Tuesday, October 20, 2026
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Djibouti, Tiryaki Agro sign port MoU

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Tiryaki Agro, a Turkish agribusiness and logistics firm, is poised to become a significant international player in the Horn of Africa’s increasingly competitive port and logistics sector. This follows the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Djibouti Ports and Free Zones Authority (DPFZA) to explore the long-term management and operation of Tadjourah Port.

This agreement underscores Djibouti’s ongoing efforts to attract global private investment and solidify its position as a strategic maritime and logistics hub. The port overlooks the Bab el-Mandab Strait, one of the world’s busiest shipping corridors.

Under the MoU, Tiryaki Agro and DPFZA will negotiate a framework that could lead to a long-term concession agreement for Tadjourah Port’s management and operation. Before detailed negotiations and definitive agreements, both parties will conduct technical, commercial, and operational assessments.

According to DPFZA, this partnership is a significant step toward modernizing and expanding Tadjourah Port. It also aims to position Djibouti as a regional hub for trade, logistics, and agricultural supply chains serving the Horn of Africa.

The project includes substantial upgrades to port infrastructure, expansion of logistics and storage facilities, improved handling capacity for agricultural and bulk commodities, and broader investments to enhance regional trade connectivity and economic development.

Officials state that this initiative will not only strengthen Djibouti’s logistics sector but also improve food security and supply chain resilience across the wider Horn of Africa through increased private-sector participation.

The MoU also lays the groundwork for negotiating a long-term concession agreement that would formally grant Tiryaki Agro responsibility for managing and operating the port, pending successful completion of feasibility studies and negotiations.

This project builds upon an earlier partnership between Tiryaki Agro and the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the private-sector investment arm of the World Bank Group.

 The IFC has supported the initiative from its early stages by financing feasibility studies, strategic planning, and stakeholder engagement activities that helped shape the project.

This advisory support aims to unlock Djibouti’s potential as a strategic logistics gateway and encourage sustainable private-sector investment in transport infrastructure and agricultural trade.

“The signing of this Memorandum of Understanding marks an important step forward in our long-term commitment to Djibouti and our vision of contributing to the country’s role as a regional trade and logistics gateway,” said Süleyman Tiryakioğlu, CEO of Tiryaki Agro.

He thanked the Government of Djibouti, DPFZA, and IFC for their collaboration, expressing the company’s eagerness to advance the project’s next stages and strengthen regional trade, food security, and sustainable economic development.

DPFZA affirmed that the initiative aligns with Djibouti’s long-term vision of serving as a strategic logistics bridge connecting Africa, the Middle East, and global markets.

The Turkish company’s involvement comes months after Djibouti revealed that Ethiopia had declined an offer to take a leading role in administering Tadjourah Port.

In April, Capital reported DPFZA Chairman Aboubakar Omar Hadi stating that Addis Ababa preferred negotiating a broader corridor arrangement linked to port access rather than directly participating in the port’s administration.

Speaking to Capital, Hadi emphasized Djibouti’s continued commitment to working with Ethiopia and offering extensive facilities for Ethiopian trade.

“We are working well with the government and offering them all the facilities they need to use our ports. We are very open to Ethiopia,” he said.

Djibouti has proposed equity participation as part of its engagement with Addis Ababa. Since Eritrea’s independence in the early 1990s, Ethiopia has been landlocked, losing its direct access to the Red Sea. This issue continues to shape Ethiopian foreign and economic policy. Critics have long argued that the former Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front failed to secure sovereign or guaranteed maritime access during the negotiations surrounding Eritrea’s independence.

Today, Ethiopia is the world’s most populous landlocked country, making access to seaports a strategic national priority.

Over the past several years, Addis Ababa has intensified efforts to secure reliable maritime access, arguing that the loss of direct sea access represents a historic injustice that must be addressed through peaceful negotiations.

The debate escalated on January 1, 2024, when Ethiopia signed a controversial Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland. This agreement sought access to a port on the Gulf of Aden in exchange for a stake in state-owned enterprises. The deal generated strong diplomatic opposition from Somalia and heightened geopolitical tensions across the Horn of Africa.

Following these developments, Djibouti proposed alternative arrangements involving access through Tadjourah Port. However, Ethiopia’s reported request for a broader corridor arrangement—including possible special transit or administrative rights—appears to have complicated negotiations.

