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Africa eyes small modular reactors to plug power gaps

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African countries are exploring small modular reactors (SMRs) to deliver clean, reliable energy to where it’s needed most.

While most progress in clean energy adoption in Africa has focused on solar and wind, a growing number of countries are now turning to nuclear power, specifically small modular and micro reactors, as a complementary, locally adaptable solution.

According to Robert Lisinge, a technology, innovation and connectivity expert, Africa’s SMR ambitions can be achieved through “synchronised planning at regional and national levels.”

“There is a need to conceptualise and potentially develop regional nuclear projects that involve perhaps multiple countries.”

That’s the vision emerging from Kigali, Rwanda, where policymakers, engineers and experts gathered between June 30 and July 1 for the Nuclear Energy Innovation Summit for Africa.

The continent, they agreed, is no longer just exploring nuclear options, it is laying the groundwork for a new generation of energy solutions designed for Africa’s infrastructure realities.

“Across the continent today, we have 15 percent of generation, 40 GW of power, that cannot be delivered simply because of infrastructure issues, curtailment, and grids not being available, sometimes for 800 to 1,000 hours per year,” said Yohannes Hailu, Economic Affairs Officer at the UN Economic Commission for Africa.

Small Modular Reactors, which typically produce under 300MW, offer a potential workaround.

Built in factories and shipped to site, they can be installed close to the point of use, mining sites, industrial parks, or off-grid communities, cutting the need for extensive transmission infrastructure.

With more than 600 million Africans still living in the dark and demand rising from sectors like mining and manufacturing, the interest in SMRs is gaining speed.

Yet, in Africa, this is not just talk. From Ghana to Kenya to South Africa, governments are moving beyond feasibility studies and into tangible action, backed by policy shifts, skills development, and international partnerships.

Ghana, for example, has signed a framework agreement with U.S.-based Regnum Technology Group and NuScale Power to deploy up to 12 NuScale VOYGR-12 SMR modules. Each module will initially produce 50MW, with plans to scale up to 77MW, delivering nearly 924MW when fully deployed.

Beyond generation capacity, Ghana is building a foundation to become a regional hub for nuclear training and localization. With U.S. government collaboration, the country has launched the region’s first NuScale Energy Exploration Centre (E2 Centre) in Accra—a state-of-the-art facility that simulates full-scale nuclear operations and includes a welding certification lab.

The centre will provide hands-on training for Ghanaian engineers and technicians and is linked to academic institutions like Texas A&M University. It’s also laying the foundation for local nuclear supply chains, making Ghana a potential first-mover in West Africa’s nuclear ecosystem.

Officials aim to build up to 1,000MW of nuclear capacity by 2034. According to Ghana’s Nuclear Power Institute, the country is also in the process of negotiating a “123 Agreement” with the U.S. for long-term civilian nuclear cooperation and trade.

In South Africa, home to the continent’s only commercial nuclear facility, Koeberg, the focus has shifted from large-scale expansion to a locally designed high-temperature SMR known as the HTMR-100.

The project, supported by domestic firms and Chinese partners, already has a financing plan close to US$500 million.

Rwanda is also positioning itself as a launchpad for experimental nuclear technology in East Africa. The government has signed agreements with U.S.-based NANO Nuclear Energy and the Canada-Germany firm Dual Fluid to pilot microreactors in the 2 to 10 megawatts range.

These units could provide off-grid communities or specialized industries with reliable power, serving as test cases for broader deployment.

“SMRs could supply clean, reliable energy to creditworthy mining operations, enabling value addition to products for global markets,” according to Brian Dlamini, Planning Engineer for the Southern Africa Power Pool.

Even countries without active deployment plans are laying the foundation.

Nigeria is modernizing its regulatory frameworks and has joined the U.S.-backed FIRST program, which helps countries prepare for advanced nuclear technologies.

Kenya, aiming to commission its first nuclear plant by 2034, hosted Africa’s first IAEA-led SMR School in May 2025 and has launched its own SMR feasibility studies.

The geopolitical landscape is also rapidly evolving as global powers race to gain a foothold in Africa’s nuclear future.

