A strategic assessment of two nations’ strengths, vulnerabilities, and choices, four plausible futures, and a roadmap toward lasting peace.
Two Nations, One Unavoidable Strategic Reality
Ethiopia and Eritrea are approaching another dangerous crossroads. Renewed fighting in northern Ethiopia, deteriorating relations, competing accusations, and increasingly confrontational rhetoric over access to the Red Sea raise the possibility of another devastating war. Decisions made in Addis Ababa and Asmara could affect not only their peoples, but the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea, the Middle East, and international commerce.
I have witnessed such a crossroads before. When the Ethiopia–Eritrea war erupted in 1998, I was President of the Addis Ababa University Students’ Union. Initially, like many civic organizations, we called for peace and restraint. After Eritrean forces crossed into Ethiopian territory, our executive committee debated the crisis and concluded that Ethiopia’s territorial integrity had been violated. We mobilized thousands of students to protest the invasion. I remember those deliberations vividly, and I remember the terrible human cost of the war that followed.
Ethiopia and Eritrea share centuries of history, intertwined cultures, families, and economic interests. Yet their relationship also carries deep wounds from Eritrea’s three-decade struggle for independence against successive Ethiopian governments, the devastating 1998–2000 border war, and the years of hostility that followed. Their dramatic rapprochement in 2018 demonstrated that former adversaries could become partners. Their renewed confrontation, however, reveals how fragile that progress was and how easily unresolved historical grievances can threaten both nations’ future.
At the heart of the dispute is Assab. For many Ethiopians, it is not simply a convenient foreign port. It was once an Ethiopian gateway to the sea, and its loss remains a painful, contested national question. For Eritrea, it is part of the territory it controls as an internationally recognized state. Ignoring either reality will not produce a lasting settlement.
Why I Am Applying a Strategic Lens
In my book Strategic Edge, I argue that sound leadership requires three complementary disciplines:
- Critical thinking, which challenges assumptions and tests competing claims;
- Strategic positioning, which examines strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats; and
- Scenario planning, which prepares leaders for several plausible futures instead of betting everything on one outcome.
I have facilitated strategic planning processes in which diverse stakeholders spend days examining evidence, challenging one another, weighing alternatives, and turning priorities into accountable action. A serious national exercise would require officials, historians, economists, military and security experts, lawyers, diplomats, and affected communities from both sides. This article cannot substitute for that process. It is an independent, public-source assessment intended to ask questions that deserve attention.
My objective is not to pretend that I have no position. Instead, I subject my position, and both governments’, to strategic scrutiny.
- What is each country trying to achieve?
- What could each lose?
- How might the other respond?
- And which choices could deliver results that last?
Ethiopia’s Strategic Position: An Advantage and an Unresolved Grievance
Ethiopia has a large population and wider domestic market, significant military capacity, regional influence, and substantial long-term economic potential. Yet it remains landlocked and heavily dependent on Djibouti for its international trade. That dependence imposes costs and exposes the economy to decisions made beyond Ethiopia’s borders. Internal conflicts, fiscal pressures, and competing development needs further complicate its strategic choices.
- Strengths: Market size, economic potential, military capacity, infrastructure, and regional influence.
- Weaknesses: Landlocked geography, concentrated trade routes, internal insecurity, and limited fiscal flexibility.
- Opportunities: Assab access, diversified ports, infrastructure partnerships, and regional integration.
- Threats: War, disrupted commerce, prolonged resistance, external involvement, and resources diverted from development.
But reducing Ethiopia’s case to the needs of a landlocked country misses something essential. I believe the way Ethiopia lost Assab during Eritrea’s separation was a historic failure of Ethiopian leadership. I remain deeply troubled by the decisions made under Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and by the unanswered questions about whether Ethiopia’s interests and the constitutional process received adequate consideration.