The Tiryaki Agro agreement also reflects growing international competition among foreign investors seeking strategic positions in Horn of Africa ports.

In October 2025, Djibouti awarded a 30-year concession to Red Sea Gateway Terminal International, a subsidiary of Saudi Arabia’s Jeddah-based Red Sea Gateway Terminal (RSGT), to operate port facilities on the Red Sea.

Saudi-backed RSGT has also agreed to participate in the operation and future development of Tadjourah Port, underscoring the increasing interest of Gulf investors in regional maritime infrastructure.

Elsewhere in the region, UAE-based DP World operates Berbera Port in Somaliland under a long-term concession agreement and continues expanding logistics facilities there.

Other international investors have expressed interest in developing and operating ports across Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan, despite ongoing political instability and security challenges, particularly Sudan’s continuing civil war.

The rush by global operators into Horn of Africa ports is driven by the region’s strategic location along one of the world’s busiest maritime trade routes, connecting Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.

Bab el-Mandab serves as the gateway between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, making nearby ports critical nodes in international shipping and energy transportation.

Beyond commercial interests, Djibouti has become one of the world’s most strategically important military locations.

China established its first overseas military base in Djibouti adjacent to the Doraleh Multipurpose Port, where Chinese state-owned China Merchants Group also holds a significant ownership stake.

The United States, France, Japan, Italy, and several other Western countries also maintain military facilities in Djibouti, reflecting the country’s strategic importance for global security and maritime trade.

Ethiopia’s Kagnew song rings out in Gwanghwamun, bridging 75 years of friendship

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A meaningful stage honoring the sacrifice and solidarity of nations that fought in the Korean War was held at Gwanghwamun Square in Seoul, featuring a performance by descendants of Ethiopian Korean War veterans.

On the afternoon of the 22nd, the cultural exchange performance “Courage of That Day, Song of Today” was held at the Garden of Gratitude in Gwanghwamun Square, bringing together the Kagnew Choir, composed of descendants of veterans from Ethiopia’s Kagnew Battalion, and the Seoul Metropolitan Arts Company. The performance was arranged to honor the dedication of Ethiopia’s Kagnew Battalion, which fought for the Republic of Korea during the Korean War, and to carry the ties between the two nations forward through the culture and friendship of future generations.

The event gained added significance by being held at the Garden of Gratitude, which symbolizes the sacrifice of the 22 participating nations and the Republic of Korea. About 300 people attended, including Seoul Mayor Oh Se-hoon, figures from the veterans affairs and cultural and arts communities, and citizens.

The performance opened with a string quintet by the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra, followed by a b-boy performance and the Seoul Metropolitan Choir’s renditions of “Longing for Mount Kumgang” and “Beautiful Country.” The Kagnew Choir performed “Spring in My Hometown” and “Hollo Arirang” in Korean, conveying gratitude for the sacrifice of the veteran generation and a message of peace. At the end of the performance, a flower bouquet presentation and a “Light of Gratitude” ceremony were held together by a children’s press corps and the choir.

The Kagnew Choir is a group composed of descendants of Ethiopian veterans, founded in 2018. This visit to Korea includes veteran Tesfaye Asmamaw (95) and 34 members aged 8 to 16, who have been visiting Korea on a 36-day schedule since June.

Ethiopia was the only African nation to deploy ground forces during the Korean War. The Kagnew Battalion, organized by Emperor Haile Selassie around the Imperial Guard, arrived in Korea in 1951 and was deployed to major battles including the Battle of Jeokgeun Mountain and the Iron Triangle offensive and defensive campaign. A total of 3,518 troops served until the armistice. After the war, the battalion also contributed to postwar reconstruction, including operating the “Bohwawon” childcare facility for war orphans.

Mark (14), a member and descendant of a veteran, said, “I am proud that Korea has not forgotten my grandfather’s sacrifice,” while Blin (15) shared, “I hope the friendship between the two nations continues for a long time.”

Meanwhile, the Garden of Gratitude has been establishing itself as a new historical and cultural landmark since its opening in May. It features 23 stone pillars symbolizing the 22 participating nations and the Republic of Korea, along with “Light of Gratitude 23” and “Freedom Hall,” a media art exhibition space. About 1.34 million people visited during the ten days immediately following its opening.

