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Strengthening Africa’s security architecture

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Africa has been increasingly drawn into conflicts and faces difficulty in preventing or managing them. At the Fourth India-Africa Forum Summit to be held on May 28-31, India can announce assistance to the continent in capacity-building in training, logistics, and technology. India-Africa defence industrial cooperation, particularly in affordable equipment and maintenance capabilities tailored to African conditions, will align with its evolving needs.

The assassination of the Defence Minister of Mali by jihadists in a suicide bombing on April 25 was the latest security shock in Africa. The rise of radicalised groups like Al Shabab and Boko Haram and dozens of others loosely connected with Al Qaeda and Islamic State has created security complications for the continent, from Somalia to Nigeria. They have led to military coups overthrowing governments in Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, which, in turn, have dissociated themselves from France, their traditional security provider, and withdrawn from the regional Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). These shifts are unravelling the African Union Peace and Security Architecture[1](APSA), set up in 2002 to prevent, manage and resolve crises and conflicts within Africa.

APSA has had few successes. Africa faces over 50 ongoing armed conflicts, with over 35 million people displaced. Major hotspots include the Sudanese civil war, violence in the eastern Congo, and insurgencies across the Sahel – Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Other significant conflicts exist in Somalia, Nigeria, and the Central African Republic.[2]

Since 1946, Africa has accounted for nearly a third of international armed conflicts, underscoring its persistent security challenges. In recent decades, conflicts are increasingly internationalised, with external interventions rising sharply from 12 cases (1991–2010) to 27 (2011–2021). The period after 2014 saw a notable surge, peaking in 2015–16.

Total military spending across Africa grew by 8.5% in 2025 from 2024 to an estimated $58.2 billion. Algeria is the largest spender ($25.4 billion), and Nigeria is increasing expenditure by 55% from the previous year to $2.1 billion.[3]

Why does peace consistently evade Africa, despite having, in the African Union Peace and Security Architecture, the most ambitious regional security governance frameworks in the contemporary international system? APSA, established alongside the transformation of the African Union from the Organization of African Unity, was a decisive normative and institutional shift from the principle of non-interference to that of “non-indifference.”[4] This evolution reflected Africa’s recognition that sovereignty could no longer serve as a shield for atrocities, unconstitutional changes of government, or state collapse. APSA sought to be a comprehensive framework of institutions, norms, and operational mechanisms for “African solutions to African problems.”[5]

The core of APSA is the Peace and Security Council (PSC), a standing decision-making body designed to function as Africa’s equivalent of a collective security council. Comprising 15 member states with varying tenure, the PSC is mandated to undertake conflict prevention, authorize peace support operations, impose sanctions, and coordinate post-conflict reconstruction. Its authority is supported by four principal pillars: the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF), and the Peace Fund. Together, these form a layered architecture that integrates diplomacy, intelligence, military readiness, and financial support.

The Panel of the Wise[6] is APSA’s preventive diplomacy arm – a proactive action to prevent disputes from arising, and stop existing ones from escalating into violent conflict. It consists of eminent African personalities tasked with mediation, quiet diplomacy, and advisory functions – but without enforcement authority. That hobbles its active efforts in electoral mediation and conflict de-escalation efforts in countries such as Kenya and Burkina Faso. The Panel of the Wise consists of five respected African personalities tasked with advising the PSC and the AU Chairperson. It runs parallel to the African Forum for Former African Heads of State and Government[7]which leverages the expertise of former leaders to support current governance, conflict resolution, and development initiatives across the continent.. Individual leaders like Thabo Mbeki, through his eponymous foundation and Olusegun Obasanjo, through his non-profit African Leadership Forum for young leaders, have been individually active. These have certainly contributed to embedding a culture of preventive engagement within African conflict management practices.

Other entities of APSA, like the Continental Early Warning System to anticipate and mitigate conflicts before escalation, and the Africa Standby Force (ASF) with five regional standby-brigades have uneven efficacy, limiting their transformative potential.

The ASF struggles with issues of readiness, interoperability, logistics, and political authorization. Although ad hoc coalitions such as the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram and the G5 Sahel Joint Force have demonstrated Africa’s willingness to act, they have often operated outside the formal ASF framework, highlighting both flexibility and institutional weakness. When in 2017 Mozambique faced insurgency in Cabo Delgado, the SADC ASF took a long time to be ready. Instead, Rwandan troops came and quelled the insurgency at the French behest.