Egypt’s nuclear ambitions have received a major boost with the El-Dabaa plant reaching a key milestone in July. A Russia-backed project, El-Dabaa saw the installation of a 480-tonne core catcher, an essential passive safety system designed to prevent reactor meltdown.

The US$30 billion project will deliver four reactors of 1,200MW each, with the first expected to come online by 2028. Egypt’s long-term plan aims to install 4,800MW of nuclear capacity by 2035.

Rosatom, the Russian state energy corporation, is leading the build, but Egypt has also signed nuclear energy cooperation agreements with China and South Korea, as it seeks to diversify partnerships and strengthen its technological base.

The United States, meanwhile, is accelerating engagement as seen during the U.S.-Africa Nuclear Energy Summit. Held in Nairobi in 2024, the event saw agreements signed with Ghana and Kenya, including plans for reactor development, regulatory support, and nuclear workforce training.

Kenya also signed an MoU with Russia in 2025, outlining plans to start construction of its first nuclear power plant by 2027 with a projected capacity of 1,000MW.

China, too, is pushing aggressively. At the 2024 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), China and Nigeria inked a deal to expand nuclear energy cooperation. BloombergNEF reports that China approved 11 new domestic reactor projects in 2024 alone and plans to become the world’s top nuclear generator by 2030.

Projections from the Nuclear Business Platform (NBP) suggest Africa could generate as much as 15,000MW of nuclear energy by 2035, led by Ghana, Uganda, Kenya, and Rwanda.

While no African nation currently manufactures SMRs, early steps toward localization are underway.

Despite efforts, financing remains a key challenge. With costs ranging from US$2 to US$3 million per megawatt, a single 100-megawatt SMR could run over US$200 million.

However, institutions like the African Development Bank and the West African Development Bank are beginning to study SMR financing mechanisms. Regional power pools and public-private partnerships are also being considered.

With 40 gigawatts of energy capacity stuck in limbo due to poor infrastructure, SMRs offer a way to bypass bottlenecks and deliver power where it’s needed.

Industrial parks, mining zones, and remote towns are emerging as early targets. SMRs could also support desalination projects, mini-grids, and even green hydrogen development.

The consensus in Kigali was unmistakable. Small and micro modular reactors represent a transformative opportunity for the continent. But seizing it will require coordinated investment in policy, finance, and infrastructure.

A 2025 report by the International Energy Agency (IEA) projects that nuclear energy will reach a record high this year, with 63 reactors representing more than 70 gigawatts (GW) of new capacity under construction globally.

Bulldozer Politics and Economic Development: Authoritarianism, Infrastructure, and the Politics of Speed

“Bulldozer politics” refers to a form of governance characterized by decisive, top-down decision-making, the rapid execution of infrastructure projects, and the suppression of dissent or legal constraints in the name of development. In an era where infrastructure is equated with development, “bulldozer politics” has emerged as a distinctive style of governance, particularly in authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes.

This approach prioritizes large-scale infrastructure projects, bypasses bureaucratic delays, and often suppresses environmental and human rights concerns. While efficient and visibly transformative, such politics pose critical questions about governance, equity, and sustainability.

The term “bulldozer politics” is both literal and metaphorical. It symbolizes the physical act of demolishing structures to make way for infrastructure projects; the political style of using forceful, unilateral action to implement policy as well as he discursive framing of opposition as obstructionist or anti-development.

In many cases, this style emerges in contexts where democratic institutions are weak or deliberately sidelined, and where charismatic leaders frame development as an act of national pride and political strength.

The idea that infrastructure drives development has deep roots in modernization theory. However, since the 2000s, the resurgence of state-led capitalism and China’s global infrastructure push under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has normalized authoritarian developmentalism. Bulldozer politics borrows from this model but is often less institutionalized, more populist, and more concerned with domestic optics.

Political theorists such as James C. Scott and Daron Acemoglu have warned against “high modernist” projects and extractive institutions, which bulldozer politics often exemplifies. These critiques provide a lens to examine how centralized power may yield short-term growth at the cost of long-term institutional resilience.

There are several case studies. India: The Rise of Bulldozer Developmentalism –  In recent years, several Indian states, notably Uttar Pradesh, have seen a rise in bulldozer politics. Leaders use heavy machinery not only to demolish illegal structures but also to symbolically assert control over dissenting populations, often along religious lines. The promotion of highways, airports, and industrial corridors has been central to this narrative.