Seoul Mayor Oh Se-hoon said, “What the Kagnew Battalion defended went beyond the territory of the Republic of Korea to freedom and the future,” adding, “This is a meaningful occasion where the courage of that day carries on into the song of today.”

The Expat Economy

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There is something that makes some of the worlds exciting cities tick. And it is not often talked about. This is the expat economy. The expat economy is like a system that runs on people moving from one place to another. These people are workers, professionals and business owners who live in a place but do not really belong there.

They are in a place where they’re useful but they do not really fit in. From Dubai to Singapore from London to Toronto you can see the expat economy at work. It is a part of what makes the world more connected. It is not just about people moving to a new country. It is about creating an economy that depends on people who are only there for a little while. At the heart of the expat economy is a contradiction. The more important these expats become the less they are allowed to put down roots.

In cities like Dubai expats make up 90 percent of the people living there. They build the roads they work in the hospitals they run the companies and they keep the service economy going. Even though they do all these important things they are not really allowed to stay. Their visa is tied to their job they do not have political rights and they often cannot become citizens. This creates a workforce that’s very good at what it does but it is also very temporary.

The expat economy is very good for the countries that use it. They can bring in workers with the skills they need. They do not have to pay for things like education and healthcare. This means the country can have a flexible workforce without having to spend a lot of money. This system is not very strong. It works well when times are good. It can fall apart when things get tough.

When there is a recession expats often lose their jobs. Leave the country. This can cause problems for the economy. We saw this happen during the crisis in 2008 and the COVID-19 pandemic. The expat economy is like a buffer that helps the country deal with risk. When things get tough the expats are the first to leave. This helps the country keep its employment numbers and social spending under control. There is another problem with the expat economy.

Expats often live in their little worlds. They do not always mix with the people and they might not even learn the local language. This can create a lot of social groups that do not really interact with each other. A British business owner in Dubai an engineer in Singapore and a Filipino nurse in London might all be part of the same economy but they live in different worlds.

The expat economy is also very divided. There are the expats who have a lot of power and freedom. They can move to any city they want. They can negotiate their contracts. Then there are the expats who have to work very hard just to get by. They might have to pay a lot of money to get a job. They might not have many rights.

In between these two groups there are a lot of expats who are just trying to make a living. They are not rich. They are not poor either. They are just trying to get by in a system that’s not always fair. So can an economy that is based on people moving around ever be fair and sustainable?

Some people say that the expat economy is the way for cities to grow and compete. It allows them to bring in the talent they need. It helps them stay ahead of the game. Others say that this system is not fair. It can create a lot of inequality. It can make it hard for people to feel like they belong.

The expat economy is also connected to the rest of the world. Expats send money back to their home countries. They can help their home countries have more power and influence. This can also create problems. If there are changes in the home country it can affect the expats and the countries where they live. So what does the future hold for the expat economy?

Some countries are trying to change the way they do things. They are trying to get local people involved in the workforce and they are creating new visa programs to attract and keep talent. These changes are trying to balance flexibility with stability. The goal is to make the expat economy stronger and more fair.

It is not going to be easy. The expat economy is a part of the world we live in today. It is a system that is based on movement. It is also limited by borders. It creates opportunities. It does not always distribute them fairly. It helps cities grow. It can also make them fragile.

The question is not whether the expat economy will continue. It will. The question is whether it can become more sustainable and more fair. Can it move from a system that is based on using people to a system that is based on including them? Can cities start to see expats as more than workers. Can they see them as people who belong?

The answers to these questions will shape the future of cities around the world and the lives of millions of people who call these cities home. Because in the end the expat economy is not about where people work. It is, about where they belong.

The Iran war exposes the global economy’s fault lines

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Buoyed by AI stocks, global financial markets have largely shrugged off the war with Iran. Yet the conflict’s long-term economic costs are only beginning to emerge, as depleted strategic oil reserves, damaged refining capacity, and rising fuel and fertilizer costs increasingly weigh on lower-income economies.

The on-again, off-again US-Israeli war against Iran has underscored the growing disconnect between financial markets and real economic activity. It has also exposed how differently such shocks play out across the global economy.

Consider oil markets. While they have been extremely volatile since the war began, their fluctuations have largely reflected shifting perceptions and expectations—often shaped by US President Donald Trump’s erratic social media posts—rather than immediate changes in demand and supply.

To be sure, Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz did disrupt global oil supplies. But shipping distances and transport lags meant that the effects were not immediately felt by consumers and producers.

