Friday, October 16, 2026
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Air quality crisis

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In global climate discourse, carbon dioxide (CO2) commands almost every headline, summit agenda, and policy white paper. International climate diplomacy consistently frames environmental virtue through the lens of long-term decarbonization. Yet for cities like Addis Ababa, this singular focus on CO2 obscures a far more immediate, domestic public health emergency unfolding at street level: the silent crisis of black carbon.

Recent research conducted in collaboration with NASA’s Multi-Angle Imager for Aerosols (MAIA) mission provides an empirical wake-up call. Ground-monitoring data collected across Addis Ababa reveals that local concentrations of fine particulate matter (PM 2.5) average 30 micrograms per cubic meter—triple the annual health-based threshold set by international environmental benchmarks. More alarming still, average black carbon levels in the capital are four to nine times higher than those measured in major U.S. metropolitan centers such as Los Angeles, Atlanta, and Boston.

Black carbon is not an abstract climate metric to be addressed in decades-long cycles; it is toxic, inhalable soot born from incomplete combustion. Medical science is unequivocal about its physiological toll. When inhaled, these microscopic particles penetrate deep into the lungs and enter the bloodstream, triggering acute respiratory illnesses, cardiovascular disease, impaired cognitive development in children, and elevated risks of premature mortality. As environmental health researchers aptly observe, the continuous inhalation of this urban haze carries a physiological burden akin to chronic exposure to secondhand tobacco smoke.

Why must our policy orientation change? The distinction between carbon dioxide and black carbon is fundamental to crafting effective national policy. Ethiopia contributes less than a fraction of one percent to global CO2 emissions. While national afforestation and renewable energy initiatives remain admirable contributions to global stewardship, cutting domestic CO2 will not cleanse the air inhaled daily by millions of residents across our urban centers. Carbon dioxide lingers in the global atmosphere for centuries, meaning its climate benefits are diffuse and slow to materialize.

Black carbon, by contrast, possesses an atmospheric lifespan of merely one to two weeks. This brief duration represents a tremendous policy opportunity: aggressive, targeted local interventions can yield dramatic, measurable improvements in urban air quality almost immediately. The health dividends of reducing soot are entirely captured by the local population that enacts the reforms.

To seize this opportunity, municipal authorities and federal regulators must direct their regulatory firepower at the primary domestic culprits identified by ground-level sensors: aging diesel transport and household biomass combustion.

The MAIA ground network confirms that vehicular traffic generates severe pollution spikes during morning and evening rush hours, with diesel engines alone accounting for nearly 30 percent of urban PM 2.5. While the federal government took a forward-looking step by restricting the importation of internal combustion engine passenger vehicles, the commercial backbone of urban transit—heavy diesel trucks, construction machinery, and aging public minibuses—continues to operate with minimal emissions oversight. Stricter tailpipe emission standards, mandatory vehicle inspection regimes, and incentives for fleet renewal must be enforced without compromise.

Equally urgent is the domestic energy equation. Data shows that even after daytime traffic subsides, particulate pollution remains persistently high well into the evening. This secondary surge is driven by widespread household reliance on charcoal, wood, and other solid fuels for daily cooking. Traditional biomass combustion is both an indoor health hazard and a major outdoor pollutant. Municipal environmental strategies cannot succeed without accelerated investments in clean cooking technologies, including subsidized electric induction stoves, expanded urban power distribution, and accessible modern cooking alternatives.

Cultural celebrations and seasonal activities also produce intense particulate spikes. Ground monitors recorded black carbon concentrations during holiday bonfires that exceeded World Health Organization guidelines by more than eight times. While cultural traditions remain vital to national identity, public health authorities can introduce awareness campaigns and cleaner combustion practices to minimize toxic smoke exposure in dense residential areas.

Treating air quality solely as a climate change portfolio managed through global pledges misses the mark. Clean air is essential public infrastructure, as critical to economic productivity and social well-being as clean water, reliable electricity, or paved roads. Respiratory illnesses place an immense, preventable burden on healthcare facilities and erode national labor productivity.

