Initiative Africa announced that the preparation of organizing the 12th Edition of Addis International Film Festival (AIFF) is underway. The 2018 edition of AIFF will take place from May 1 – 6, 2018 at the Italian Cultural Institute and Hager Fiker Theater in Addis Ababa, and the university campuses of Adama, Hawassa, Bahir Dar and Mekele.
Organized by Initiative Africa, this year, the theme of the Festival is ‘Migration, Displacement and Climate Change’ and will be joined by several international film professional guests. Although the scope remains Migration and Displacement, the 2018 Edition will also screen films outside the core theme.
The documentaries, which will be screened this year around the above thematic area, aim to contribute to humanitarian efforts that enhance the protection of migrants, refugees, and internally displaced persons. Through the screening of relevant documentaries on the issues and the convening of discussions among experts and practitioners, the Addis International Film Festival (AIFF) is focused on addressing the key drivers of vulnerability among migrants and displaced persons, and foster a space for citizens to engage in exchange about challenges and dilemmas relating to sustainable humanitarian responses to migration and displacement.
This year AIFF expects to screen over 60 documentary films from around the world to over 7,000 attendees. Festival participants are mostly young professionals, university students, and members of the international community.
This year, AIFF invites young and women filmmakers to vie for two very exciting awards: ‘Young Filmmaker of the Year Award’ and ‘Woman Filmmaker of the Year Award’.
As in the past the 12th Edition of AIFF is accepting short (up to 30 minutes long) and feature (over 50 minutes long) documentary film submissions until March 15, 2018.
Since its inception in 2007, Addis International Film Festival has grown in scope and size from drawing less than 500 people, 9 films and one venue in its first year to over 7,000 attendants, 60 films and three venues last year. Overall, the Festival has screened over 630 films and attracted over 39k participants over the past 11 years.
The Festival expects to draw up to 10,000 attendants to its three venues and screen 70 short and feature local and international documentary films.
Addis International Film Festival now accepting short and feature documentary film submissions
Ethiopia: The relentless protests that forced the Prime Minister to resign
The stepping down of Hailemariam Desalegn will not satisfy Ethiopia’s protesters. But it is a start.
Hailemariam Desalegn has announced his resignation as Ethiopia’s Prime Minister and chair of the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF).
According to some analysts, the prime minister since 2012 was expected to step down at the EPRDF congress scheduled for later this year, but today’s move came as a surprise.
Desalegn said he would formally step down once a successor is chosen and claimed his departure was part of the government’s attempts to change how it operates. “I see my resignation as vital in the bid to carry out reforms that would lead to sustainable peace and democracy,” he said in a televised address.
The government has faced a crisis of legitimacy in recent years amidst huge protests across much of the country, particularly by members of the populous Oromo and Amhara ethnic groups. Hundreds of people have been killed in resulting clashes with security forces.
Desalegn’s resignation can be seen as a response to the fact these protests have continued despite brutal crackdowns and gestures of reform. As analyst Mohammed Ademo says: “Make no mistake. This momentous transformation isn’t a favor from a benevolent vanguard party. It’s the cumulative outcome of years of relentless struggle by democracy activists and opposition. Many died fighting to see this day.”
Oromo and Amhara protests
Ademo says Desalegn’s replacement is widely expected to come from the Oromo party in the ruling coalition. Protests in the Oromiya have been particularly sustained and this week saw a concerted three-day strike across the region. Enormous numbers blockaded roads and marches on the streets of towns and cities. An Oromo prime minister would not necessarily mean the regime would change it how it governs, but it would be a symbolic victory for the protests in that region.
However, as speculation grows about what happens next, protests in Ethiopia’s northern Amhara region – although generally lesser covered – should not be forgotten. Just last month, demonstrations flared up in Amhara too, resulting in bloody clashes and several deaths.
These weeklong events were triggered in the town of Woldiya when people taking part in a popular religious festival chanted anti-government slogans. Security forces responded violently, leading to the deaths of at least six civilians and one security agent. Angry at this bloodshed, protests then spread to the nearby cities of Kobo and Mersa where government offices and private property were attacked, leading to millions of dollars of damage. At least eight more people were killed in the resulting crackdown.