There have been successes, for sure, over the past two decades. APSA has significantly strengthened Africa’s capacity for peace support operations, as seen in missions in Somalia (AMISOM/ATMIS), the Central African Republic, and Sudan. These interventions underscore the normative shift toward proactive engagement and collective responsibility. APSA has deepened coordination between the AU and RECs, creating a multi-layered security governance system that reflects Africa’s regional diversity.

However, a central challenge for APSA is financial dependency. Despite the establishment of the $610 million Peace Fund, the architecture has relied heavily on external donors, particularly the European Union, for operational and administrative costs. This undermines African ownership and constrains strategic autonomy. Efforts to enhance financial self-reliance, including the AU’s 0.2% import levy on all imports from outside Africa, have progressed slowly and unevenly.

The “Silencing the Guns” initiative, the flagship project of the AU’s Agenda 2063, encapsulates APSA’s long-term ambition to end violent conflict on the continent. Yet, the outcomes of this 2013 initiative have fallen short of expectations. While some conflicts have de-escalated, new and complex threats, such as violent extremism in the Sahel, insurgencies in Mozambique, and persistent instability in Libya and Sudan, have proliferated. The changing nature of conflict, characterised by non-state actors, transnational networks, and climate-related pressures, has tested APSA’s largely state-centric design.

A critical issue has been the gap between normative ambition and political will. The effectiveness of APSA mechanisms often depends on consensus among member states, which is not always forthcoming. Divergent national interests, concerns about sovereignty, and varying levels of commitment have frequently delayed or diluted responses. This has been particularly evident in situations requiring rapid intervention or sanctions against member states.

Despite these challenges, APSA does its best. Its greatest success lies perhaps not in resolving all conflicts, but in creating a framework within which African actors can collectively address security challenges. The architecture has normalized intervention in cases of grave circumstances and has elevated peace and security as central pillars of continental integration at least as aspirations.

Strengthening APSA will require addressing structural weaknesses. Enhancing the operational readiness of the ASF, bridging the early warning-early action gap, and ensuring sustainable financing are critical priorities. Equally important is adapting the architecture to emerging threats, including cyber insecurity, maritime piracy, and climate-induced conflict.

Can India play a positive role in this significant African effort? Certainly. As a long-standing partner of Africa and a major contributor to United Nations peacekeeping operations, India is well-positioned to support APSA. At the Fourth India-Africa Forum Summit to be held on May 28-31, India can announce assistance to APSA for capacity-building in training, logistics, and technology for early warning systems. India-Africa defence industrial cooperation, particularly in affordable equipment and maintenance capabilities tailored to African conditions and expanding cooperation in maritime security, counter-terrorism, and cyber resilience, will align with APSA’s evolving needs. Importantly, India’s Harambee development partnership model, emphasizing local ownership and demand-driven assistance, resonates with APSA’s foundational principle of African-led solutions.

In this way, India can be a catalyst in enhancing APSA’s transformation of Africa’s approach to peace and security. On its part, Africa through APSA must consolidate the gains, overcome persistent constraints, and better manage the rapidly changing security landscape.

Africa faces mounting trade costs as non-tariff barriers rise

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African exporters are facing a growing and often overlooked burden from non-tariff measures, with a new UNCTAD policy update warning that compliance costs are now outweighing tariffs for most countries and are hitting developing economies especially hard.

The report, Invisible Barriers: The Costs of Non-Tariff Measures, says trade-related regulations have become more interventionist in recent years, driven by national security concerns, industrial policy and geopolitical tensions. While tariff rates rose sharply in 2025, UNCTAD found that non-tariff measures still impose higher costs on exports for 88 percent of countries, including many in Africa.

UNCTAD said the problem is particularly severe for smaller developing countries and least developed countries, which often lack the technical capacity, laboratories, certification bodies and administrative systems needed to comply with changing requirements. In some cases, exporters must route goods through third countries just to secure compliance documentation. The agency estimates that least developed countries lose about 10 percent of their exports to G20 markets because of their inability to meet these standards.

The report argues that the issue is not simply one of tariffs or market access, but of regulatory complexity. Non-tariff measures include import licensing rules, quotas and bans, but they also cover technical measures aimed at health, safety and environmental protection. While many such rules serve legitimate public policy goals, they can still create major trade costs through certification, labeling, inspection and information requirements.