As Ethiopia prepares for major international climate milestones, policymakers must distinguish between global climate diplomacy and urban environmental survival. Decarbonization is a global imperative, but eliminating black carbon is our domestic responsibility. By shifting focus from global CO2 abstractions to practical, localized interventions targeting diesel exhaust and household biomass, municipal leaders can deliver what citizens need most: breathable, healthy urban air.

EDIF weighs shift to ‘target fund’ model amid T-bill yield drops

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The Ethiopian Deposit Insurance Fund (EDIF), the statutory body established to protect retail depositors and bolster financial stability across the banking and microfinance sectors, is weighing a fundamental reform in how it assesses member contributions. Fund officials are exploring a transition from the current flat annual rate of 0.3 percent to a dynamic “target fund” model that factors in the specific risk profiles and liabilities of individual financial institutions.

The proposal comes as the fund accumulates tens of billions of birr in reserves while navigating yield compression on government securities, notably a sharp drop in Treasury bill (T-bill) yields alongside limited domestic investment outlets.

Currently, 31 commercial banks and 44 microfinance institutions operating in Ethiopia pay an annual premium of 0.3 percent calculated on their average total deposits.

“Since the EDIF began operations in 2023, member institutions have been required to pay an annual contribution of 0.3 percent of their average total deposits, alongside an initial contribution paid upon joining,” said Merga Wakweya, Director of Operations at the EDIF. He noted that the 0.3 percent rate was drawn from international benchmarks to build a financial safety net quickly.

However, fund leadership argues that a more sophisticated methodology is needed over the long term, moving away from a flat rate toward an actuarially determined target size.

“Right now, we simply calculate and collect 0.3 percent of the existing deposit pool,” Merga explained. “Our long-term objective is to transition to a structured, scientifically modeled target fund approach.”

Under the proposed model, the EDIF would establish a specific target reserve ratio relative to the banking sector’s aggregate insured liabilities. Once the reserve reaches the determined threshold, the fund could pause collections, issue pro-rata rebates, or adjust premiums based on institutional risk ratings.

A central operational challenge facing the fund is the sharp drop in T-bill yields. When the fund commenced operations, government securities offered returns of up to 18 percent, generating robust revenue on reserves. Yields have since decreased substantially.

Data from the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) shows that weighted-average yields on government securities fell from 15.59 percent in September 2025 to 5.79 percent in September 2026.

Results from the central bank auction held on September 2, 2026, reflected high market liquidity, with total bids reaching 74.18 billion birr against an offering of 43 billion birr, compared to 44.11 billion birr in bids recorded during the September 2025 auction. The downward trend across 28-day, 91-day, 182-day, and 364-day tenors has directly reduced the fund’s investment income.

“Where do we place the funds we continuously collect from institutions?” Merga noted. “We invest primarily in Treasury bills, effectively lending to the government. With yields dropping to roughly 6.87 percent, fund revenue is directly affected.”

Despite lower yields, fund leadership reiterated that investment decisions strictly prioritize safety and liquidity over aggressive returns.

Beyond T-bills, the fund holds roughly 2.36 billion birr collected from interest-free and Mudarabah deposits in accounts with the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE). Officials acknowledged that holding significant reserves directly within commercial banks is a temporary arrangement, as deposit insurers generally avoid redepositing funds into institutions they insure to prevent circular exposure.

To diversify its holdings, the fund is actively tracking the development of Sukuk (sharia-compliant securities) in Ethiopia, which could offer alternative fixed-income vehicles for its interest-free reserves.

Despite macroeconomic adjustments, the EDIF’s financial standing remains solid, with accumulated reserve balances reaching 45.57 billion birr by late 2026. The fund currently guarantees deposits up to 100,000 birr per depositor per institution, covering the vast majority of retail accounts.

The fund recently initiated its first statutory payout process following the liquidation of a microfinance institution whose operating license was revoked by the central bank. Beneficiary verifications and disbursements are underway for affected depositors in Addis Ababa and the Dilla area.

Under prevailing regulations, insured payouts must be executed within 90 days of a declared institutional failure, while depositors retain the legal right to claim entitlements for up to five years.

