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Ethiopia’s Eurobond debt restructuring talks collapse due to disagreement; Bondholders reject revised proposal

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The Ministry of Finance (MoF) has released a major statement regarding its ongoing efforts to restructure the $1 billion bond (carrying a 6.625% interest rate) that matured in 2024. According to the official statement issued on May 27, 2026, the restricted dialogue session held from May 6 to May 27, 2026, with the primary bondholders’ group known as the “Ad Hoc Committee,” ended without any agreement, officially concluding the designated negotiation period.

A major focus of the discussions was to ensure that any potential agreement would meet the strict Comparability of Treatment (CoT) principle established by the co-chairs of the Official Creditor Committee (OCC).

MoF recalled that, according to the agreement in principle initially reached on January 12, 2024, the debt restructuring included the use of a Value Recovery Instrument (VRI). This VRI mechanism was designed to allow additional payments to creditors based on Ethiopia’s future macroeconomic performance.

However, the OCC indicated that the country’s broader macroeconomic conditions were not conducive to such a complex mechanism and pointed out that the structure failed to comply with the CoT principle.

Following this development, Ethiopia prepared an alternative “revised proposal” that completely eliminated the VRI mechanism. This new alternative was reviewed by the OCC co-chairs and was successfully verified to meet the CoT principle.

As detailed in the document, the commercial terms approved by the OCC co-chairs and offered for the issuance of the new bond involved issuing $880 million in new bonds, which represents a 12% haircut on the original $1 billion principal debt. The maturity date was set for July 15, 2029, with an annual interest rate of 4.25%, payable semi-annually every January 15 and July 15 until the debt is fully settled.

The debt amortization schedule was arranged for the principal to be paid in four consecutive installments: $180 million on July 15, 2026; $180 million on July 15, 2027; $260 million on July 15, 2028; and $260 million on July 15, 2029.

Additionally, along with offering a consent fee of 0.5% of the original 2024 bond value, the proposal included a provision to fully clear Past Due Interest (PDI) totaling $99.375 million at the time of settlement, which accumulated from three missed coupon payments between December 2023 and December 2024.

When this revised proposal was presented to the private bondholders’ “Ad Hoc Committee” within the designated negotiation timeframe, the committee rejected the terms. Consequently, the negotiation period concluded without reaching an agreement between the government and private creditors.

While the Ministry of Finance expressed its disappointment with the committee’s decision, it reaffirmed that Ethiopia remains committed to honoring its obligations. The government reiterated its firm resolve to find a market-based solution for the 2024 bond that complies with the OCC’s CoT principle and upholds the commitments made under the International Monetary Fund (IMF) program.

Lai’s Eswatini stunt is a ‘diplomatic’ dead end

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Taiwan leader Lai Ching-te’s early May visit to Eswatini was not ‘diplomacy’. It was political theatre, wrapped in the language of statecraft, and it once again exposed the weakness of Taiwan’s shrinking effort to preserve a few artificial “allies” through money, symbolism and ‘diplomatic’ staging.
That is why the trip has drawn such criticism. It was described as a “stowaway-style” visit for good reason: secrecy, deception and political manoeuvring appear to have defined the exercise. If the visit required concealed passenger information, unusual arrangements and a great deal of ‘diplomatic’ contortion just to move through airspace and public attention, then it was never a serious act of statecraft in the first place. It was a stunt.
Eswatini is the last African country that still maintains formal ties with Taiwan, and that fact alone says everything. Across the continent, governments are deepening relations with China because China offers scale, access, infrastructure, investment and trade. Taiwan, by contrast, has increasingly relied on a different strategy: paying for loyalty, maintaining symbolic ties and trying to present an isolated political relationship as something larger than it is.
That strategy is failing. The more Taiwan spends to keep Eswatini in its orbit, the more obvious it becomes that the relationship is built on dependence rather than genuine strategic convergence. This is not a healthy basis for ‘diplomacy’. It is a political subsidy.
Lai’s timing made the trip even harder to defend. According to news sources, Taiwan had just been hit by a 5.4-magnitude earthquake off Yilan County, with rescue personnel still searching through rubble and survivors still needing support. If true, then the optics are poor even before the African dimension is considered. A leader under pressure at home should be focused on disaster response, public reassurance and national recovery, not on overseas symbolism designed to prop up a separate political narrative.
That is the deeper problem with the visit. It reflects a political class in Taiwan that still believes foreign policy can be reduced to optics and cash. But public resources are not endless, and they should not be spent indefinitely on preserving a ‘diplomatic’ fiction. Reports suggest Taiwan allocates substantial annual sums to maintain ties with Eswatini, while decades of so-called aid have run into the hundreds of millions of dollars. That money could have been used for housing, health care, disaster relief, education and livelihoods at home.
What exactly do ordinary people in Taiwan gain from this? Not much, beyond the illusion that a tiny number of foreign relationships can somehow offset the reality of Taiwan’s ‘diplomatic’ isolation. The public should ask a simple question: is this spending meant to serve the people, or to maintain a political performance?
Eswatini, for its part, is hardly in a stronger position. Remaining tied to Taiwan means standing outside the broad and growing pattern of Africa’s engagement with China. Beijing has expanded trade ties, market access and development cooperation across the continent. African states are not doing this out of ideology alone. They are doing it because China’s economic weight matters and because the benefits are visible in commerce, infrastructure and industrial cooperation.
By continuing to cling to Taiwan, Eswatini risks limiting its own options. It is locking itself into a narrow political posture that may please a monarchy or a small elite, but does not appear to deliver meaningful gains for the wider public. Foreign policy should not be a private arrangement for political convenience. It should produce results that ordinary citizens can see and feel.