For Africa, the implications are significant. UNCTAD says the cost of technical measures in Africa remains high, and the potential benefits of regulatory cooperation are large. In the agri-food and manufacturing sectors, stronger alignment of rules could reduce technical trade costs by 30 to 40 percent. The report says even limited cooperation among African countries, including mutual recognition of standards and better transparency around regulations, could improve South-South trade and make regional integration under the African Continental Free Trade Area more effective.

The update also warns that African exporters are often disadvantaged by weak transparency. Many trade measures are notified to the World Trade Organization too late, incompletely or not at all, making it difficult for firms—especially smaller ones—to understand which rules apply. UNCTAD says better transparency could reduce non-tariff trade costs by about 19 percent.

At the same time, developing countries have become more active in defending their interests in the WTO, while least developed countries remain underrepresented in trade diplomacy. UNCTAD says this “diplomatic silence” limits the ability of poorer countries to challenge restrictive measures or seek clarification on rules that may block their exports.

The report also highlights a broader shift in global trade policy. After years of tariff decline, the world is now seeing more trade intervention, with recent years marked by the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine and new tariff hikes from the United States. Trade negotiations are increasingly focused on regulatory and administrative issues such as standards, conformity assessment, local content rules and import licensing, rather than tariffs alone.

UNCTAD says this makes regulatory cooperation more important than ever. It argues that countries should align domestic rules with international standards, strengthen notification systems and improve access to trade information. For Africa, the report says, these measures could help turn regional trade into a stronger engine of growth at a time when external market access is becoming more complicated.

The publication concludes that while non-tariff measures often pursue legitimate goals, their rising cost burden risks undermining decades of progress in trade liberalization. Without transparency, capacity-building and stronger regulatory cooperation, UNCTAD warns, African exporters will continue to face an uneven playing field in global and regional trade.

Yerevan Dialogue 2026 seeks to turn geopolitical tension into practical cooperation

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Yerevan, Armenia

Armenia’s third Yerevan Dialogue opened this week with an ambitious objective: moving beyond broad geopolitical rhetoric to promote practical cooperation on peace, connectivity, climate, and resilience.

Held on May 5–6 under the theme “Riding Through the Storms,” the forum brought together senior government officials, diplomats, experts, business leaders, civil society representatives, and youth voices in the Armenian capital. Taking place immediately after the European Political Community summit in Yerevan, the event aimed to sustain diplomatic momentum while widening the conversation to include the political, economic, technological, and environmental pressures reshaping the region.

Organized by Armenia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Yerevan Dialogue has increasingly positioned itself as more than a traditional policy conference. Officials describe it as a platform designed to deepen strategic engagement between governments and non-state actors while encouraging practical responses to regional and global challenges. This year’s agenda focused on geopolitical divides, democratic resilience, hybrid threats, economic connectivity, and the green transition — themes that reflect both the uncertainty of the current international environment and Armenia’s expanding foreign-policy ambitions.

French President Emmanuel Macron, speaking alongside Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan at the opening session, described the current period as “Armenia’s moment.” During his state visit, Macron highlighted Armenia’s peace agenda, economic progress, and growing diplomatic visibility. He noted that only a few years ago it would have seemed unlikely for Yerevan to host around 40 heads of state through the European Political Community framework or hold a summit between Armenia and the European Union.

At the center of discussions was the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process, which remains active but fragile. Negotiations continue amid unresolved tensions, competing narratives, and limited trust between the two sides. Armenian officials emphasized that peace cannot be separated from broader questions of regional connectivity and economic integration. In their view, open borders, transit links, and trade corridors should be tied to durable security guarantees rather than treated as isolated technical arrangements.

That argument has gained urgency as the peace process enters another sensitive phase. Although previous diplomatic rounds produced draft understandings and mutual commitments, a final agreement has yet to emerge. Against that backdrop, hosting the dialogue in Yerevan serves both a symbolic and strategic purpose: keeping diplomatic channels open while expanding discussions beyond formal state negotiations. The forum reinforces the idea that sustainable peace depends not only on agreements between governments, but also on wider regional engagement involving business, civil society, and international partners.

The timing of the event further amplified its significance. Coming alongside the European Political Community summit and shortly after the first EU–Armenia summit, the dialogue formed part of an unusually dense period of international diplomacy in Yerevan. Together, these events underscored Armenia’s effort to position itself as a constructive regional actor and a bridge between Europe and the South Caucasus.

