over the Blue Nile River.
Therefore, Cairo has strong interest to drag the current border dispute between Ethiopia and Sudan in to an escalated tension and it is putting its strategy in to action. However, border dispute between Ethiopia and Sudan has been common for hundred years now. Sometimes, minor exchange of fires between local security forces from both sides were noticeable. But there is no reason to change such dispute in to formal war. So, the question is, why it is needed to be an overriding phenomenon at this particular time? The answer is, because Sudan is currently under the rule of Egypt’s invisible hand. Sudanese transitional military council led by Lt-Gen Abdel Fattah Abdelrahman Burhan has promised to maintain the interest of Egypt and support were provided him accordingly mainly from Egypt and also from Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. As a result, Sudan started to maintain the interest of Egypt through igniting conflict in its border with Ethiopia to keep its promise. But Egypt is using Sudan as a deriving agent to fulfill its interest of solely benefiting from the Nile waters.
Sudan under modern colonial rule by Egypt
By receiving order form Egypt the country deployed 10,000 troops to fight in Yemen. Sudan is also paying role given by Egypt by escalating tensions along its broader with Ethiopia. Inflicting Ethiopia, ceasing its internal political situation as an opportunity is what both Egypt and Sudan is counting for, but the reality on the ground is different. Such salivation of Egypt in not new one, rather temporarily aggravates by analyzing political transition of both Sudan and Ethiopia.
The general picture here is that, Egypt is striving to destabilize the region by putting both Sudan and Ethiopia in conflict to satisfy its own interest on the Nile waters. So, Egypt is exerting action to change the status quo of good neighbors Sudan and Ethiopia to enmity.
What Sudan should really understand at this time?
Ethiopia is a true neighbor of Sudan. The two countries has long standing people to people relation. Ethiopia was agent for Sudan to print its own money. Ethiopia has always been there to pacify Sudan when it was in conflict by involving in various peace keeping operations in Sudan.
Sudan must act as a sovereign independent country able to maintain its own interest not working for third country, cognizant to the consequence which will by large involve itself.

Assessing the Achievements and Prospects of China-Africa Cooperation Towards Enhancing the Strategic Partnership

0

By Ali Issa
Current achievements in China-Africa Cooperation
Since the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was established 20 years ago, and the more recent initiation of the Belt and Road Forum for international cooperation, China has become Africa’s biggest economic partner. Across trade, investment and infrastructure financing, there is no other country with such depth and breadth of engagement in Africa. The multifaceted development cooperation has boosted trade and investment between the partners. In this context, China’s Foreign Minister Mr. Wang Yi underscored, (on 12 November,2020) at the occasion of the 2oth anniversary of FOCAC, that “trade between China and Africa hit US$208.9 billion in 2019, and total Chinese FDI in Africa reached US$49.1 billion, grown by 20 fold and 100 fold respectively, compared with 20 years ago”. Also, more than $200 billion has been generated in Chinese financial support for development projects in Africa as of end 2019.
Over the two decades since FOCAC, the massive economic and financial cooperation has generated large investments in economic infrastructure, in the form of construction of roads, railways, ports and power plants, which have made considerable difference in the economic and social development of countries in Africa. The post FOCAC collaboration between the partners also impacted well on the social developments of many countries, especially in the health and education sectors.
China’s expanding investments were supported by the Forum through promoting infrastructure development, encouraging Chinese enterprises to invest, and facilitating the development of SMEs in Africa. The inflows of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), both from government and private enterprises, facilitated and under FOCAC and Chinese finance enhanced the inclusive development potential of many African countries.
China has already become a big source of finance of Africa’s development endeavors. In September 2018, at the 7th FOCAC Summit, US$60 billion was pledged in financing for Africa, which included $15 billion in grants, interest-free and concessional loans; $20 billion in credit lines; a $10 billion special fund for development finance; a $5 billion fund for financing imports from Africa; and incentives to Chinese companies to invest at least $10 billion over three years. Most of the investments under the forum were allocated to projects: in roads and railways, power generation and distribution, and building economic zones and industrial parks that promoted opportunities for jobs and economic growth. The beneficiary countries utilized the Chinese investments as a means to foster and enhance inclusive growth and poverty reduction, for opening their economies to international markets, and attaining sustainable transformation.