Grievances and triggers
These recent anti-government demonstrations are the continuation of those that emerged in late-2015. At that time, members of the Oromo and then Amhara – Ethiopia’s two largest ethnic groups, who together make up about two-thirds of the population – began protesting in huge numbers.
The grievances that triggered those protests were not resolved, but temporarily suppressed through force and the imposition of a state of emergency from October 2016 to August 2017.
The Oromo protests have deep roots and encompass widespread disaffection with the government regarding human rights abuses and lack of freedoms, but they were initially triggered by an urban development plan in the capital. Addis Ababa is located within the Oromiya region and activists complained that the proposed expansion would have seen it swallow up Oromia land and towns.
The Amhara’s reasons for protesting have been similarly manifold. They have demanded greater respect for human rights and democracy. They have called for more economic investment in the Amhara region to create employment and spur development. And they have expressed anger at an unfair political economy that disproportionately benefits supporters of the regime.
However, one of key triggers of the Amhara’s protests has been the disputed territory of Wolqaite. Activists claim that this large agricultural district was annexed by neighbouring Tigray regional state despite the fact its residents largely identify as Amhara, and a committee was established to campaign for its return. The government’s decision in 2016 to detain this group’s leaders using Ethiopia’s notorious anti-terrorism law was one of the main triggers of the widespread protests that followed.
It remains to be seen how many of these protesters demands will, and can, be met by a new EPRDF prime minister.
Infighting in government
As well as on the streets, growing discontent with the ruling class has also manifested in the corridors of power. In office since 1991, the ruling coalition known as the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) is composed of four ethno-nationalist parties. This includes the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), the Oromo Peoples’ Democratic Organisation (OPDO), and the Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (SEPDM).
However, by far the most senior and strongest party within the coalition is the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Representing an estimated 6% of the population, the TPLF oversaw the formation of the other three parties in government and handpicked their leaders.
Over the years, the TPLF has taken advantage of its dominance to favour its political base. Today, Tigreans dominate key political and economic positions, including in the army, security establishment, key federal ministries, and state-owned corporations such as Ethiopian Airlines and Ethio Telecom.
The government’s junior parties have typically been acquiescent. But with growing pressure from their constituencies, the OPDO, and to a lesser extent ANDM, have become more assertive. They have demandedless interference from the TPLF in their regional affairs and expanded political and economic roles at the federal level. At times, decisions and policy directions provided by federal authorities have been over turned by regional authorities, and vice versa.
Some are now suggesting the new prime minister will be from the OPDO. While this would be symbolically meaningful, it is too early to say how significant it would be in terms of governance. TPLF loyalists would still hold key positions and it is notable that outgoing Desalegn is not from the TPFL either, but the SEPDM. He was chosen by the former PM Meles Zenawi to be his successor and was viewed by many as a puppet of the TPLF.
Ethiopia after Desalegn
Years of unaccountability, the collapse of rule of law, and the ethnicisation of the country’s politics have pushed Ethiopia to tipping point. Injustice, repression and lack of democracy have instilled a sense of despondency, particularly among Ethiopia’s youth. This has driven many to view protests as the only viable means of bringing about meaningful political change.
As these sustained mobilisations have continued, the government has been forced to offer ever greater signs that it is willing to reform, most notably through Desalegn’s resignation as well as the recent release hundreds of political prisoners. But unless this leads to real steps to institute rule of law, redefine the political economy, and promote a fairer distribution of resources, discontent will only be staved off momentarily.
Protesters in Oromiya, Amhara and beyond may see the PM’s resignation as a victory, but they will crucially be watching closely for what happens next.
Gonje de Wadla is an assistant professor of public administration based in Ethiopia.
Putinomics-101
In late 2014, a headline “Putin Watches Russian Economy Collapse Along with His Stature,” blared in Time magazine. Yet three years have passed since the price of oil crashed in 2014, halving the value of the commodity that once funded half of Russia’s government budget. That same year, the Western countries imposed harsh economic sanctions on Russia’s banks, energy firms, and defense sector, cutting off Russia’s largest firms from international capital markets and high-tech oil drilling gear. Many analysts, both in Russia as well as abroad, thought that economic crisis might threaten President Vladimir Putin’s hold on power.