That ambition was reflected in the breadth of the 2026 agenda. Alongside peace and security, discussions examined artificial intelligence, climate cooperation, economic disruption, information warfare, and the pressures created by intensifying geopolitical competition. The forum presented Yerevan not only as a venue for diplomacy, but also as a space for developing responses to the interconnected political, technological, and environmental challenges shaping the modern world.

Connectivity emerged as one of the most consequential themes. In the South Caucasus, transport routes and border openings carry implications far beyond economics; they touch directly on sovereignty, security, and regional influence. Armenian officials argued that stronger regional links could create incentives for stability by expanding trade, improving mobility, and increasing people-to-people contact.

At the same time, participants acknowledged that infrastructure and trade alone cannot overcome decades of mistrust. The peace process remains vulnerable to setbacks, and regional politics continue to be shaped by historical grievances and strategic rivalry. The structure of the Yerevan Dialogue itself was intended as part of the response. By bringing together governments, businesses, academics, civil society groups, and younger generations, organizers sought to broaden participation in regional diplomacy and reduce the perception that peacebuilding is confined to closed-door negotiations.

More broadly, the forum reflected Armenia’s growing determination to shape its international narrative proactively. The theme “Riding Through the Storms” acknowledged the instability facing the region while rejecting the idea that the South Caucasus must remain defined solely by conflict. Instead, the dialogue projected an alternative vision centered on cooperation, resilience, and pragmatic diplomacy.

The challenge now is whether those conversations can produce lasting results. International forums often generate visibility and goodwill, but their long-term value depends on whether they influence policy, strengthen trust, and preserve channels of communication during periods of heightened tension.

Still, the third edition of the Yerevan Dialogue signaled Armenia’s intention to keep that conversation alive. In a region where political storms have often overwhelmed compromise, the message from Yerevan was consistent: dialogue remains possible, connectivity matters, and peace is still worth pursuing despite the uncertainties ahead.

Government takes over ERC debt after China restructuring deal

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The Ministry of Finance has announced that it will assume the debt of the Ethiopian Railway Corporation following the conclusion of restructuring talks with Chinese creditors, in a move that signals a new government approach to managing the liabilities of state-owned enterprises.

Finance Minister Ahmed Shide told Parliament that rising domestic and external debt levels remain a concern, but said the government is committed to a sustainable financial model that aligns repayment capacity with national economic growth. He said the railway corporation’s inability to generate enough revenue to service loans tied to the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway and light rail projects had created major financial bottlenecks.

The debt will now be transferred to the Ministry of Finance and formalized in the budget document for the coming fiscal year, according to the minister.

The decision follows reports that Ethiopia Investment Holdings was negotiating with Chinese creditors to convert ERC’s large external liabilities into sovereign debt. The corporation, which is among eight state-owned enterprises under EIH, is currently reported to be carrying losses of 264 billion birr.

Asma Redi, a portfolio manager at EIH, had previously said discussions were focused mainly on debt owed to China. After high-level talks in Beijing led by Ahmed Shide last month, the process reached what officials described as its final stage, moving from temporary payment pauses to a revised long-term repayment plan.

ERC Deputy CEO Getu Gizaw said the corporation is also looking for alternative financing models to reduce dependence on traditional borrowing. While the company continues to pursue external loans, it is also exploring private investment opportunities. In December 2024, ERC signed a memorandum of understanding with Italy’s COIPA Capital OU to strengthen logistics capacity. Getu warned that delays in resolving the debt burden could worsen the situation further.

The Ministry of Finance said the debt transfer is intended to give ERC a clean slate so it can focus on maintaining existing infrastructure and completing ongoing projects. The ministry also disclosed that 463.4 billion birr has been allocated for debt servicing in the 2025/26 fiscal year. Of the 277.3 billion birr planned for the first nine months, 226.8 billion birr, or 81 percent, had already been paid. Overall performance for the year stands at 48.9 percent, partly because negotiations under the G20 Common Framework for Debt Treatment are still ongoing.

Beyond debt restructuring, ERC is also trying to widen its commercial activities. The corporation is advancing a major redevelopment plan for its La Gare headquarters site in central Addis Ababa. The project is expected to include a 35-story headquarters building, a 21-story hotel, 27 residential towers ranging from 25 to 36 floors, and five large shopping malls.

ERC is also seeking to position itself as a multimodal transport operator. To address gaps in infrastructure and human resources, the corporation has submitted technical and financial proposals to form a consortium with private firms including PanAfric Global, Tradepath International, and Awash Cargo Ride in order to obtain a multimodal transport license.