Undoubtedly, Chinese investments and external financing have been indispensable part of sustained economic growth achieved in the beneficiary countries in the past 2 decades. Such investments have contributed to providing world class economic infrastructure, injected much needed capital, introduced new technologies and modern management know-how, and strengthened management of projects implementation in these economies.
The countries that have benefited from the Chinese investments have been those that succeeded in synchronizing their own national strategies with Chinese investments and external financing, so as to address the principal binding constraints on their national economies. The productivity gains and spill-over positive effects of these investments have permitted these countries to leverage the contributions made by the Chinese FDI and external financing.
The views of African policy makers and academics demonstrate that countries benefited significantly from the Chinese investment inflows during the 2 decades of the FOCAC. Accordingly, China’s economic and foreign relations approach is generally perceived positively in African countries. Most observers emphasize China’s diplomacy of non-interference, mutual respect and friendship with Africa, as being fully appreciated by key decision makers.
The current achievements are broad based but tell only part of the story, as the China-Africa cooperation extends to other key sectors, as declared at the 2018 FOCAC Beijing Summit to build a stronger community with a shared future. The deepening relationship thus covers beyond the economic cooperation, and extends to critical social sectors as demonstrated by the efforts to provide support for health and educational institutions and governance in African countries; and for peace and security missions in some states.
More specifically, there is much to commend the Chinese authorities’ efforts to assist African countries under the difficult circumstances of the Covid-19 pandemic. The global health and economic impact of this pandemic is creating huge economic and social challenges globally. China’s efforts to support African countries in surmounting these challenges and achieving post-pandemic recovery is vital to ensuring that economic achievements in recent years are sustained, and poverty reduction in recent decades is not reversed.
At such critical moment in the global fight against Covid-19 pandemic, commitments made at the extraordinary China-Africa virtual Summit on solidarity against Covid-19 (on 17 June 2020) promised to build a China- Africa community of health for all. These commitments made at the Summit in the words of President Xi Jinping included: “to mobilize necessary resources, stick together in collaboration, and do whatever it takes to protect people’s lives and health and minimize the fall out of Covid-19;” as well as a pledge “that once the development and deployment of Covid -19 vaccine is completed in China, African countries will be among the first to benefit”.
The gains achieved under the FOCAC and BRI cooperation have evidently built a shared community and substantial collaboration in the socio-economic fields. The remaining issues are how to strengthen cooperation within FOCAC and BRI on issues that are of high priority need and that improve people’s livelihoods and their wellbeing.
Towards enhancing the strategic partnership
The recent primary focus on trade, investment and finance of the China Africa relationship merits further examination and assessment; so as to increase and expand the core priorities fields, beyond the successes achieved in the economic and finance cooperation in the last 20 years. There are core areas of vital importance for the transformation of Africa that should be covered urgently, including (i) poverty reduction in fragile economies through learning from China’s successes; (ii) expanding efforts to develop Africa’s industrialization through accelerated technology transfers; (iii) avoiding the risks of accumulating unsustainable external debts; and (iv) addressing the impact of adverse climate change that is an existential threat to some African countries.
There are concerns that the investment and financial resources from China while key for some African countries growth and transformation, could aggravate the income inequalities within the continent and individual countries. First the top African recipients of Chinese finance and investments are relatively the more developed countries and/or those that have proven natural resources, such as minerals or hydrocarbons in abundance. Second, within individual countries, the projects that benefit from the Chinese financial and investment access are centered in few urban centers within high income countries.
The widening income inequality is contrary to the “Development Model of China”, which targeted and achieved phenomenal poverty reduction in the country in a few decades. The achievements of China’s transformation to eliminate poverty of 700 million of its population, both urban and rural, in a few decades is much desired and aspired to by Africans.