While GDP indicators and investment flows have increased, critics argue that such development excludes marginalized communities and bypasses environmental safeguards.

China: Infrastructure as a Tool of Control – China’s model exemplifies state-led bulldozer politics. The Chinese Communist Party has executed massive projects like the South-North Water Transfer Project and urban redevelopment in cities like Beijing and Shanghai. While these have bolstered economic output and lifted millions out of poverty, they have also displaced millions and created ghost cities and unproductive debt.

Yet, China’s institutional capacity and long-term planning mechanisms partially mitigate the dangers of bulldozer governance, making it a hybrid rather than a purely extractive model.

Sub-Saharan Africa: Imported Bulldozer Politics – In countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya, and Angola, bulldozer-style development has been influenced by foreign investment, particularly from China. Projects like Nairobi’s expressway or Angola’s new cities showcase rapid infrastructure deployment. However, in many instances, these have failed to integrate with local economies, leading to debt dependency and elite capture.

The positive economic impacts includes rapid infrastructure development (roads, power, housing); improved foreign investor confidence due to clear state commitment; and visibility of progress increases political capital for leaders.

By the same token, the negative aspects includes environmental degradation and displacement; weakening of legal safeguards and participatory planning; vulnerability to corruption and inefficiency; and lack of focus on human capital and long-term productivity.

The greatest danger of bulldozer politics lies in its anti-institutional ethos. It rewards personalistic leadership over institutional accountability, reduces the space for civil society and media, and sets a precedent for developmental authoritarianism. Over time, this erodes the very governance structures needed for inclusive and sustainable economic growth.

Regarding policy implications, international institutions must tie infrastructure funding to transparency and public consultation. Domestic policy should emphasize “inclusive infrastructure” that centers on community participation. Civil society and media must play a watchdog role, exposing developmental abuses masked as progress.

To conclude, Bulldozer politics presents a seductive model of development – fast, visible, and politically rewarding. But beneath its surface lies a developmental paradigm that privileges form over function, optics over outcomes, and control over consensus. For nations aspiring to achieve resilient and equitable growth, the bulldozer may build roads – but it cannot build democracy.

The BRICS model of inclusive cooperation is coming of age

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Brazil’s picturesque metropolis Rio de Janeiro will host the 17th BRICS Summit from July 6 to 7, with government leaders convening for what is increasingly becoming a leading forum for the voice of the Global South. The number 17 is significant – in many parts of the world it marks the penultimate year before an individual attains majority or adulthood, and at 17, there is every indication that the same is true of BRICS.

The grouping has come a long way since its conception in a Goldman Sachs thesis in 2001. The seminal paper titled “Building Better Global Economic BRICs” had estimated that Brazil, Russia, India and China would account for 23.3 percent of global GDP in purchasing power parity, or PPP (US dollar rates) terms by end-2000. While IMF data suggests that estimate may have been over-optimistic (the real figure was closer to 17 percent), following the addition of South Africa in 2010 as well as the 2024 expansion, BRICS’ share of the global GDP (in PPP terms) is projected to be 41 percent in 2025.

With Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran and the UAE having also become full members, BRICS now accounts for over 40 percent of the world’s population and some 35 percent of the land area. Crucially, it has continued to outpace global economic growth, with the IMF projecting BRICS nations to grow by 3.4 percent this year compared to the 2.8 percent global average. In terms of international trade too, BRICS countries answer for 24 percent of the total global exchanges, as per the BRICS website. But while the shared economic trajectory of being emerging market economies may have been the BRICS’ foundational common thread, the group’s raison d’etre has increasingly evolved to being a champion of multipolarity and inclusive growth.

The theme for Brazil’s 2025 presidency has been “Strengthening Global South Cooperation for More Inclusive and Sustainable Governance,” with political attention focused on six core areas: Global health cooperation; Trade, investment & finance; Climate change; Artificial Intelligence governance; Multilateral peace and security architecture; and Institutional development. These entail the most pressing issues the world faces at the moment, and it’s crucial to ensure that the interests of as many people as possible are represented.