Today, IMF and World Bank report revealed that Russia’s economy has stabilised, inflation is at historic lows, the budget is nearly balanced, and President Putin is coasting toward reelection on 18 March 2018, positioning him for a fourth term as president of Russia. Russian media highlighted that fact that President Putin has recently overtaken Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev as the longest-serving Russian leader since Joseph Stalin. They also reported that economic stability has underwritten an approval rating of President Putin that hovers around 80 percent. Chris Miller, noted Russian expert, stated that “Putinomics” made it possible for Russia’s president to survive repeated financial and political shocks. Here, the most important question is, how did he do it?
Chris Miller noted that Russia survived the twin challenges of the oil price crash and Western sanctions thanks to a three-pronged economic strategy. First, it focused on macroeconomic stability, keeping debt levels and inflation low above all else. Second, it prevented popular discontent by guaranteeing low unemployment and steady pensions, even at the expense of higher wages or economic growth. Third, it let the private sector improve efficiency, but only where it did not conflict with political goals. This strategy will not make Russia rich, but it has kept the country stable and kept the ruling elite in power.
That said, the other question worth mentioning is that, does President Putin really have an economic strategy? According to Chris Miller, a common explanation of President Putin’s longevity is that he survives because Russia’s oil revenues keeps the country afloat. A number of economic analysts adamantly argued that Russia’s economy is known more for corruption than for capable economic management. But the Russian government could have adopted different economic policies and some of the alternatives would have made it harder for President Putin to sustain his hold on power. They might also have left Russians worse off. Consider what Russia looked like in 1999 when Vladimir Putin first became President: a middle-income country in which oil rents constituted a sizeable share of GDP. A country led by a young lieutenant colonel KGB officer committed to using the security services to bolster his power. A president who claimed the mantle of democratic legitimacy in part based on his ability to force big business and oligarchs to follow his rules, whether by fair or foul means.
A Russian economist, Anatoly Gregor explained that this could well describe Chavista Venezuela, still governed by an autocratic regime, still dependent on declining oil revenues, and still failing to build an economy based on rules rather than political whim. The difference is that Venezuela’s Chavistas spent recklessly during the oil boom while presiding over a mismanagement-induced collapse in oil production and, now, painful shortages of consumer goods created by poorly conceived price controls. According to World Bank estimates, Venezuela was wealthier on a per person basis than Russia in 1999. No longer now.
Willie Buster of Leeds University stated that the Russian government’s skill in mustering and distributing resources explains why the Russian elite has maintained power for nearly two decades and how it has deployed power abroad with some success. According to Willie Buster, many oil-fueled dictatorships squander their oil revenues on luxury goods like Ferraris and Fendi handbags. Russia’s ostentatious oligarchs have certainly accumulated their share of British football teams and hundred-million-dollar yachts armed with missile defense systems. But unlike its own spendthrift 1990s, Russia during the 2000s saved hundreds of billions of dollars during the good years, stowing resources in reserve funds for use when oil prices fell.
President Putin’s aim in economic policy has not been to maximize GDP or household incomes. Such a goal would have required a very different set of policies. But for President Putin’s objectives of retaining power at home and retaining the flexibility to deploy it abroad, the three-pronged strategy of Putinomics, macroeconomic stability, labor market stability, and limiting state control to strategically important sectors, has worked.
To understand Putinomics much better, let’s start with macroeconomic stability. Alexander Potonin of Warsaw University stated that Russia is a relatively rare kleptocracy that gets high marks from the IMF for its economic management. Why? Since the beginning of Vladimir Putin’s time in office, he and the Russian elite more generally have prioritized paying down debt, keeping deficits low, and limiting inflation. According to Alexander Potonin, having lived through devastating economic crashes in 1991 and 1998, Russia’s leaders know that budget crises and debt defaults can destroy a president’s popularity and even topple a regime, as Boris Yeltsin and Mikhail Gorbachev both discovered.
Willie Buster explained that when Vladimir Putin first took power, he devoted much of Russia’s oil earnings to paying back the country’s foreign debt ahead of schedule. In the current crisis, Russia has slashed spending on social services to ensure that the budget remains close to balance. In 2014, oil and gas earnings constituted around half of Russia’s government budget. Today, it is widely reported that oil trades at half the 2014 level, but thanks to harsh budget cuts, Russia’s deficit is around one percent of GDP which is far lower than in most Western countries. To ensure macroeconomic stability, President Putin has implemented a harsh austerity program since 2014, but there have been few complaints.