Nevertheless, crude oil and natural-gas prices swung sharply as conflicting official announcements repeatedly shifted market expectations. By early July, following the initial ceasefire agreement between the United States and Iran, crude oil was trading below $70 per barrel—roughly where it stood in February, before the war began. Even the subsequent resumption of hostilities has so far produced only a modest price increase.

Despite the volatility in global energy prices, US stock markets recorded their best-performing quarter since 2020 between April and June and continued to rise in early July. The rally was led by AI stocks, buoyed by the belief that AI will deliver unprecedented gains in productivity and economic growth.

To some extent, this reflects the relatively limited impact of the war on economic activity in rich countries. The International Monetary Fund projects only a modest slowdown in GDP growth in advanced economies in 2026, from 1.9% in 2025 to 1.7%. The US, for its part, is expected to grow by 2.3%, up from 2.1% in 2025. Across OECD economies, the unemployment rate stood at 5% in April, virtually unchanged since February 2022.

Advanced economies’ resilience can be largely attributed to the recent boom in AI and cryptocurrency investments. Several Asian economies—notably China, Taiwan, South Korea, and Malaysia—have also benefited from this trend. Financial markets’ current complacency is further reinforced by the widespread perception that the war with Iran is effectively over, despite both sides’ belligerence, or that it will persist only as a low-intensity conflict that allows at least partial movement through the Strait.

Yet this confidence overlooks the war’s longer-term economic consequences. Despite the ceasefire, oil exports from the Gulf remained well below pre-war levels. And even if exports recover completely, lower-income countries will continue to bear the costs of today’s energy crisis for years to come.

These countries lacked the means to carry out the extraordinary government interventions that limited the energy shock’s impact on advanced economies. Roughly 440 million barrels of crude oil and refined products were released from commercial and strategic reserves between April and June, mostly by the US. But with the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve now below half its capacity and approaching its operational floor of 33%, and with total OECD inventories continuing to decline, there is far less scope for a similar intervention. Although prolonged uncertainty over the Strait is likely to accelerate the diversification of both energy sources and trade routes, those adjustments will require years of investment and new infrastructure.

Global attention has largely focused on crude oil, but modern production also relies heavily on petroleum derivatives. According to the International Energy Agency, Gulf exports of refined petroleum products and liquefied petroleum gas were still less than half their pre-war levels in June, partly because the war destroyed some of the region’s refining capacity.

Among the most economically significant petroleum derivatives are fertilizers, which are crucial for agricultural productivity. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations projects a 15–20% increase in global fertilizer prices in the first half of 2026. As a result, farmers—especially in lower-income countries—must now contend with rising fertilizer prices as well as higher fuel costs for irrigation and transport.

Even modest reductions in fertilizer use can trigger steep declines in crop yields, especially where application rates are already low. But food markets are unlikely to wait for the harvest, as oligopolistic firms typically raise prices in anticipation of tighter supplies, long before physical shortages materialize.

The consequences extend far beyond agriculture. More than 6,000 products rely on fossil-fuel derivatives and processing by-products such as helium, sulfur, methanol, polyethylene, and polypropylene, many of which are supplied by Gulf countries. These inputs are essential for plastics, lubricants, waxes, tars, asphalt, synthetic textiles, and life-saving medical devices like MRI machines and pacemakers. Ironically, the green energy transition also depends on specialized petroleum products used to manufacture, maintain, and operate wind turbines and other renewable-energy infrastructure.

These disruptions will fall disproportionately on lower-income countries, particularly in Asia and Africa, which remain heavily dependent on the Middle East for both imports and exports. Worse still, they come as many emerging and developing economies are still recovering from the damage inflicted by the COVID-19 pandemic, the food and fuel price spikes that followed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the interest-rate hikes that have driven up borrowing costs.

Against this backdrop, the World Bank estimates that the per-capita income gap between advanced and developing economies, excluding China and India, will not return to its pre-pandemic level until after 2028. For many countries in the Global South, the result could be a lost decade; for those already in debt distress, the economic toll could be catastrophic.

This raises a fundamental question: How will an increasingly fragmented global economy reshape geopolitics? Governments around the world have learned that ignoring rising inequality within their own societies fuels political instability. The same lesson applies to the widening economic divide between countries. Financial markets may be able to ignore it for now, but the rest of the world cannot.