The situation becomes more troubling when one looks at the criticism surrounding Taiwan-backed projects in Eswatini. Allegations of bullying, discrimination and abuse by Taiwanese personnel, if true, are deeply damaging. Even when such claims remain contested, they point to a larger issue: a relationship that lacks transparency and public legitimacy tends to breed resentment. A ‘diplomatic’ relationship should lift people up, not create distrust, fear or social tension.
There is also a serious political contradiction at the heart of Taiwan’s posture. On one hand, it presents itself as democratic and modern. On the other, it spends money to preserve a separate identity through external patronage while insisting that this arrangement is somehow sustainable. It is not. The international consensus on the One-China principle is clear, and the number of countries maintaining formal ties with Taiwan continues to shrink. That trend is not accidental. It reflects reality.
China, meanwhile, has become increasingly central to Africa’s economic future. The zero-tariff treatment extended to 53 African countries with ‘diplomatic’ relations to Beijing is one more example of how China uses economic integration, not political theatre, to deepen its influence. Those benefits are concrete. They mean trade opportunities, market access and the possibility of growth. Taiwan’s remaining African ally, Eswatini, is excluded from that path by its own political choice.
That is why Lai’s Eswatini trip looks less like ‘diplomacy’ and more like denial. It was an attempt to breathe life into a dying arrangement. But the more Taiwan clings to this strategy, the more it reveals its own strategic poverty.
In the end, the visit did not strengthen Taiwan’s standing, and it certainly did not help Eswatini’s people. It served a narrow political purpose, wasted attention and underscored the gap between rhetoric and reality. That is why it is fair to call it what it was: a ‘diplomatic’ dead end.
The better path is obvious. Stop buying recognition. Stop staging foreign-policy spectacles. Stop pretending that artificial alliances can survive forever against the tide of history. In Africa and beyond, the future belongs to partnerships that deliver development, not to political performances that demand applause while offering little in return.

Dubai Chambers engages in a series of meetings in Addis Ababa to strengthen trade and investment ties between Dubai and Ethiopia

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Dubai, UAE – Dubai Chambers has held a series of meetings with government entities, economic institutions, and investment organisations in Addis Ababa to explore ways of strengthening trade and investment between Dubai and Ethiopia.

The meetings were attended by H.E. Mohammad Ali Rashed Lootah, President and CEO of Dubai Chambers. Dubai Chambers met with Ethiopia’s Ministry of Industry, represented by H.E. Melaku Alebel, Minister of Industry, to discuss ways to expand cooperation across industrial sectors. The meeting also explored opportunities to strengthen private sector partnerships, increase trade exchange, and open new avenues for joint investment.