To enhance public understanding, the EDIF is drafting directives requiring commercial banks and microfinance institutions to actively disclose deposit insurance coverage in their customer communications and savings campaigns.

Established under Council of Ministers Regulation No. 482/2021, the Ethiopian Deposit Insurance Fund operates under the regulatory oversight of the National Bank of Ethiopia, with its Board of Directors chaired by the NBE Governor.

CCDA-14 calls for African climate agency ahead of COP31 and COP32

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The Fourteenth Conference on Climate Change and Development in Africa (CCDA-14) concluded today in Addis Ababa with a comprehensive set of key messages urging the continent to move from climate participation to climate agency, and from pledges to implementation, as it prepares for COP31 in Antalya and an African-hosted COP32 in Addis Ababa in 2027.

Convened under the Climate for Development in Africa (ClimDev-Africa) Programme — a joint initiative of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), the African Union Commission (AUC), the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank), in partnership with the Pan African Climate Justice Alliance (PACJA) — the three-day conference brought together policymakers, negotiators, financial institutions, researchers, civil society, youth, women and the private sector under the theme “From Pledges to Implementation: The Belém–Antalya–Addis Roadmap.”

Closing the conference, ECA Deputy Executive Secretary Hanan Morsy said CCDA-14 called for a coherent African climate agenda anchored in equity, sustainable development, accountability and African ownership. She urged Africa to strengthen its climate agency by shaping global governance, mobilizing transformative finance, and advancing science, technology and innovation. The conference called for Africa’s road to COP31 and COP32 to prioritize predictable, adequate, accessible and non-debt-creating climate finance; stronger institutions; enhanced data and innovation capacities; and scaled investment in adaptation and early warning that benefits cities, local governments and vulnerable communities. It emphasized that climate action must drive economic transformation through regional integration, industrialization, critical-minerals management, circular and bioeconomy approaches, food security, peace and resilient urban development — underpinned by just, inclusive and gender-responsive transition pathways.

Earlier in the week, ECA Executive Secretary Claver Gatete said Africa’s climate story “should not be defined by vulnerability alone,” urging the continent to “press for climate justice and greater international support, while harnessing Africa’s assets to help shape the rules, investments and solutions driving global climate action.” AUC Commissioner Moses Vilakati said the conference “asks us to move beyond the question of what Africa should seek from COP31… to what Africa should propose to the world.”

AfDB’s James Kinyangi said “Africa is not merely a victim of climate change. We are a source of solutions,” while Afreximbank’s Olubunmi Obasanjo-Williams told delegates “vulnerability is not the full African story.” For his part, Mithika Mwenda of PACJA urged delegates to move “from declaration to delivery.”

Delegates were told Africa contributes less than 4 per cent of global emissions yet needs about $277 billion a year to implement its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) through 2030, with current flows covering only around 11 per cent of that need.

The conference adopted a wide-ranging agenda covering climate finance, governance, science and innovation, just transitions, circular economy, adaptation, agriculture, and climate, peace and security.

On climate finance, delegates called on developed countries to honour obligations under the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement to provide predictable, adequate and accessible climate finance. Financing must be structurally transformational, move beyond project-centric approaches, and strengthen domestic fiscal institutions and African-owned financing mechanisms. Adaptation was framed as an investment, not a cost, with returns embedded in national planning, budgets and multilateral development bank decisions.

On global climate governance, CCDA-14 said Africa needs a coherent position grounded in equity, development priorities and the right to development, safeguarding its policy space and natural-resource use. While the UNFCCC remains indispensable, African climate diplomacy must also engage international financial institutions, trade and technology regimes, and standard-setting processes.

On carbon pricing and Article 6, the conference said carbon pricing can support climate and development goals when tailored to national circumstances and backed by rigorous cost-benefit analysis and strong monitoring, reporting and verification. Africa should shift from capacity-building toward functional, high-integrity carbon markets that mobilize private capital and deliver tangible community benefits.