Certain challenges faced in some African countries, including endemic instability, insecurity, and poor governance lead to limited access to foreign direct investment and financial flows. In such countries, evidence of fragility and ineffective institutional governance clearly are contributing factors to insufficient access to China’s support, and thus different modalities of engagement (e.g. highly concessional credits and grants) should be explored.
Policy makers and academics have argued that successes of considerable home grown technological progress in China in the last 3-4 decades will permit African countries to tap into this know-how in a quick manner. The over whelming evidence, however, is that most of the skilled labor and advanced technology that built the base of China’s global success has yet to impact on Africa. It needs to be underlined that host countries capture technology transfers associated with FDI only when they achieve a certain threshold in terms of skills, technological capabilities, and viable industrial development. Accordingly, emphasis should be laid to support competitive industrialization in Africa on the basis of the Continent’s Free trade agreement, which is under implementation.
Some African countries have accumulated unsustainable levels of foreign public debts, raising the question of what sacrifices they may have to make to repay these loans. China has shown willingness to reschedule debts owed by several African countries in recent years; to cancel or suspend debt service obligations for African countries that are hardest hit by the coronavirus pandemic and are under heavy financial stress; and to participate in the G20’s debt service suspension initiative for countries facing debt distress.
In any event, it is the responsibility of borrowing governments to ensure that the terms and conditions of the loans and credits negotiated are affordable and are used for productive investments. Moreover, the acquired foreign financing ought to generate additional productive capacity, and add to foreign exchange earnings to meet debt service payments. Both the lending and borrowing countries should maintain caution, and ensure debt obligations would not lead to default and debt crisis; as they would both share the blame if “expenditures on vanity projects” lead a country to early debt distress. Responsible policy makers in African countries should be wary and vigilant that access to funding and its terms and conditions ought to be based on capacity of a country to maintain debt sustainability in the long term.
Many African countries are suffering from perennial drought and chronic food insecurity. The prevalence of undernourishment in such countries is more pronounced than anywhere in the world. Vulnerability to food insecurity is not only high but is becoming structural with most of the poor concentrated in arid and semi-arid ecosystems. Drought is one of the most pervasive climate events and has significant impact across the food value chain.
The affected countries lack the institutional capacity and advanced operational systems to effectively respond to the magnitude of climate change risks. This calls for establishment of an integrated response for resilience building to boost overall risk-management capacity, and deliver means of addressing climate crisis effects. In view of China’s success in building models of food security and addressing adverse climate impact on agricultural productivity; ways and means of collaborating in this critical area for human resilience should be set as a priority in extending the achievements.
The Chinese leadership has declared readiness to work with Africa countries on a framework of strategic cooperation on climate change to jointly tackle this challenge; as well as willingness to explore broader cooperation in new business forms as clean energy and advanced communications.
Over the past 2o years, FOCAC has considerably enhanced the cooperation and friendship of China and Africa, and the Belt and Road Initiative could further strengthen the relationships built over the period. Substantial mutual gains have been registered in the economic front as demonstrated by the current magnitudes of trade, investments and financial resource inflows from China, which have substantially transformed economic infrastructure.
The Effective cooperation has also been extended to social areas, particularly in building educational and health institutions capacities, and strengthening knowledge base across multiple productive sectors to assist in health and economic recovery. The cooperation in the preparedness for and mitigation of the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic has strengthened Chinese and African solidarity thus far. However, comprehensive assistance to Africa to address the pandemic is critical in meeting the challenges of the unfinished recovery from on-going health and economic crisis.
The broad China-Africa relations under the FOCAC and BRI have been immensely effective in the core areas of engagement; notably in the development of trade facilitation, investment promotion and access to finance. These current effective practices should be further strengthened and deepened, and the China and Africa strategic relations should be enhanced in fields that are vital for improving people’s lives and promoting sustainable development.

Ali Issa (PhD) is Managing Director of Horn Economic and Social Policy Institute