Such a consequential decision involving millions of people should never have been made through what many Ethiopians regard as a nontransparent, win-lose process, without adequately involving the broader Ethiopian population or ensuring proper constitutional and legal procedures. The resulting sense of an unequal settlement was not only a disservice to Ethiopia; it also planted grievances that could threaten Eritrea’s long-term security and prosperity.The consequences were enormous, and Ethiopians have every reason to demand a serious examination of that history.
Over the years, I have heard accounts, including from people I regarded as credible, that American negotiators urged Meles to put Assab on the negotiating table and that he declined, believing Ethiopia could simply purchase port services later and elsewhere. I cannot independently establish the details of those conversations, and I do not present them as documented fact. But the persistence of such accounts reflects a larger, legitimate question: Who made the decisions that left Ethiopia without Assab, on what authority, and after considering which alternatives? Records, testimony, and serious historical and constitutional analysis should investigate that question rather than dismiss it as nostalgia.
My criticism of those decisions does not settle the port’s present legal status. Eritrea’s independence and subsequent recognition created international realities that any responsible Ethiopian strategy must confront.But recognition does not erase Ethiopians’ right to scrutinize their own leaders or to argue that a consequential national interest was mishandled.
Ethiopia must also separate the justice of its grievance from the effectiveness of its response. Suppose it captured Assab militarily. Could it then keep the port, connecting roads, shipping services, and investors secure at an acceptable cost? Military control is not the same as commercially dependable access. Nor is a negotiated agreement automatically dependable if it lacks credible guarantees. The test is not merely what Ethiopia can obtain, but what it can sustain.
Eritrea’s Strategic Position: Control Today, Uncertainty Tomorrow
Eritrea holds a long Red Sea coastline and the ports of Assab and Massawa. Its location offers commercial and geopolitical leverage, and its armed forces have extensive territorial-defense experience. Yet its small domestic market, limited economic diversification, infrastructure needs, and relative isolation limit the benefits it can draw from those assets.
- Strengths: Red Sea geography, ports, strategic leverage, and defense experience.
- Weaknesses: Small domestic market, infrastructure constraints, limited diversification, and economic isolation.
- Opportunities: Ethiopian transit trade, port investment, jobs, revenue, and regional partnerships.
- Threats: Military escalation, damaged infrastructure, persistent hostility, and shifting regional alliances.
Eritrea’s leaders may believe that international recognition and military readiness are sufficient to preserve their position indefinitely. That would be a dangerous assumption. I am not predicting that Ethiopia will reclaim Assab, nor advocating another war.I am asking Eritrean decision-makers to consider a possibility that strategic planners cannot ignore: the balance of military power, regional alliances, diplomatic support, and domestic politics can change. A settlement available today may become much harder to achieve after another crisis.
For Eritrea, the question should not be simply, “How do we deny Ethiopia’s claim?” It should also be, “How do we turn Assab into a lasting source of prosperity and security while the opportunity to negotiate from a position of control remains?” Ethiopia’s vast market could help make Assab commercially valuable. A well-designed agreement could generate revenue, employment, and infrastructure investment without requiring Eritrea to accept an arrangement it considers a surrender of sovereignty.
Eritrea’s security concerns are real, and any agreement would need to address them. But indefinite refusal to discuss Ethiopia’s historical grievances or practical access needs could deepen resentment and leave the dispute to a future generation under less favorable conditions. Maintaining control of an asset is not the same as maximizing its long-term strategic value.
Where Their Interests Intersect
Ethiopia needs reliable maritime access. Eritrea possesses maritime infrastructure that could serve a large neighboring market. Their interests are complementary, but their fears are not imaginary. Ethiopia worries that dependence on another government’s decisions can become a strategic vulnerability. Eritrea worries that a larger neighbor, economically and militarily, might eventually turn access into a demand for control.
This is why a simple promise to reopen Assab will not be enough. Both countries need enforceable commercial terms, predictable transit rights, infrastructure investment, credible security safeguards, and a way to settle disputes without threatening one another. They also need room to examine Assab’s history without letting every disagreement about the past block every practical step toward the future.
