Second, financing mechanisms must be reimagined. Critical minerals projects are capital-intensive and carry high risks. A blended finance model, combining public funding, private investment, and multilateral support from institutions such as the African Development Bank or trilateral partners, can unlock scale
As New Delhi prepares for the India-Africa Forum Summit IV, the agenda must move decisively beyond traditional development cooperation toward shaping the future economic architecture. Few areas demand such urgent and imaginative collaboration as critical minerals. The race for cobalt, lithium, rare earths, and other strategic resources is not simply about trade; it impinges on industrial sovereignty, energy transition, and geopolitical leverage. For India and Africa, this moment offers both a challenge and a shared opportunity to co-create a sustainable, resilient, and equitable supply chain.
Africa sits at the heart of this transformation. With nearly a third of global reserves of key transition minerals, the continent is indispensable to the clean energy revolution. Countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia and Tanzania are already central to global production networks. Yet, Africa’s historical experience with extractive industries has been marked by limited value addition, volatile revenues, and uneven development outcomes.
Today, through frameworks like the African Union’s Africa Mining Vision and the African Continental Free Trade Area, there is a clear determination to change that trajectory toward beneficiation, industrialisation, and regional value chains. India’s ambitions in electric mobility, renewable energy, semiconductors and defence manufacturing depend on secure access to these minerals. Yet India remains import-dependent, on China -led supply chains, which dominate processing and refining. This structural vulnerability has strategic implications.
Without reliable access to inputs, India’s manufacturing growth and energy transition could be constrained. The India-Africa partnership has a positive ambiance. PIO companies are already embedded across African mining ecosystems, particularly in copper, cobalt, tin, and tantalum. The paradox is that their output flows not to India but to China due to the absence of predictable systems such as long-term offtake agreements, competitive financing, and streamlined procurement. In global commodity markets, certainty drives decisions. Where China offers integrated, state-backed ecosystems, India’s engagement is fragmented.
This is where where IAFS-IV could introduce a new template that brings governments and the private sector into a coordinated partnership. First, India must move from a transactional to a systemic approach. This requires building a full-spectrum supply chain strategy: upstream access, midstream processing, and downstream industrial integration. At the upstream level, India needs to anchor long-term partnerships with African producers, not merely through MOUs, but through bankable projects backed by sovereign or quasi-sovereign guarantees. Indian companies operating in Africa should be integrated into a national critical mineral framework, incentivized to align their production with Indian demand. Second, financing mechanisms must be reimagined. Critical minerals projects are capital-intensive and carry high risks. A blended finance model, combining public funding, private investment, and multilateral support from institutions such as the African Development Bank or trilateral partners, can unlock scale. Intellecap and an Indian consulting company have successfully undertaken this for solar projects in Africa, and it may be replicated. Long-term offtake agreements, backed by Indian public sector undertakings or industry consortia, would provide the predictability that African producers seek. They also then attract private equity players. Third, the midstream segment of processing and refining must be a central pillar of cooperation.
Today, the bulk of value addition occurs outside Africa, mainly in China. This is neither globally sustainable nor aligned with African aspirations. India and Africa can jointly invest in processing facilities, utilising partnerships with other G-7 countries. Such a distributed model would allow Africa to capture greater value locally, while enabling India to build its own midstream capabilities. Already, companies like Lohum India are attracting global interest in this segment Here, collaboration with Japan adds a powerful dimension. Japan brings advanced technology, project structuring expertise, and access to capital. Its vision of an Indo-Pacific–Africa economic corridor aligns closely with India’s outreach and Africa’s development priorities. A trilateral India-Africa-Japan framework could create competitive alternatives to existing supply chains, particularly in high-purity processing and battery materials. This was discussed around TICAD9 in Yokohama in August 2025. The Pax Silica also offers such opportunities, which India needs to integrate into its partnership with Africa. Fourth, downstream integration must drive the entire strategy. The goal is not simply to secure raw materials, but to embed them within industrial ecosystems that generate jobs, innovation, and value. India’s “Make in India” initiative and production-linked incentives can serve as anchors for industries such as electric vehicles, battery manufacturing and electronics. African countries, in turn, can develop complementary industries, leveraging AfCFTA to build regional value chains. This creates a virtuous cycle in which secure supply enables industrial growth, which in turn sustains demand. Equally important is sustainability. The future of critical minerals cannot replicate the environmental and social costs of past extractive models. Ethical mining practices, community participation, and environmental safeguards must be integral to any India-Africa partnership. This aligns not only with African priorities but also with global expectations, particularly as supply chains come under increasing scrutiny from regulators and consumers alike. Connectivity and logistics form another critical layer. The Indian Ocean is the natural bridge linking African resources to Asian manufacturing hubs. Initiatives such as India’s SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) and broader Indo-Pacific frameworks can be leveraged to strengthen maritime infrastructure, port connectivity and supply chain resilience. Efficient logistics will be essential to ensure that new supply chains are not only secure but also cost competitive.
Finally, the role of the private sector must be elevated from that of a participant to that of a partner. Governments can set the framework, but execution will depend on the industry. This requires institutional platforms where businesses, financiers, and policymakers can align strategies, share risks, and co-create solutions. Indian-origin entrepreneurs in Africa can serve as vital bridges in this process. IAFS-IV presents a pivotal moment. It can either reaffirm existing patterns of engagement or catalyse a shift toward future-oriented cooperation. The latter demands bold thinking: converting goodwill into structured partnerships, aligning national strategies with continental visions, and bringing together diverse actors into a coherent ecosystem. The global contest for critical minerals will only intensify in the coming decade. For India and Africa, the choice is not whether to participate, but how. By building a sustainable, diversified, and inclusive supply chain, potentially strengthened by partnerships with Japan and the US under Pax Silica. They can not only secure their own economic futures but also reshape the global landscape. In doing so, they would move from the margins of supply chains to their very centre, as co-architects of a more balanced and resilient world order.
Gurjit Singh is a retired ambassador and author