On science, innovation and data, delegates said Africa must move from climate data generation to integrated, decision-ready climate-risk intelligence linked to bankable investment and stronger finance accountability. Indigenous and local knowledge, and gender-responsive science, must be embedded, with stronger science-policy linkages to inform decision-making.

On early warning, CCDA-14 called for an integrated early-warning value chain connecting observation, forecasting, communication, anticipatory action, financing and response. The Systematic Observations Financing Facility (SOFF) should be expanded to all countries in need, with resources ring-fenced for National Meteorological and Hydrological Services.

On just transitions and critical minerals, the conference said African agency is essential to ensure critical minerals and the energy transition deliver industrialization, energy security and inclusive growth. A just energy transition must deliver a just minerals transition, with mineral-producing countries capturing a fair share of value, technology, revenues and jobs through local processing and beneficiation.

On circular economy, delegates said the approach should be pursued as a competitiveness, development and transformation agenda, advancing resilience, green industrialization and job creation. National development and climate frameworks, including NDCs and NAPs, should systematically integrate circular economy approaches.

On adaptation and urban leadership, cities must be recognized as primary receiving systems for climate-related mobility and displacement, with secure land, housing and services treated as adaptation infrastructure. Climate mobility, housing and urban resilience should be integrated into NDCs and NAPs, with direct, predictable finance for cities and local governments.

On agriculture and food systems, the conference said agriculture should be redefined as a climate-resilient agrifood system and a central pillar of climate negotiations, with food security a non-negotiable outcome of climate action.

On climate, peace and security, delegates said climate change is a risk multiplier for peace, security and social cohesion. The African Union and Member States should finalize, adopt and operationalize the Common African Position on Climate, Peace and Security.

To carry the agenda forward, CCDA-14 established six working committees — on climate finance and carbon markets, agriculture and food systems, just transition and critical minerals, circular economy, and adaptation and climate change and development — each composed of a Chair, Alternate Chair, Secretary and six to ten technical experts representing Africa’s diverse regions.

Coordinated by the ClimDev-Africa Secretariat, the committees will integrate outcomes from COP31, including the Belém–Antalya–Addis Roadmap, and prepare a consolidated report for CCDA-XV, assessing the state of climate finance delivery in Africa and recommending priority actions on the road to COP32, which Ethiopia will host in Addis Ababa in November 2027.

The Hydra effect in the production process

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In Greek mythology, the Hydra was a terrifying creature with multiple heads. The most disturbing feature of the beast was not simply its strength, but its ability to regenerate itself. When one head was cut off, two more grew in its place. The metaphor has become increasingly relevant to modern production processes. In manufacturing, supply chains and organisational operations, managers often discover that solving one operational problem can unexpectedly generate several new ones. This phenomenon may be described as the Hydra Effect which is an intervention intended to eliminate a bottleneck, or inefficiency produces unintended consequences that multiply complexity elsewhere in the system.

The Hydra Effect matters because modern production systems are rarely simple. A factory is not merely a collection of machines performing independent tasks. It is an interconnected system involving labour, technology, suppliers, inventory, quality control, transportation and customer demand. Improving one part of this system without understanding its relationship with the others can create new constraints. As Goldratt and Cox in their 2014 published book entitled “The Goal: A Process of Ongoing Improvement“ famously argued in their Theory of Constraints, every system contains limiting factors that determine overall performance. Removing one constraint does not necessarily solve the wider problem; it may simply expose another.

Consider a manufacturer experiencing delays because its assembly department cannot process enough components. Management invests in faster machinery, automation and additional labour. Initially, productivity appears to improve. Output from the assembly line increases dramatically. However, the next department may now be unable to cope with the additional volume. Inventory begins accumulating between production stages, warehouse space becomes limited, quality inspectors face greater workloads and delivery schedules become increasingly difficult to manage. The original bottleneck has disappeared, but several new operational problems have emerged.

This is the Hydra Effect in action. The mistake lies in assuming that local efficiency automatically creates system-wide efficiency. The obsession with productivity metrics can make this problem worse. Managers are often rewarded for improving measurable performance indicators such as units produced per hour, machine utilisation or labour productivity. Yet an increase in one metric may conceal a deterioration elsewhere. A machine operating at maximum capacity, for example, may produce more inventory than downstream processes require. Excess inventory ties up capital, increases storage costs and creates a greater risk of waste or obsolescence.