The second prong of President Putin’s economic strategy has been to guarantee jobs and pensions, even at the expense of wages and efficiency. During the economic shock of the 1990s, Russian wages and government pensions often went unpaid, causing protests and a collapse in President Boris Yeltsin’s popularity. When the recent crisis hit, therefore, the Kremlin opted for a strategy of wage cuts rather than allowing unemployment to rise.
The third prong of Putinomics is to let private firms operate freely only where they do not compromise the President Putin’s political strategy. The large role that oligarch-dominated state-owned firms play in certain key sectors is justified in part by their willingness to support President Putin in managing the populace by keeping unemployment low, media outlets docile, and political opposition marginalized. Alexander Potonin noted that the energy industry, for example, is crucial to the government’s finances, so private firms have either been expropriated or wholly subordinated to the state.
RETHINKING THE CRITICAL ISSUES-I
The current crisis in Ethiopia is forcing many a concerned citizen to rethink the founding principles and related issues that underlie the country’s governance system. In today’s installment, we will look at the judiciary or what it is supposed to deliver-justice. Ethiopia’s reigning federalism has put, amongst other things, the administration of justice, almost exclusively, in the hands of political appointees. Semantics aside, Ethiopia’s regional states are ethnically based and tend to be biased against ‘the others’. Nonetheless, the current political leadership in Ethiopia where EPRDF and affiliated political entities hold absolute power is being shaken to its core. Unintended consequences can potentially result in dislocating existing institutional setup!
Theoretically, justice is supposed to be impartial or blind to many outside factors that can potentially influence court rulings. The rule of law, facts, independence, ethics, integrity, morality and the likes, are important elements on which judgments are based. In our federal system, where the preponderance of ethnic politics is unavoidable, the delivery of justice had been significantly tainted, putting it mildly! With such undesirable interferences, some of the long established traditions associated with Ethiopia’s revered judiciary started to fade. The ‘Mafiosi State’ that operates clandestinely and leverages everything under the sky, manipulated court cases to satisfy its wanton desires. Such malpractices effectively removed the very glue that was holding Ethiopia’s diverse communities together, namely, trust & confidence in the judiciary! Consequently, the legitimacy of the court system and by implication the state itself, began to corrode. Without faith on the justice system, the subtle social compact developed through time and gave rise to relative peace between the diverse communities started to wane. Whether we like it or not, this, in a nutshell, is what happened in Ethiopia during the last quarter of a century. To recall: by the ‘Mafiosi State’, we mean the state that operates behind the formal state with immense political power leveraging all the institutions of government/ruling party. Its partners in crime are the famous oligarchs (foreign/local) under the tutelage of ‘godfathers’ of the ‘Mafiosi State’!
At the federal level, justice was also massively influenced by the ‘Mafiosi State.’ Again there are many blatant cases to illustrate the point. Ethiopia’s celebrated legal minds with tradition of fairness and erudition, found this degenerate behavior of the power that be absolutely repugnant and intentionally withdrew from the judiciary and related endeavors. In recent years, all rounded degeneration of justice delivery accelerated and the ‘Mafiosi State’ became the law onto itself! In the hands of the Mafiosi, justice became a political weapon to disfranchise and criminalize independently minded individuals and entities. At the federal level where ethnic politics is somewhat subdued (very mixed communities) and grievances can be conveniently hidden and ignored, the abuse of justice became frightening! Results are now clearly visible across this land of diversity. One of the rallying cries of the ongoing uprising is the resolute demand for justice! Mincing words in this late hour, we believe, only adds to confusion and mistrust. It is time to call a spade a spade. What is amazing in our twisted world is how many people are shocked by honesty and how few by deceit. (Noël Coward)!
“We can no longer afford to worship the god of hate or bow before the altar of retaliation. The oceans of history are made turbulent by the ever-rising tides of hate. History is cluttered with the wreckage of nations and individuals that pursued this self-defeating path of hate. As Arnold Toynbee says : “Love is the ultimate force that makes for the saving choice of life and good against the damning choice of death and evil. Therefore the first hope in our inventory must be the hope that love is going to have the last word. Now let us begin. Now let us rededicate ourselves to the long and bitter – but beautiful – struggle for a new world.” Rev. Martin Luther King. Good Day!