The 10 full BRICS members represent a vast geographical spread, including parts of the world that have only recently begun to share in the fruits of industrial development. In addition, 10 countries have also been granted the “BRICS Partner Country” status, namely, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Vietnam, Uganda, and Uzbekistan, significantly extending BRICS’ inclusivity and deepening its links with other key groupings and regions such as ASEAN, Central Asia, South America and Africa.

Nations clearly see BRICS as an increasingly influential platform. And BRICS, in turn, has enlarged its mechanisms to provide a vast array of coordination forums. For instance, while all eyes will doubtlessly be on the Leaders’ summit, the preceding week will play host to the 3rd Sherpas meeting, a Women Business Alliance meeting, a BRICS Business Council meeting, a Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meeting, and more. And neither is this simply a flurry of activity before the main event where participants will finalize matters for leaders to sign on the dotted line — Brazil has planned close to 120 events during the course of its presidency, keeping up the pace set by previous hosts.

What’s most remarkable about this kind of continuous and multifaceted engagement is the sheer spread of domains and initiatives. Ahead of the summit, the BRICS Academic Forum has unveiled a compendium of topical consultations through the years. The document is effectively a ready-reference of the various BRICS meetings and working groups, their respective memberships and mandates, and their activities and outcomes, including joint declarations and action plans.

The various expert groups and ministerial groups straddle multiple sectors, including agriculture, business, civil issues, culture, energy, think tanks, trade, sustainable finance, labour and employment, security and statistics. They also include groups on socio-political development like meetings of political parties, civil society organizations, women’s affairs, youth affairs, and even a Young Scientists forum.

The frequency of engagement is clearly high and the scope is quite holistic, offering evidence of how BRICS has developed and matured through the years. Far from being some kind of thinly veiled counterweight that nations are prone to forming, championing and then discarding, BRICS has added layers of structure and a larger purpose – advancing the cause of the Global South and facilitating the progress of the developed world – meeting by meeting, brick by brick.

Ankit Prasad is CGTN biz commentator

Name:  Tiya Fikre Korsa

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2. Education (የት/ት ደረጃ):  3rd year student at Jimma university

3. Company name (የመስሪያ ቤቱ ስም): Debo Engineering

4. Title (የስራ ድርሻህ): Agritech Team Leader

5. Founded in (መቼ ተመሰረተ): 2019

6. What it does (ምንድነው የሚሰራው): AI-powered Agritech and smart digital solutions, focusing on coffee sorting, IoT tools for agriculture, web/app development

7. Headquarters (ዋና መስሪያ ቤት): Jimma, Ethiopia

8. Start-up capital (በምን ያህል ገንዘብ ስራዉን ጀመርሽ/ክ): 15,000 ETB

9. Current capital (የአሁን ካፒታል): Over 2,000,000 ETB

10. Number of employees (የሰራተኞች ቁጥር): 11 permanent, 49 commission-based freelancers

11. Reason for starting the business (ለስራው መጀመር ምክንያት): To solve agricultural challenges through AI

12. Biggest perk of ownership (የባለቤትነት ጥቅም): Freedom to innovate and directly solve community problems

13. Biggest strength (ጥንካሬህ/ሽ): Innovation-driven, resilient, and solution-oriented mindset

14. Biggest challenge (ተግዳሮት): Limited funding and slow digital adoption by traditional sectors

15. Plan (እቅድ): Scale Coffee AI solutions nationwide and expand into new digital agriculture tools

16. First career path (የመጀመሪያ ስራ): Currently student

17. Most interested in meeting (ማግኘት የምትፈልጊ/ገው ሰው): Elon Musk

18. Most admired person (የምታደንቂ/ቀው ሰው): Zaha Hadid

19. Stress reducer (ጭንቀትን የሚያቀልልሽ/ለህ): Listening to spiritual songs

20. Favorite book (የመፅሐፍ ምርጫ): The Alchemist and Sememen from Amharic

21. Favorite pastime (ማድረግ የሚያስደስትህ): Reading fiction, listening to music or podcasts

22. Favorite destination to travel to (ከኢትዮጵያ ውጪ መሄድ የምትፈልጊ/ገዉ ስፍራ): Rome, Switzerland and Turkey

23. Favorite automobile (የመኪና ምርጫ): Santorini Black Range Rover