Four Plausible Futures
Scenario planning does not predict the future. It forces leaders to confront possibilities they might prefer to ignore. Two uncertainties matter most here: whether the governments choose confrontation or negotiation, and whether the wider region encourages stability or fuels competition.
1. Contained Rivalry
Both governments remain hostile but avoid a major war. Accusations, military preparations, and periodic incidents continue. Ethiopia remains dissatisfied with its maritime position, while Eritrea bears the costs of permanent vigilance. This may look manageable for a time, but a single miscalculation could end it.
2. Strategic Peace
The governments negotiate a durable arrangement for Assab, with clear access rights, fair commercial terms, infrastructure commitments, and security guarantees. Historical and legal disagreements receive a separate, credible forum for examination. Neither side gets everything it wants, but both secure benefits they could not reliably obtain through confrontation. This is the most desirable future, not necessarily the most likely.
3. Regional Crisis
Confrontation escalates into war, possibly drawing in armed groups and/or outside interested powers. Ethiopia might win battles yet inherit an insecure port and enormous costs. Eritrea might defend its position yet suffer severe human and economic losses. Instability could spread through the Horn and Red Sea region. The central lesson is that a tactical victory can become a strategic defeat.
4. Fragile Rapprochement
The governments reduce hostile rhetoric, restore communication, and test limited confidence-building or commercial measures without resolving the central dispute. Progress remains vulnerable to setbacks, but the risk of accidental escalation declines. Modest cooperation can be the first step toward a more ambitious settlement.
At present, contained rivalry seems more likely than comprehensive peace, but the risk of a regional crisis cannot be discounted. Border activity, developments in northern Ethiopia, outside military support, official rhetoric, and willingness to reopen dialogue will be important signals to watch.
A Roadmap Worth Considering
For Ethiopia: Commission a serious, independent review of the historical, constitutional, and diplomatic decisions surrounding Assab. Establish what can be documented, what remains disputed, and what peaceful remedies may be available. In parallel, compare the full costs of military confrontation with negotiated access to Assab and diversified maritime corridors. The objective should be secure, affordable, dependable access, not a symbolic victory that proves impossible to sustain in the long run.
For Eritrea: Recognize that Ethiopia’s grievance is deeply felt and will not disappear if Eritrea rejects it. Examine whether today’s negotiating position offers a better opportunity than an uncertain future. Consider long-term access arrangements that generate substantial economic returns while addressing security, jurisdiction, and operational concerns. Negotiation need not mean capitulation; it can be strategic foresight.
For both governments: Separate immediate de-escalation, historical review, and commercial negotiation into coordinated but distinct tracks. A practical Assab framework could address port modernization, transport links, transit rights, fees, customs, security, independent dispute resolution, and phased implementation. A mutually acceptable group of historians and legal specialists could examine the contested record without predetermining its findings. The African Union and other partners could facilitate dialogue, but neither nation should outsource its future to foreign powers.
These negotiations would not be easy. They would require sustained work, multiple stakeholders, and leaders prepared to hear uncomfortable truths. That is what serious strategic planning looks like. The goal is not a beautiful agreement announced for the cameras. It is a workable arrangement that survives political changes and delivers measurable results.
The Leadership Test
I do not believe Ethiopians should be asked to forget Assab, suppress questions about its loss, or treat past leaders’ decisions as beyond criticism. I also do not believe that the answer to a historic wrong, real or perceived, must be another devastating war. Ethiopia should use its strength to expand its strategic options, not narrow them to one costly confrontation.
And I would urge Eritrea’s leaders not to confuse today’s position with a permanent guarantee of tomorrows. The most prudent time to negotiate may be when a government still has the greatest freedom to shape the terms. Waiting until circumstances become more dangerous is not always a demonstration of strength.
I remember 1998. I remember how quickly calls for restraint gave way to mobilization, and how many families paid the price. My Ethiopian identity is part of why I write this. My experience in strategic leadership is why I insist that convictions must be tested against consequences.