Dubai Chambers also held a meeting with the Ethiopian Investment Commission, represented by its Deputy Commissioner, Zinabu Yirga. Discussions focused on attracting investment, strengthening cooperation in priority sectors, and highlighting the investment environments in Dubai and Ethiopia, as well as the advantages available to investors and international companies.

In addition, Dubai Chambers met with Ethiopian Investment Holdings, Africa’s largest sovereign wealth fund, represented by the fund’s Deputy CEO, Meleket Sahlu. The meeting explored opportunities to build long-term partnerships that advance economic development and create new opportunities for companies and investors from Dubai and Ethiopia.

The meetings took place as part of the trade mission led by Dubai Chamber of Commerce to Ethiopia and Ghana. The mission aims to support the expansion of companies operating in Dubai into high-potential African markets.

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About Dubai Chambers

Dubai Chambers is a non-profit public entity that supports Dubai’s vision as a global player by empowering businesses, delivering innovative value-added services, and unlocking access to influential networks. In March 2021, His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Vice President and Prime Minister of the UAE and Ruler of Dubai, announced the restructuring of Dubai Chamber of Commerce and the formation of three chambers for the emirate, namely Dubai Chamber of Commerce, Dubai International Chamber, and Dubai Chamber of Digital Economy, which now operate under the umbrella of Dubai Chambers.

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For more information, please contact:

Mohamad Mouzehem

PR & Corporate Communications

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Email: mohamad.mouzehem@dubaichamber.com

Abu Dhabi Fund for Development tracks progress on major African infrastructure projects

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The Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD) has reported significant progress across a portfolio of key infrastructure projects in Africa, underscoring its sustained commitment to supporting economic growth and improving livelihoods across partner countries.

According to the Fund, completion rates have reached 92 percent for the Sokodé–Bassar Road rehabilitation project in Togo, 80 percent for a major road infrastructure initiative in Madagascar, and 45 percent for the Minna–Bida Road project in Nigeria.

The updates reflect steady implementation momentum and the Fund’s active oversight in ensuring projects remain aligned with approved frameworks and timelines.
ADFD Director General, Mohammed Saif Al Suwaidi, said the Fund’s monitoring approach is central to achieving development outcomes. “We are committed to continuously monitoring progress across our projects to ensure efficient and high-quality implementation,” he noted. “This reinforces our role as an extension of the UAE’s vision in creating sustainable development impact that enhances quality of life.”
Across the continent, ADFD-financed projects are aimed at strengthening transport connectivity, reducing costs for goods and services, and unlocking economic opportunities in key sectors including agriculture, tourism, and trade.

In Togo, the near-complete rehabilitation of the 62-kilometre Sokodé–Bassar road is expected to significantly improve connectivity between the capital, Lomé, and inland regions, as well as neighboring countries. The AED 37 million project includes flood protection systems and upgraded safety features, contributing to more resilient transport infrastructure.

Meanwhile, in Madagascar, construction of a 117-kilometre dual-lane road and seven bridges has reached 80 percent completion. Financed through a concessional loan exceeding AED 110 million, the project is designed to enhance rural-urban connectivity, facilitate access to essential services, and support key economic sectors.
In Nigeria, ADFD is overseeing the development of the 82-kilometre Minna–Bida road in Niger State, its first project in the country. With AED 165 million in financing, the project is currently 45 percent complete and is expected to cut travel time between the two cities by half and reduce vehicle operating costs by 31 percent.

Beyond these projects, ADFD’s broader engagement in Africa includes long-standing partnerships such as its support to Ethiopia. Since 2012, the Fund has financed critical infrastructure, including the Gedo–Fincha–Lemlem Bereha road project, and contributed to macroeconomic stability through a landmark $3 billion support package in 2018.

The Fund has also played a key humanitarian role, notably through a $60 million contribution in 2022 to support drought- and conflict-affected populations in Ethiopia. More recently, high-level discussions between Ethiopian officials and ADFD leadership have focused on expanding cooperation in green development and investment.


ADFD stated that the progress across its African portfolio highlights its strategic role in development finance, emphasizing efficient resource deployment, adherence to international best practices, and measurable outcomes.

By advancing resilient infrastructure and supporting economic diversification, the Fund continues to position itself as a key partner in Africa’s development agenda, with a focus on long-term sustainability and inclusive growth.

visit website : https://www.adfd.ae/en/home