Lean production emerged partly as a response to this type of inefficiency.  However, even well-intentioned efficiency programmes can themselves produce a Hydra Effect. Cost-cutting initiatives, for example, frequently appear attractive in the short term. A company may reduce its supplier base to obtain lower prices through larger contracts. The immediate result is lower procurement expenditure and a simplified purchasing process. Yet dependence on fewer suppliers may increase vulnerability to disruption. If a major supplier experiences a strike, financial failure or transportation delay, the entire production process may be affected.

The global supply-chain disruptions of recent years have demonstrated the dangers of excessive efficiency. For decades, many organisations adopted just-in-time production systems designed to minimise inventory and reduce waste. These systems can be highly effective when supply networks are stable. However, when unexpected disruptions occur, organisations with minimal inventory buffers may struggle to continue production. A solution to the problem of excessive stock can therefore create a new problem: reduced resilience.

This does not mean that efficiency is undesirable. Rather, it demonstrates that efficiency must be balanced against resilience. Christopher and Peck in 2004 published book entitled “Building the resilient supply chain” argue that supply chains must be designed with vulnerability and risk in mind. In other words, a production system should not be judged solely by how efficiently it operates under normal conditions, but also by how effectively it responds when conditions change.

Technology provides another important example. Digital automation, artificial intelligence and advanced production software are frequently presented as solutions to human error and operational inefficiency. Automation can undoubtedly improve consistency, speed and productivity. Nevertheless, introducing new technology can create additional layers of complexity. Employees require training, systems must be maintained, cybersecurity risks increase and organisations may become dependent on specialised software providers.

Furthermore, automation can shift rather than eliminate human involvement. A company may reduce the number of workers performing repetitive tasks, but it may simultaneously require more engineers, data analysts and technical specialists. The nature of the problem changes. Instead of managing routine labour, the organisation must manage technical expertise, software failures and digital infrastructure. Cutting off one head creates another.

The Hydra Effect also raises important questions about managerial decision-making. Too often, organisations respond to visible symptoms rather than underlying causes. When delivery performance deteriorates, management may demand overtime. When quality declines, additional inspection may be introduced. When employees become overwhelmed, more reporting systems may be implemented. Each response may temporarily address the immediate problem, but it can also add new pressures to the organisation.

Systems thinking offers a more sustainable alternative. A decision made in procurement can influence production. A production decision can influence inventory. Inventory decisions can influence customer service. These relationships mean that isolated solutions are often inadequate.

The practical challenge, therefore, is not simply to solve problems faster. It is to understand what the solution itself will do to the wider production system. Before investing in additional machinery, managers should ask whether downstream capacity can absorb the increased output. Before reducing inventory, they should examine supply-chain risk. Before automating a process, they should consider the skills, maintenance and security requirements that will follow.

This requires a shift in managerial culture. Organisations must become less interested in celebrating quick fixes and more willing to examine second- and third-order consequences. Short-term solutions can be politically attractive because their benefits are visible immediately, while their costs may emerge months later in another department. Yet transferring a problem is not the same as solving it.

Ultimately, the Hydra Effect should serve as a warning against simplistic approaches to production management. Modern organisations operate in systems characterised by interdependence, uncertainty and feedback. Removing a bottleneck, reducing a cost or automating a task may create genuine benefits, but these benefits should always be evaluated against possible consequences elsewhere.

The lesson from the Hydra is therefore surprisingly relevant to the factory floor. The challenge is not merely to cut off the head of the problem in front of us. It is to understand the entire organism. Production managers who adopt a systems perspective are more likely to identify hidden constraints, anticipate unintended consequences and design processes that are both efficient and resilient.

In an increasingly complex industrial environment, the best solution is rarely the fastest or most obvious one. Real operational improvement requires organisations to look beyond individual problems and recognise the connections between them. Otherwise, managers may proudly eliminate one production difficulty, only to discover that two more have appeared in its place.